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THE ANGUS LECTURESHIP

III.

CHRIST THE TRUTH



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CHRIST THE TRUTH

AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF CHRISTIAN THINKING

EIGHT LECTURES DELIVERED IN 1900
AT REGENT'S PARK COLLEGE
LONDON

BY

REV. WILLIAM MEDLEY, M.A.

OF RAWDON COLLEGE

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PRELIMINARY NOTE.

THE ANGUS LECTURESHIP has its origin in a Fund raised as a Testimonial to the Rev. Joseph Angus, M.A., D.D., as an expression of the sense entertained by the subscribers of his character and services as President of the Baptist Theological College formerly situated at Stepney and now at Regent's Park, London. Dr. Angus having intimated his desire that the Fund should be devoted to the establishment of a permanent Lectureship in connection with the College, a Trust has been constituted for the purpose; 'its income to be administered and applied by the College Committee for the establishment and maintenance of a Lectureship, to be called "The Angus Lectureship," in connection with the said College, for the delivery of periodic Lectures on great questions connected with Systematic, Practical, or Pastoral

Theology, or the Evidences and Study of the Bible, or Christian Missions, or Church History, or kindred subjects.'

It is further provided that the College Committee, in conjunction with the Trustees, shall once in two years, or oftener (should exceptional circumstances render it desirable), 'appoint and engage a Lecturer, who shall ordinarily be a member of the Baptist denomination, but who may occasionally be a member of any other body of Evangelical Christians, to deliver a course of not more than eight Lectures, on some subject of the nature hereinbefore mentioned.'

In accordance with these provisions, the Rev. Dr. Angus delivered, at Regent's Park College, in the year 1896, a Course of Six Lectures on 'Regeneration,' afterwards published.

In 1898 Seven Lectures were given by the Rev. Samuel G. Green, B.A., D.D., on 'The Christian Creed and the Creeds of Christendom' (Macmillan & Co.).

The Third Course, delivered in 1900, is contained in the present volume.

NOTE.—The sentences above marked as quotations are from the Deed of Trust, executed March 1896.

PREFACE.

THE aim and method of the following Inquiry have been so fully explained in the text that any prefatory word is hardly needed. The conscious inadequacy of an attempt to deal with so wide a range of reflective thought has also found expression therein. The writer is at least as deeply sensible of it as any of his readers can be. He still ventures to hope, however, that some significant and pregnant hints and suggestions may be afforded to a certain number whose mental history has borne some analogy with his own. Perhaps it may be permitted to add that the subject discussed, as also the method of treatment, arose in a natural manner out of the writer's vocation as teacher. Called to deal with the principles underlying many branches of a wide educational scheme, it has

always been his happy experience that in all of them his own Christian faith not only found itself congenially at home, but was constantly receiving new accessions of illumination and vitality. Every subject had its own contribution to make to the supreme interest of his life. And the *raison d'être* of the following pages is to be found in the simple endeavour to share in some degree with others of kindred mind the fruits of a secluded life-work of much tranquil happiness. The invitation of the Angus Trust supplied at once an opportunity and an incentive, without which publication would hardly have been thought of. The Lectures are printed as delivered; though in their delivery a good deal of improvised illustration and comment was added, which, of course, could not be reproduced. The substance of the appended notes consists almost entirely of certain matter which had to be omitted from the Lectures, in order to bring their delivery within the compass of the time allotted.

Finally, the writer desires to express his sincere and very grateful obligation to one or two friends whose services have been invaluable in the pre-

paration of the Lectures. Among these he would especially mention with gratitude the Rev. Hubert M. Foston, M.A., who kindly helped to bring the written Lectures into a form suitable for delivery; also the Rev. Professor S. W. Green, M.A., of Regent's Park College, and the Rev. Principal Tymms, D.D., of Rawdon College, who have freely given much valuable time and labour to the revision of the proof-sheets. To all these gentlemen, and to some others whose interest in the work has been a continual incentive and encouragement, the writer has been throughout very greatly indebted.

W. M.

RAWDON COLLEGE,
August, 1900.

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CHRIST, THE TRUTH.

LECTURE I.

THE preceding series of Angus Lectures may perhaps give me a link of connection, which I am glad on personal grounds to recognise, and supply a point of departure for my own Essay.

Let me, then, with an unfeigned sense of my own limitations, with which I shall have to struggle throughout, unfold the subject which I have selected for my own treatment; and especially—for the moment—the motive which has chiefly impelled me, and the end to which I would fain, to the extent of my powers, contribute. And it will somewhat relieve my own sense of deficiency, and give a truer presentment of my exact purpose, if I say here, that I write not for the learned few—*i.e.* not for professed

theologians and metaphysicians—though with no wish to avoid any legitimate criticism ; but more especially for others, a much larger class whom I am more likely to be able to help.

I might perhaps describe them as persons who, while their hold on the Christian Faith is vital and even absolute, are yet very keenly alive on the intellectual side. Their Religion, therefore, is a subject on which their intelligence is continually at work. They are sensitive to the impact of ideas, cultivating openness of mind on all accessible subjects, and reading many books—possibly too many. It is no infrequent experience with such persons to find the intellectual and the spiritual streams of ideas and emotions often tending to become cross-currents, if not even in direct antagonism. There results from this distraction of energy a weakening of the full force of vitality, both intellectual and spiritual ; a certain waste of life, a certain falling short of that true buoyancy which is necessary in order that any life may reach its full measure of power and happiness.

Now, with no absurd pretension to the possession of any perfect remedy for such a state of

things, one may perhaps, without presumption, suggest that it is within the competency of most to endeavour, in a more strenuous and connected manner than they have yet attempted, to get their governing and guiding principles into some sort of order, *i.e.* to organise their thinking. And, indeed, we must all often become acutely aware how much we lose by reason of incoherence among our ideas. What a confused miscellany of thoughts, opinions, and beliefs meets us when we turn our gaze inwards! And what a revelation of confusion is given to the insight of many a listener when one of these is hastily, perhaps violently expressed!

It is so easy to say, 'I think this' or 'I think that': but if the thoughts do not share in the essential unity of the thinker, they come to be stricken with a certain vanity and ineffectiveness.

I am, indeed, far from believing that any such organisation and unification of our thoughts can be perfectly realised. But it may be good for us to contemplate the governing and guiding Ideal, which, if not within our reach, yet rightly claims us, and is for every life, in the degree in which it is approached, a source of strength and of inspiration. Were this Ideal actually realised,

and the organisation completely effected, this would surely be the salvation of the mind. A central conception would so completely hold sway, that every item of thought would fall into its place. Each would furnish its measure of corroboration and illumination to every other. No thought would antagonise or neutralise another. The 'I think' would then stream forth with all the power of full vitality from the centre, instead of being a mere wilful spurt from this point or that of the tossing waters.

My conviction, then, is, that without any pre-requisite of exceptional powers, or of the exceptional knowledge of the specialist, something —nay, much even—may be accomplished in this direction; and, moreover, that for students for the ministry, who are not less in danger than others, it is essential that it be actually attempted.

Some strenuous, continuous, and patient effort is doubtless required: it is no light task to endeavour to bring our several items of opinion and belief into right relation to one another, and ultimately into an ordered harmony. But for those who will consent to be tolerant of dis-

cipline, who are capable of self-restraint, and content to move slowly but consecutively forwards along certain lines of sober, yet aspiring thought, there will not fail a due reward. This, doubtless, will vary according to those finer idiosyncrasies—intellectual, imaginative, spiritual—which for each of us are bound to become the medium of interpretation for all our experience; yet, for all, it may be found that in time the clashing of intellect and spirit has somewhat abated—nay, perhaps, that it is gradually falling into a unison which is one main part of a full harmony—the harmony of a perfected human life. And faith, so far from losing any of its hold of the unseen and eternal as it grows more reasonable, will become for us stronger, simpler, more absolute.

Striking a connection, then, with the last series of Angus Lectures, which dealt historically with the Creeds of Christendom and the Christian Creed, I may state a question now to be taken up and discussed: viz., How much, and how little, may reasonably be expected from a creed, *i.e.* from any formulated statement of things to be believed?

Now, suppose one whose very interpretation of that singular addition to the great commandment, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, *and with all thy mind*,' is, that to love God with all our 'mind' must surely be a divine injunction to think our best. For such an one, perhaps, no readier approach to the subject can be made than by considering that the great, all-important word Faith, round which nearly all religious controversy rages, has two aspects, which have found expression in English in two convenient terms, Belief and Creed.

These, the moment they are pronounced, carry with them, in their very Saxon and Latinised forms, to a sensitive ear, a certain suggestion of difference of quality, which further consideration will only serve to define and accentuate.

This difference between two terms that are so intimately related may fairly be signalised by saying that Creed is Belief intellectualised; and some clear apprehension of this mental operation of intellection will at once illuminate for us the nature of that distinction between them which we all instinctively recognise.

Belief can never be separated from action: its natural expression is its utterance in conduct; its seat, therefore, is in the heart, where the springs of all our intelligent activities lie. There, penetrated with the forces of our emotional life, it derives all its power to affect our behaviour. But this belief can at will be projected from its central seat within the breast, and intellectually regarded and scrutinised as an object of pure thought. This faculty of thought will then subject it to analytic processes, drawing out its separate constituents in sharply enunciated propositional form; thence proceeding to connect the enunciations in logical concatenation. And it will find at last, perhaps, its completed satisfaction in such co-ordination and subordination of the several elements as shall make of them a harmonised system: a logical whole, governed and illuminated by a certain unity of idea, which shall answer to the unity of the intelligence which has been thus so busily at work.

Thus we have Belief, the impulsive spring of conduct, exhibited as an intellectualised product, as a Creed. This, then, may now be described

as *so much* of the substance of the things believed and rested upon by the person of whose voluntary life they are at once the basis and the springs,—*so much* of the contents of this substantial Faith (which itself can never be disjoined from works) as the speculative intellect can detach.

When we once realise this distinction, so commonly described in the language which sets in opposition the head and the heart, then we are on the way to a clear and intelligible explanation of some familiar commonplaces, which yet are of great significance: as, *e.g.*, that when the main force of the spiritual vitality is suffered to expend itself in the speculative, contemplative consideration of the objects of its faith, there is apt to be found an undue subtraction from their effectiveness in practical life. And, again, that a religious man's life is for the most part very imperfectly explained by the clearest statement of his creed—though it be most sincerely and intelligently held—so that, in common parlance, we often say that a man is much better, or alas, much worse than his creed.[1]

[1] See Note 1.

These considerations may well suggest to every intelligent Christian man the still deeper and more comprehensive inquiry: viz., What is the just relation of Belief to that Truth which is its objective? And, more especially, what is the actual and necessary relation of a Creed to these two?—for it is this relation to Belief and to Truth which gives all their meaning to the words and phrases of formulated statements. It may further appear that this last is a question which depends for its answer upon another, simpler, but more fundamental, viz., What is the inevitable, the necessary limitation of Words? Let them be ever so well and fitly chosen, what is the limitation of Words, as an adequate exponent and expression, not now of Thought alone, but of Truth, in its completed sense of Reality: *i.e.* of Reality as related *to us*?

If these two added words seem to express a certain limitation, a little reflection will convince us that it is at all events a natural and even a necessary one. For all that can be legitimately named Reality implies of necessity a tacit, implicit reference to the reality of our own personal existence. Reality may be admitted, of

course, to be, and that to any extent, transcendent; nay, there may be, and I am convinced there is, that contained in the nature of the apprehension of it by ourselves, which amounts to evidence that it is infinite in the scope of its transcendence. But it is not with this that our argument is at present concerned. It is not the measurable or the immeasurable extent of it that now occupies us, but solely the connotation of the word Real; not the *extent*, but the *intent* of the term that we need to define: neither is it at present the qualities we may find ourselves compelled to attribute to it, though these are of supreme interest to us. It is rather the core and nucleus of the thing itself. And no other definition is capable of carrying any clear meaning with it than that which makes our own personal existence the standard we must apply—that personal existence of which we are each of us directly aware. As real as we ourselves are in our personal life, is the utmost we can claim to signify by the term Reality.[2]

I put aside, for the present, the large and

[2] See Note 2.

most significant implications that lie in that added attribute, 'personal,' which may, on further reflection, even compel us to construe in like manner the Transcendent Reality which environs us, and which, in the experience of us all, is ever now and again breaking through into the narrow range of our actual sensible experiences, and in many modes approaching us, and making its appeal. All will confess that when our response to this appeal is most full and clear and vital, then we are conscious of an immediate accession of spiritual vitality. But, for the moment, we are simply considering how the great word Truth, with its constant significance as that upon which we can absolutely rely, may legitimately break the bounds of the logical definition of it as a proposition, complete and unambiguous—a proposition which, like Truth in the largest sense, can be relied upon and acted upon. And there can be no limit assigned to this expansion of signification, until it include *all* and *of every kind* that is approved to us as being of this character—that which, according to the etymology of the word Truth, we can absolutely trust. All, that is to

say, that can be as absolutely believed in, rested upon, as is our own existence as living persons.

One may, even at this early stage of our inquiry, obtain a glimpse of what may later on become a clear vision, viz., that Truth so interpreted must at last find its consummated meaning in that highest form of absolute trust of which our nature is capable, viz., trust in a Person.

However mystical it may sound in scientific ears to hear of 'Truth—as it is—in Jesus,' or that other word, which goes deeper still, of the Master Himself, 'It is I that am the Truth,' it is at least a mysticism into which it is quite possible for a thoughtful man to gain a genuinely rational insight. But our present concern is rather with the more limited question of the competency of language to express this Truth. For it is obvious that any decision as to the value of dogmatic statements, formulated as a Creed, must ultimately depend upon our answer to the wider inquiry, viz., to what extent can spoken and written words be taken as adequately expressive of Reality as above defined?

It will appear in a moment that such ex-

pression is subject to many important conditions, and that when all these are allowed, and the utmost range of expressiveness is conceded, there will still remain a limitless surplusage, which is beyond the utmost power of language, with all its adventitious accompaniments and allies, to deal with. For while it is most freely admitted that there is in speech a marvellous plasticity and power of expression in its endeavour to cope with all that claims of it some kind of utterance; and that when we hear it from the lips of a master the marvel is entrancing: yet, with all this, it can never be conceded that all that approves itself to us as the Really Existent can by any possibility be compressed into clear and unambiguous sentences.

Words are, in the first instance, a direct product of Thought, which, emerging gradually from that sensational experience in which it is embedded, occupies itself in that characteristic twofold process of intellectual activity—the distinguishing of difference, and the recognition of agreement or of likeness—which occupies us to the end.[3] Definitions they are, though far enough

[3] See Note 3.

indeed from being absolute. On the contrary they are endowed with vital attributes which render them amazingly pliant and plastic to the uses of life. Yet in the first instance they must have arisen from a clear distinction noted, then supplemented and amplified by recognition of resemblance as experience enlarged. Themselves products of the life of men, they come at last to obtain an almost independent life of their own, which still continues in vital responsive relation to the larger human life which gave them birth. And this responsive plasticity of spoken words is exhibited and measured by the degree in which they are not reserved or restricted to the narrow sharp-lined intellectual conception, but are immersed in and impregnated with the full current of our rich, complex human life.

In particular, we cannot but note that in the degree in which Feeling is implicated, language instinctively loses its strictly defined meaning, takes up into itself other and quite different elements, contracts associations, absorbs and radiates emotion, becomes rhetorical, rhythmical, musical; while at each stage it loses somewhat

of its sharpness and precision of meaning, but gains a compensating fulness of imaginative and emotional expression.

It is in this way that we come to see how necessarily wide is the interval which separates a Scientific statement of Truth—especially in its severest forms, as, *e.g.*, a mathematical enunciation—from what most certainly has as just a claim to be called a Truth: viz., a Poetic setting forth of Reality. Will anyone say that a Geometrical Axiom better deserves the name of Truth than such a sentence as this from St. John:

'Love is of God'?

Or will it be contended that when Browning sings:

> 'For life, with all it yields of joy or woe
> And hope or fear,
> Is just a chance of the prize of learning love,
> How love might be, hath been indeed, and is.'

this cannot be as absolutely trusted, relied upon in all the conduct of life, as anything that can be scientifically framed? But not even St. John can tell us what Love is. It can never be defined: yet is it beyond question a greater Reality than anything that can.

In the Scientific statement, language keeps close to its source as an intellectual product, and a precise exponent of clear Thought. In Poetic Truth it is driven ever further away from it.[4] In proportion as Reality becomes more and more profound, and widens the scope of its appeal to us, approaching ever nearer to the apprehension of our central personality, in that degree does clear and definite statement, such as our logical intellect ever craves, simply misrepresent what it tries to express; and if Prose be still required of speech, the only alternatives will prove to be either Paradox or Figure, neither of which can claim any place in Scientific statement. If, however, Poetry be allowed, then is the range of expression full and rich indeed, yet again under the inevitable penalty of sacrifice of sharpness of outlined statement.

But let Feeling deepen still, and grow more full and complex: then have not many of us found that Poetry itself has reached for us its limit in the satisfaction it affords to our yearning for expression? Music alone, in its subtle harmonies of contrast, its rising and falling,

[4] See Note 4.

ebbing and flowing of sweet sounds, in some master's Symphony, becomes for us a fitter organ of expression and of communication. While in the supreme crises of Life, when that Transcendent Reality of which I have spoken comes forth and claims us, heart to heart, then is every form of expression a vain thing: sound, whether articulate, rhythmical, musical, avails us nothing. And in the hush of silence we find ourselves wrapped in the closest embrace of Reality.

From this it will appear how reasonable it is, how natural (that is, how consonant with the very nature of things) it is, that in the sphere of Religion the limitations of language should be especially exhibited. For when we consider the necessary conditions that attach to the communication to the soul of man of Divine Truth, which from its very nature implies a reference and appeal to the whole spiritual being of man,[5] it can be but a certain limited portion of its entire substance that can be scientifically formulated in the manner attempted in theological exposition or dogmatic creed.

[5] See Note 5.

There is not intended, in saying this, the slightest depreciation of Dogmatic Theology, or formulated statement of things to be believed. The intellect has its rights in this matter, and they are losers who deny or disparage them. Yet those are greater losers still who would make the measure of their compass the measure also of the meaning and substance of the Religion which approaches us on every side of our nature, and claims us at the centre of our being.

We might admit that at the base of the rich, sensuous fulness of external Nature, pulsing with warm life in infinite variety of manifestation, there may be considered to lie a certain diagrammatic *schema* which falls entirely within the competency of pure science to apprehend and handle. Yet it would be the height of absurdity to suppose that such an interpretation and apprehension exhausted the signification of Nature, or was either the greater or the more certain part of its whole truth for a human spirit. Nay, it is but as the architect's chart of the elevation of some great church or palace: all set down in clear lines, each with its specific measure-

ment, ensuring geometrical proportions among its several parts—all needful to be known, yet all subsidiary to the completed structure, with its utilities, beauties, glories. It was these which originated the impulse to build, and guided the draughtsman's hand. Let anyone set side by side with these bare skeleton outlines the infinite detail of carved and fretted stonework, with all its symbolic meanings, of some noble cathedral, all in softened tone and colouring, solidly based on the broad earth, yet every line aspiring towards heaven, lying there in the transfiguring light of a westering sun : its innumerable detail falling into such a perfect unity and harmony of effect, that organic growth would seem a truer account of its creation than any mechanical process of laying stone to stone. Such a contrast may afford some clue to the amazing width of interval that must separate any bare lines and measurements and formulated statements from the fulness of the contents of whatever makes appeal, not to a part of our nature, but to its entirety. What a vast surplusage of meaning is left over, to find its apprehension otherwhere and otherwise !

And if this be so with things that, while they embody ideas, and from this fact derive their power to move and affect us, yet are themselves material and physical, how must the case stand when attempts are made to present to the soul in dogmatic statement, however carefully conceived and constructed, the actual fulness and richness of what is meant by Religion, when by that word is signified, as the heart and soul of it, the elevation of the finite human spirit to a veritable communion with the infinite Divine Spirit, an actual participation by man in the life of God?

This being so, we may perhaps recognise more fully than we have hitherto done, how deeply natural it is that in all attempted verbal communication of Divine Truth, or Divine Reality, there should be always such especial stress laid upon that other and greater element in Divine Revelation, viz., the unuttered, unarticulated, but communicated Spirit. This co-efficient element is so much the more important and influential factor that it needs to be ever and continuously present, though words must cease

to be spoken. This spiritual, unarticulate element is the life of every statement that is addressed to the moral and spiritual apprehension; for therein lies at once the interpretation of the words, and the impulse to obedience.

When, in what should be a blessed crisis in the history of two lives, a man and a woman, standing at the altar, plight their troth to one another for life, invoking the witness and sanction of God above them, and of those who love them standing round, the utterance of the simple formula is recognised by all as of greatest moment. That simple, pregnant word, 'I will,' must stand out for ever among the myriad utterances of these two, and is a statement which shall have right to approve or condemn through their whole earthly course. Yet—at least when the brief honeymoon has slipped away—what call is there for repeated recital of the solemn, binding words? No. Once will suffice for the words, but the spirit which gives all its meaning and force to the marriage vow must never be interrupted through all the length and vicissitudes of the years they have to live.

So is it throughout, in every case to which the principle applies. The few great sayings that hold in express statement the Truth by which we live can dispense with incessant reiteration, but the unuttered Spirit, which is the life of the words, must for ever and continuously abide.

Nay, will any say that it is a far-fetched or forced analogy if I venture to say that herein we gain some true insight into the reason for the brief sojourn of our Lord upon the earth, and for that strange haste to finish His atoning work and depart, when so much seemed to remain unsaid, undone? For what was the Incarnation but the historical utterance, in time and place and circumstance, of the Eternal Word; which, without the quickening interpreting Spirit, remained comparatively ineffective? Not until the mind of the Master had ceased to be uttered from His lips, and the gracious presence of the Incarnate Word had been withdrawn from the eyes of His disciples, and that other Comforter—the promise of the Father—had descended upon them,—not till then did the word, and the life, and the death of the

Redeemer reveal their significance and power. But, once descended, that Spirit must never return: never withdraw or interrupt the ceaseless operation of His life-giving energy. Else, though the Bible and the Creeds remain, the Church would die out from the earth, and the world become a moral wilderness. The Word became quickly historically mute, but the Spirit must abide, and witness, and inspire, and work even to the end.[6]

There is something very significant and instructive in the conception of the true nature of Christian discipleship implied in the pregnant phrase, 'guidance into the Truth,' which meets us in St. John's gospel. It suggests at once the wide distinction that is found between any such view of Truth as can be obtained of its exterior by one who occupies a position outside of it, and that which this same Truth presents to one who has obtained an entrance, and regards it from within, from its centre. As Hawthorne says in his *Transformation*: 'Christian faith is a grand cathedral, with divinely pictured windows: standing without, you

Jn 16

[6] See Note 6.

see no beauty, nor can possibly imagine any; standing within, each ray of light reveals a harmony of unspeakable splendour.'

Again, doubtless it is but a highly figurative way of speaking if we liken Truth to a *sphere*, which can thus be contemplated from without, or, again, from a point within; and yet, when we have once got rid of the notion that a propositional form is the only strictly proper mode in which Truth exists, and have come to see that from its very nature it can never be so restricted, it may then well appear that no so-called plainer or more accurate exposition of the fact therein conveyed will ever exhibit so truly or so adequately its meaning as this expression of the imaginative intellect. For the Truth here intended is of that moral and spiritual order which requires for its apprehension the *movement* of life: it must be *entered into*.

I ventured on the assertion, at an earlier stage, that in the degree in which the profoundest realities of our life met and claimed us, the best that language could ever do in the way of expression would be either by Paradox, where

the intellect was baffled by the failure of logical consistency, or by Figure, where the imagination escaped altogether the restrictions of formulated statement. And we have now before us what may perhaps illustrate my meaning. A sphere, by virtue of its characteristic nature, is constituted by a centre and polar opposites. These latter, logically considered, should part and fly asunder, as contradictories absolutely mutually repellant; but here they appear as directly opposed, indeed, but still in their very opposition held together as essentially constituent of the spherical unity.

Now, to one who is surveying it from without, these opposing poles can never be viewed together in the harmony of their mutual relation. They seem to antagonise one another. The terms employed to describe them are essentially oppositive, as north to south. Nor can any agility of movement enable one who is surveying the sphere from without to catch, at a given moment, a consentient view of them. Only in succession, each as the oppositive foil of the other, can they be discerned. All which, if thrown into expository statement, means that

it is only as paradoxically expressed that the intellect can handle the relation between them. But let the spectator be admitted to the interior, and take up a position, say, at the centre. Then these polar opposites, with no change of place, lose at once their recalcitrant antagonism, and melt into the satisfying harmony of perfect form.

This surely may furnish some insight into the very obvious fact, that Paradoxical and Figurative expression runs conspicuously through the whole texture of the written Word, and is always most strikingly seen when it is the sublimities, on the one hand of the Divine Revelation, on the other, of that human experience which answers to them, that are being dealt with. Thus, again, it becomes clear that the function of language, when it is sought thereby to give adequate expression to Truth in the profoundest sense of that great word, can only realise its fulfilment as it sets itself free from logical restriction, amplifying its range of expression by large employments of imagery ; and that when the Truth is of a kind that makes direct appeal to our moral and spiritual nature, and demands to

be translated into the activities of life, language must fail altogether until it is supplemented by an informing spirit.

'The words that I speak unto you,' says Christ, 'they are Spirit, and they are Life.'[7]

[7] See Note 7.

LECTURE II.

KEEPING before us, then, this general introduction to the subject we have in hand, may I now be allowed to recapitulate, so far as to formulate distinctly the aim I have in view, the method I desire to follow, and, by implication, the spirit in which the quest should be pursued?

It is not the sceptic or the agnostic whose case I am desirous of considering, but rather that of a sincere and devout believer in Christ, the reality and blessedness of whose faith has been, and is continually certified to him by the great fact that it has at once quickened and satisfied his whole spiritual being.

I will suppose that this assurance has been wrought into the whole texture of his experience of life: an experience, moreover, sufficiently full and varied to constitute him a fairly adequate

type of a developed human life. Faith in the central truths of the Christian religion is unquestionably that by which, in the deepest sense, he lives. Its sufficiency has been exhibited and tested in the gravest and most critical passages of his life-history: his hold of it has been in consequence ever strengthened by its power to nerve, sustain, and comfort him in his encounter with the exigencies of life—its temptations, trials, and sorrows.

But, nevertheless, with all this absoluteness of assurance and conviction, he is at times very conscious that it has occupied too exclusively, if I may say so, a separated sphere, which he is accustomed to refer to as his 'spiritual life.' This it occupies in undisputed sovereignty. It is, moreover, the central sphere of his whole life, the metropolis of his soul's being that is thus occupied. But there are wide outlying provinces of his intellectual and emotional life which have never been brought into any organic relation with it.

Now such a man would acknowledge at once that this sovereignty has paramount rights in every region where his thoughts are busy and his

interest engaged. Yet do many of these lie apart in secular estrangement, if not even in covert hostility. And he has never—to construe the apostolic injunction in its narrower and purely intellectual sense—attempted to bring 'every thought into captivity to Christ'; or if, indeed, he has, it has been by a method which is an outrage upon all thought—viz., forcible suppression and subjection.

Thus has arisen an unwarrantable cleavage in his intellectual life. It has become divided into departments, which, so far at least as this central province of his thought is concerned, have pursued an almost independent course.

If it has ever occurred to him that thought, as a vital product of a unitary being, ought to be itself an organic unity, penetrated and permeated throughout by the life-blood which has its spring in the throbbing centre of his spiritual being, to bring about this organisation of his entire thinking has seemed a desperate, even impossible task.

And the case is worse, because at times he is made plainly conscious that there is much in his mind that clearly has a necessary and important bearing upon the Faith in which his

very life is embarked, but which, in that aspect of it, he has never faced: to say nothing also of much current opinion around him, with which he is familiar, that seems to reflect some suspicion upon the validity of its foundations. For the most part, probably, it has been but in a vague way he has been conscious of these things: the antagonism has never been compelled to take definite shape. Still, the pain of it has been none the less distressing; and it is a poor alleviation of it to find it possible, under the blind, strong instinct of self-preservation, to ignore difficulties, or even by a resolute exercise of will deliberately to thrust from him all consideration of them as being perilous to his peace of mind.

In all this an uneasy feeling is left with him. The essential naturalness of his religion is not realised. There remains a certain oppressive sense of limitation when he thinks of these things, which ought not to be found with one whom the Truth has made free. Unless he keeps well within a certain range of ideas, experiences, and phrases, and restricts his intimate communications to a certain circle of associates who share these with him, he is apt to be ill at ease.

I am not, of course, speaking of those inevitable restrictions which belong to a man's loyalty to his religious convictions, and of which he is made sensible when thrust into the society of those in whom the sense of spiritual realities is conspicuously absent. Limitations of this sort are not oppressive. They are in many cases very full of sadness; but it is not a sadness which reflects any distressing incertitude upon his own convictions, or the mode in which he holds them. On the contrary, in the very sharpness of the contrast may be found, not only a striking exhibition in outline of their true character, but also a confirmation of their reality and trustworthiness.

What I mean, then, is that our representative intelligent Christian man has never carried out the lines of his thought from this central citadel into all those outlying but intimately related regions in which, nevertheless, he is himself frequently found making excursions and explorations. If he enter there, and meet with pleasant associates who are, alike with himself, interested students in various departments of, it may be, scientific, philosophical, ethical, or artistic pursuit,

but who are not alive to the verities and realities of his Christian faith, he is apt to be conscious of deliberately laying aside, for the time, the central interest of his life, as though it had no vital bearing on what was before him. A haunting sense, even, of disloyalty to his faith, nay, to Him in whom its seat is found, may occasionally trouble his enjoyment. While there may sometimes flash into his soul the idea, that if these several subjects which are confessedly claimed by a liberal culture, and are not only sources of a refined enjoyment, but undoubtedly, in a high degree, elevating and educating, could only be in some real way assumed into the supreme reality of his life, the interest they at present possess for him would not simply be eagerly acknowledged, but the subjects themselves would be henceforward transfigured to his thought.

As it is, there is, and there is often sadly felt to be, a certain falling short of that fulness of stature of a man in Christ which it should be his intense and purified ambition to attain. Moreover, it is certain that his influence over others is much circumscribed; and possibly he stands as a stumbling-block in the way of some who are

silently receiving from him their impressions of the reasonableness of the Christian faith.

Now I do not think it can be maintained that this state of things is necessary or inevitable. On the contrary, I venture to assert that, to some extent at least, it is possible for anyone who is really sensible of the defect to escape these oppressive and injurious limitations, and reach at any rate a much larger measure of that freedom with which it is the nature and the glory of the Truth to make a man free.

There can be only one way of obtaining this result; and that is by attempting to gain some real and sufficient insight into the true nature and function of the several branches of his total mental and spiritual activity, and a consequent discovery of the just limits of these hitherto half-explored and half-suspected realms of common human interest and inquiry: some just perception, also, of the kind of powers and methods applicable in each, with some growing sense of their respective place in the total harmonious development of a human life: for this is plainly a hierarchy of powers and endowments held together as a unit in a personal synthesis.

With this outline of the object we propose, and of the method that seems proper to be pursued in such an inquiry as the present, let us begin with what should naturally come first, viz.:

A brief consideration of the nature, conditions, competency, and limits of Logical proof.[1]

This does not imply or require any elaborated treatment. To grasp clearly the one or two principles which govern all its applications will be enough for our purpose. This much every man who is a sincere seeker after Truth, and who is especially desirous of clearing his ideas, and of organising his thought, and of bringing it into just relation with the central interest of his life, is bound to consider. For much is continually meeting him which is cast into logical form, and claims him as being demonstrably true. And unless he is clearly alive to the nature and limits of all that can be accepted as indeed validly proved, there will be much danger of being imposed upon by mere manner and phrase. Besides, it is right to take up this subject first, because it is in the most direct relation to the fundamental laws of thought; and it is with the

[1] See Note 8.

endeavour to co-ordinate our thoughts that we are expressly concerned. Now Logic is defined as being precisely the exact science of these laws.

It is also in explicit relation to what we adopted as our starting-point in this discussion, viz., the meaning and function of creeds. For the whole doctrine of the syllogism is, as its very name imports, concerned essentially with securing consistency of statement, and especially of statement formulated, distinct, and unambiguous. And to express dogmatic positions in this form, and in articulate connection, is the very *raison d'être* of a creed: while the further procedure of elaborating these articles of dogma into a theological system, involving as it does at every step an inferential process, implies throughout a tacit appeal to the canons of logical validity.

And yet, notwithstanding the wide range of application implied in such a definition of Logic as that just given, the moment we take it up, and ask what it can do for us in our search after Truth, its necessary limitations will surely appear disappointing.

For, as Dr. Newman says, 'It can give us no

access to the concrete.' Yet are not we and our world necessarily in the concrete?

While when we inquire after the measure of its contribution to our assurance of certitude in a case where there is in question such a knowledge of Truth as means our spiritual grasp and possession of Reality, its helpfulness seems to dwindle to a minimum.

Putting aside, then, all the accretions which have clustered round the real nucleus of the Science of Logic, and which swell the bulk of most logical text-books, we may say that its whole office and end is to secure a clear consistency among our thoughts—be they true or false—and among the carefully formulated statements of them; so that they may stand validly together without self-contradiction. More especially is Logic concerned with the inferential process; supplying us with rules for our safe passage from thought to thought, from statement to statement; giving us, the while, clear notice that all such thoughts and statements are simple 'data,' not to be questioned by the logician, save as they may chance to be deductions from still prior propositions, which, as

being grounds of deduction, receive the name of 'Premisses.'

The question, then, of Truth or Falsity only enters into the jurisdiction of Logic when raised in relation to validity or invalidity of inference.

So that if one may recur to that useful word 'Consistency,' we may employ it in a threefold connection, and say:

That the whole of Scientific endeavour is to gain and secure *consistency* between our thought and the co-existences and sequences in the world around us, which make up what we commonly name the constitution and course of nature.

And, secondly, in the Ethical sphere the contemplated purpose in practical morals is to secure *consistency* between the voluntary conduct and habits of a human life and that ideal of human nature which claims its obedience and allegiance.

So, thirdly, the *consistency* which Logic prescribes, and wherein all its virtue and cogency reside, is narrowed down to that which obtains between certain data somehow received or arrived at—data expressed in explicit and unambiguous propositions. That is to say, that,

ultimately, everything which claims to be proved by logical process rests upon the unproved.

Sufficiently obvious as this is, it is not infrequently overlooked by those eager reasoners who are giving their exclusive attention to the links in their ratiocinative chain, leaving unregarded the question of those fixed points to which its first premisses must finally be attached.

Entirely dependent as it is on pre-suppositions otherwise obtained, which it has no authority to question, the utmost it can do is, with many warnings as to the pitfalls arising from the ubiquitous ambiguities of language, to guarantee us a valid passage from premisses to conclusion. With regard to what at first seemed its high claim, as Sovereign of our thinking, to aid us in the discovery of Truth, it is revealed as possessing little or no competency. The whole process of demonstration is obviously, so far as absolute truth is concerned, entirely hypothetical : the hypothesis being always this—that the premisses be accepted as true. This is the first thing for our Christian thinker to see clearly, and to keep ever in view, viz., that every conclusion that is urged

upon his acceptance as logically certain is ultimately dependent on what, if certain, cannot logically be proved to be so: that no carrying upwards of the sequent links of our logical chain can ever render us other than entirely dependent on these fixed points, which, if indeed absolutely secure, must have been certified to us in some other way.[2]

Our point, then, is to see quite clearly what this logical process of proof really amounts to, and within what limits its acknowledged cogency is strictly confined; and especially to keep in view the question, what bearing these two considerations have on the Christian man's assurance of the actual validity of that faith in God and in Christ by which, beyond dispute, he lives, and which is finally certified to him by the responsive consent of his whole spiritual nature.

Now, when our inquirer has put aside all that is, for this purpose, purely outlying and irrelevant, or at least is but the development of principles for purposes of special application, and asks: What is the tap-root, so to say, of this many-branched, highly organised product of our

[2] See Note 9.

mental life? Whence springs whatever certainty is to be attributed to conclusions logically deduced? there can be only one answer. The ultimate standard of reference in this strictly intellectual handling of whatever data we may find ourselves furnished with, can only be discovered in the fundamental laws of thought, of which Logic is the professed science. These, of necessity, govern all; and our logicians have formulated them as three, which have been named respectively, the Law of Identity, the Law of Contradiction, the Law of Excluded Middle; though it would seem that not all have distinctly recognised the fact that the second and third laws are simply convenient modes of explicit restatement of the one primary principle—the 'Law of Identity.'

At first it may seem a flagrant specimen of learned trifling to be told that this great law, which is the one source of validity in logical process, means simply that 'Whatever is, is.' And it is not unusual to stop short with this statement, as though nothing further could be stated by way of exposition; and especially of explanation how so trite and empty a truism

could possibly be of the fundamental importance assigned to it. Yet a little reflection will bring out in a moment its real significance, which is plainly this:

Unless the objects of Thought, and the terms in which they are expressed, are absolutely unambiguous, and every time they appear perfectly preserve their identity, all the virtue of logical demonstration simply evaporates, however closely the logical phrasing be adhered to.

This is most certainly and most manifestly the case. And then it will immediately appear that the remaining two Laws, which have often seemed to take equal rank with this primary principle of Self-Identity, are only two other most serviceable ways of enforcing the same condition.

For, as to the second, 'The Law of Contradiction,' which asserts that 'A' cannot both be itself and not itself at one and the same time and place, what is this but to repeat that 'A,' the thing reasoned about, must strictly preserve its self-identity; must therefore be sharply severed from that 'not-A,' with which it stands of necessity in absolute contrast?—

a view of things which may serve to remind us that all our most positive conceptions and ideas can only be made distinct as they are set sharply against the foil of the negative.

And when we take up our third Law, 'The Law of Excluded Middle,' which asserts that everything whatsoever must be either 'A' or 'not-A'; that between contradictory conceptions or propositions space is excluded, and no 'middle' can exist—what is this also, which is justly accounted the support and pivot of all our reasoning, but a third and highly convenient mode of reaffirming the principle of Identity, by stating that by reason of its identity with itself everything must be on one side or the other of a dividing line? Failing fulfilment of this condition, there fails all cogency in logical proof.

Now, this dry statement of abstract principles will prove of permanent practical service to our inquirer, if it leave with him—in addition to the cardinal principle that all logical process is from given data, and is in consequence radically hypothetical—this second principle, that the ratiocinative process in itself is entirely

dependent for its own validity upon the absolute preservation of self-identity—the self-identity of every object of thought, of every term, which enters into the argument.

The simplest way of keeping this clearly before the mind is perhaps by representing it to the eye in the drawing of a sharp dividing line. For the line has no breadth. There can be, colloquially speaking, no hedging. Nothing can take up a position between the two areas severed by the line. And as nothing can be on both sides at once, so on the one side or the other everything must be; for, the one with the other, these two areas include all existence.

Thus, most simply, it may be made clear that logical inference is absolutely conditioned by the requirement that there shall be no lapse of self-identity in the matters handled. And any ambiguity affecting term or proposition, and any deflection from consistency of signification and usage, in the course of an argument, must necessarily invalidate the conclusion arrived at.

Let any subject be handled in which the

sharp line of distinction cannot be drawn, or if drawn, cannot be preserved ; then it is in vain to invoke the aid of logical method.

That the drawing of the line should be so central a postulate in the process will be seen to be entirely natural, if we consider that the very birth-point of the intellectual life is in the first faint shock of surprise which makes us aware of *contrast.* That first experience of differentiation, which marks the earliest dawn of our mental life, is continued to the end. In its simplest or most elaborate operations, the intellect is ever occupied with discriminating things that differ. So entirely characteristic is this, that the words 'keen,' 'acute,' 'penetrating,' 'analytical,' are the terms we most naturally apply to a mind especially distinguished for the vivid exercise of intellectual faculty.

Doubtless such a statement needs as its most necessary complement and correlative the recognition of that further function which follows immediately upon the first to complete and interpret it, thus supplying a conception of the full purpose of that preceding sharp severance of contrasting impressions: viz., the putting

together of those that are like: the recognition of resemblance. Without this it is obvious that nothing in the way of mental possession of knowledge could ever be attained.

So prominent and important, indeed, is this, that the whole constructive effort of the scientific intellect, the whole fabric of Science, is entirely due to the subordination of this primary discriminative function of mind to that second and positive one. This it is which by classifying and generalising is able to put a human mind, notwithstanding its extremely limited powers for acquainting itself with the infinitude of separate phenomena, in such effective possession of the classified uniformities, which, by a figure of speech, are denominated general laws. And thus, by means of it, man has already obtained so marvellous a mastery of the forces of this natural world; while there has been opened up a limitless vista of possibilities beyond.

Perhaps it may usefully sum up for the purposes of our present survey what I have said, to observe:

That every new thought which can be stated as a proposition is, of necessity, either:

(*a*) A putting asunder of what had hitherto been held together, a discriminating between two things which had hitherto been confounded; or, on the other hand:

(*b*) A putting together of what had hitherto been held to be unrelated, unconnected.

While the first is especially the hinge of the strictly logical procedure, the second finds its characteristic scope in scientific construction, and conspicuously also in poetic creations. But over both of these related complementary mental operations there presides, so far as the logic of them is concerned, the governing principle emphasised above, viz. the strict preservation of self-identity—the absolute exclusion of continuity of change or movement. That is, the drawing of the dividing line is the one indispensable condition of validity in all syllogistic reasoning. The slightest violation of this universal condition, no matter how carefully the forms and phrases of demonstration are preserved, will effectually vitiate the reasoning process, and invalidate the conclusion so arrived at.

This is the one great point on which it is necessary for our supposed inquirer to make him-

self thoroughly assured. For the inferences which he is warranted in drawing from it are of vast and far-reaching consequence, and may throw a flood of interpreting light on many commonplace truisms.

As for example, the comparative failure of Logic, its rules and methods, in the practice and conduct of life; the helplessness of its attempted precision compared with the triumphs of practical sagacity and commonsense. It is a fine intuition of the exact truth of the matter which has dictated the saying which is in everybody's mouth, 'How difficult, how impossible is it to draw the line!'

Hence also the comparative barrenness of all controversy and polemical writing. And if we would see the same thing exemplified on a large scale, we may turn to cases where this engrained habit of logical procedure, entering into national character, exhibits itself in the framing of political institutions and constitutional order. How frequently do we find our political writers appeal to this very thing, when they are emphasising the contrast between ourselves as a people and our neighbours across the channel. The

piece-meal legislation, the bungling inconsistencies of our own constitutional methods, our illogical adaptations, corrections, and accretions as one necessity after another has, in the course of events, pressed upon us, and claimed a remedy, are ridiculed, or it may be exalted, in comparison with the logical completeness so characteristic of the efforts yonder in fashioning constitutional schemes.

It is true, in general, that what is called the Logic of Events is flourished over the head of the logical formalist, and that, on the whole, despite the protestations of the dialecticians, a very considerable prejudice against the utility of Logic is found in almost every quarter. And, indeed, though it may be granted that the earlier elementary mathematical discipline is a valuable aid to a serviceable cultivation of the reasoning powers, yet it is very far from the truth that such training carried forward into the higher branches affords any guarantee whatsoever for sound judgment or conclusions, either in the ordinary affairs of life, or in those graver matters which claim us most vitally.

Logic, in fact, seems to promise so much, and that with such pretensions to precision and exacti-

tude, and yet actually to accomplish so little that is of practical utility.

One main reason for all this is made clear to us when we suffer the light of the simple considerations just adduced to fall full upon the facts of the case. For it thence appears that the cogency of all logical handling and ratiocinative process depends upon the fulfilment of conditions, easy to state and imagine, but in the vast majority of cases, and in all the matters of most serious concern, quite impossible strictly to observe.

Where are the actual experiences that can be relied upon to preserve their identity? How can ambiguity be absolutely excluded, whether in objects, or in ideas, or in terms? In what matters can we draw the dividing line upon which Logic depends for its very existence? Where is the realm of things in which movement, flux, continuity of change find no place? And yet let these touch and affect in the slightest degree the objects of our thought, the line is insensibly crossed, and the condition of validity is violated.

Nay, Life itself is essentially continuous. We live in time; and Time, that greatest of mysterious realities, is in ceaseless flux. We make our

convenient logical lines on the clock-face and on the calendar; but Heraclitus was right: *οὐδὲν μένει· πάντα ῥεῖ*—'All things fleet, nothing abides.' We fabricate a fixity and a permanent rest; but nowhere in our universe do we find aught but movement and change. It is not to be wondered at, then, that logical process, with all its emphasis on demonstrative certainty, fails so sadly of conclusiveness, and can only exhibit with any satisfactory completeness its demonstrative power when, in the region of Pure Mathematics, it deals with abstract conceptions, which, it is agreed at the outset, shall admit of no variation, but shall remain absolutely self-identical. Once let Logic, even in this abstract region, pass beyond the sphere of purely intellectual conception, and attempt to deal logically, as in Applied Mathematics or Physics, with continuous movement, such as the accelerating velocity of falling bodies, or even with the generation of a curve by the projection of a line which continuously changes its direction; immediately our calculations fall from completeness, become differential, and our conclusions are but approximations to the truth.

And when we recur to the matters which more immediately concern us, and face once again the dogmatic positions of religious creed, or of systematic theology, we may see in a moment that unless every term employed can be clearly and distinctly defined, and the definition consistently held; and unless the mental conceptions answering to them in the minds of those who assent, consent, and believe, can be similarly guaranteed for their identity; and unless, also, it can be guaranteed that in the course of controversy there shall be no deviation by a hair's-breadth from the signification attached to them at the outset: all that precision, validity, fidelity to the truth of things, which it would seem to be the whole aim of Logic to secure in consecutive thinking and speaking, at once ebbs away.

It is with no desire to disparage, or in any way detract from the real value and authority of logical methods, that this contention is so explicitly urged, but simply with a view to understand with some precision wherein their acknowledged demonstrative power resides, in order that we may assign to the intellect, of whose functional working Logic is the regulative

doctrine, its due place among our spiritual endowments. Let us acknowledge to the uttermost the indispensable service Logic renders to our mental and practical life, and at the same time be on our guard lest we assign to it a function beyond its due limits, and claim from its arbitrament a decisive award in matters where the very conditions prescribed by its essential nature forbid its application.

For, certainly, few things have proved so large and disastrous a co-efficient in the errors, confusions, and misjudgments of mankind as the blundering application of instruments, methods, and tests, each of them of approved and admirable utility regarded in itself, to subject-matter lying beyond their proper range, and under conditions which entirely nullify their acknowledged virtue and potency.[3]

There can be no escape, nor do I seek any escape, from the most stringent application of the canons of logical science where they have right to rule our thought. But we can never afford to forget for a moment that the validity obtained for our reasoning in conformity to them is, from

[3] See Note 10.

the nature of the case, a formal, a hypothetical validity; and that the real validity implied in affirming a conclusion to be actually true, *i.e.* such as can be absolutely trusted in all conduct that proceeds upon it, is entirely dependent upon certain necessary and most difficult conditions being strictly fulfilled.

If the conceptions and thoughts have indeed found perfect expression in the terms and the propositions of which the argument is made up, and if these concepts and judgments are themselves the perfect psychical presentation of the objects and relations they are taken to express; if, further, things and thoughts and terms can be guaranteed to maintain an absolute self-consistency, *i.e.* if that great fundamental law of thought, the ultimate basis of all these logical operations, the 'Law of Identity,' has been really obeyed in the object-world around us, and in the subject-world within us, and in the language which is the medium of our explicit reasoning: if these grave conditions were *de facto* fulfilled, instead of being merely assumed as postulates of logical validity, then, indeed, in the communings of a man with himself, and in his reasonings with his

fellows, this demonstrative method, which on the lips of not a few is apt to arrogate an almost exclusive claim to be the one sure and certain road to certitude, might be trusted for guidance to that Truth, upon which, in its full sense of Reality, our life reposes.

But, as it is, we have found that only in those spheres of inquiry where simple intellectual abstractions are in question, which, being the mind's own creation, can be guaranteed to be uniformly conceived and consistently and fixedly held—all movement, change, continuity of process, *i.e.* the very things which make up the meaning of the whole constitution and course of nature being jealously excluded—only here, in this most narrow field, has the logical intellect its full and adequate satisfaction.

LECTURE III.

We have so far been confined within a very narrow range, and one that, considered in itself, perhaps has but small interest for us. The formal logic of the syllogism seems so exclusively an affair of the Schools that one is apt to regard it as a matter of purely academic interest. But no one who is seriously desirous of organising his thought, and getting his ideas into some degree of order and harmony, can dispense with some survey and scrutiny of its real nature and office, and its necessary limits. He should make at least such a survey and scrutiny as shall enable him to test and appreciate at its true value whatever may be urged upon his acceptance or rejection on the score of demonstrative proof. For in whatever form this may be presented, all its legitimate claim to convince the judg-

ment depends finally on the few simple principles we have been occupied in elucidating.

It is now for us to advance our inquiry another stage, and widen our outlook, while carrying with us so much of our residual results as shall tell upon the main purpose we have in hand.

At the outset of our new departure let these results be briefly summarised.

We have seen that Logic affords us no guarantee for Truth—with which indeed in itself it has no concern—but only for validity of inference; and that, ultimately, every reasoned conclusion will be found to rest upon what has been ascertained in some other way: that the *reasoned*, therefore, in every case must rest upon the *intuitive*, and share its strength or weakness.[1]

Further, that within this important but very restricted range of operation, its cogency is still dependent upon the absolute exclusion of ambiguity. The sharp cleavage of the dividing line must be duly observed, not only in the definition of its terms, but also in the statement and handling of its propositions.

[1] See Note 11.

Hence it followed, that when the argument deals with subjects which from their nature do not admit of this sharp delimitation, because the element of continuous, insensible change enters as a necessary factor into the case; then logical stringency falls helplessly away, and the retention of its forms and phrases is simply a fond and misleading delusion.

It was further noted, that this baffling element of continuity is itself the very heart of that great mystery of Time, which suffers no arrest, though our arbitrary approximations are so essential a utility in our practical life; and that it is in this very mystery of time that our spirits live. Consequently Life itself, with all its objects of interest, its successive phases of experience—Life, the great all-inclusive Reality—is but this very continuity rendered, one may say, into the concrete of circumstance and experience.

Our inquirer, then, may see clearly that logical method is concerned entirely with the endeavour to secure mutual consistency among propositions formally stated, and affords in itself no clue to the consistency of statements with facts. And it is still less competent, if one may say so,

when it deals with that Truth which is the interpretation of the facts. Perceiving this, our inquirer, in his quest after some rational insight into the Spiritual Truths on which his faith has laid hold, and in which he is surely convinced he has found his true life, will be so far prepared to assign to Logic and logical methods their due place—neither more nor less—amid the activities of his mental and spiritual powers. And certainly he will no longer be so surprised that strict Logic, with its formulated discipline, its checks and tests, should prove after all to be of such slight service in that great comprehensive purpose of our existence, viz., the apprehension of the Truth that answers to the whole life; the Reality around us which is the correlative environment of the personal life within us.

In this introduction to our new field of reflective inquiry mention has been made of three terms, each of them of signal importance for our purpose, viz., Fact, Truth, and Reality. They are clearly related to one another, and in a certain ascending scale, so that they have naturally made their appearance in this order.[2] And

[2] See Note 12.

there is also another great term, which it will be expedient for our inquirer to add to the other three before taking them up to examine into their meaning and mutual relation. This term is Law, a word which, at first an emigrant from its native home in political and moral life, has been naturalised, in a different sense, in the new realm of scientific inquiry, until at length (in a construction of it other than that we are about to exhibit) it has been enthroned as king there, and the 'reign of Law' has been everywhere proclaimed.

Now, given one whose supreme interest is not in Science or Philosophy, or in Art, or even in Morals exclusively, but in Human Life as a whole, and who has come to recognise that this life is certainly an ordered hierarchy of powers and endowments, and who has further found, amid all shortcomings and failures, a real satisfaction and inspiration for his whole spiritual nature in his Christian faith: how shall such an one best interpret these ever-recurring terms, Fact, Truth, Law, Reality? What is at once the most natural and the justest way of conceiving of their import?

One may perhaps usefully regard these four cardinal terms in this way:

Fact and Truth and Law are three modes of that greater thing we have named Reality: meaning by this word all that environs us, making such approach and appeal to us as certifies an existence as real as that of which we are immediately conscious in our own personal being. And the perfecting of our personal life demands that we should rightly apprehend, and be put in just relation with every mode and aspect of this environment.[3]

Further, these three terms, Fact, Truth, Law, representing as they do three modes of the Reality that is in contact with us, we may regard as constituting a certain ordered, vitally-related series.

The Facts lying at the base of the series stand for all that is certified to us as barely existing, and that in all grades: the grades being conceived according to the higher or lower *in us* to which the facts appeal. As 'Existence' is itself too abstract a conception, we may construe it thus concretely as *facts*; and, since

[3] See Note 13.

it is not stagnant but in process, as facts and *events*; for the 'being' and the 'becoming,' the εἶναι and the γίγνεσθαι, are both needed, seeing that the whole setting of existence is, as our life is, in Time, which is ever in flux.

We may now go on to the position that Truth is the just *interpretation* of those facts and events to the human spirit, and thus takes altogether higher rank, as entering the spiritual realm. But *it* also exists in hierarchical scale, again in the degree in which it claims us—whether at the surface, or deeply and centrally—whether, on the one hand, as a particular and, so to say, provincial truth; or, on the other, as of universal and imperial import.

Facts *un*interpreted are for the spirit *nil*. Give their meaning, and at once we have a most useful and definite sense for the higher word—Truth.

Lest it should be suspected that in the words 'meaning' and 'interpretation' lurks an ambiguity which disqualifies them for safe and effective use, let me make their signification clear and precise by saying, that by it I intend to denote the relation, the relevance of these facts and events to

the Life of the person, and especially their bearing upon the future of that life.

But having before us this explanation of the connection of Truth with Facts, as being their interpretation, we are compelled to complete the series by the addition of the third term to the other two, viz., Law.

For the bearing of certain facts and events, when exhibited to a being responsible for his voluntary acts, cannot rest with the intellectual and cognitive faculties only, but presses forward in an appeal to the will, the central citadel of the personal life.

Thus it is that we see Truth ascending to a range high above us. It leaves now the *indicative* mood, which is the mood of Science and Philosophy, and assumes the *imperative*, speaking down to us with an authority that reveals itself as absolute. It is no longer an appeal, but now a claim, a claim which we all recognise as Duty.[4]

To state concisely, and in a form capable of universal application, the relation existing between the three terms and the conceptions they repre-

[4] See Note 14.

sent, one may say that every Duty will be found to be the imperative of a Truth, and every Truth the interpretation of Facts; and that all of these have a basis in that Reality of existence which we ourselves share with them.

I venture to affirm that there is no matter within the whole range of human conduct, *i.e.* the voluntary activity of a human creature, where this simple relation of consecution and dependence does not hold good. The most trivial and the most grave lie equally within its scope.

For example, a physician is summoned to the bedside of a sick man. His first business, and everything depends on its accomplishment, is the ascertainment of the *facts* and *events*, *i.e.* the history of the case, the patient's present condition, and, if possible, how he came into it. But this alone is absolutely and entirely *nil*, as are all facts everywhere that have not been interpreted. This *interpretation*, then, is the next point, vital as the preceding. But yet if the case were stopped at this point, and clear Truth had succeeded to clear Fact, but nothing further were done, all would still be nugatory. The third step must follow, else all that went before

it is null and void. The *imperative* succeeds the indicative. To skilled interpretation authority is added, and prescription, regimen, now claims obedience. The bare facts have become truths; the truths have clothed themselves with authority, and appear as laws; while the end in view, contemplated by both the interpretation of the symptoms and the orders consequently given, is the future life and health of the patient.

Surely it is in perfect analogy with this simple, familiar instance, that, when we turn to a greater subject, we find in the right reading and interpretation of the whole facts of human nature the one necessary foundation for all that can claim to be an Ethical System, with its detailed scheme of duties.

How natural, too, that in our New Testament we should find the same threefold division simply and clearly marked in the history, the doctrine, the precept which compose it. What are these but our three terms—Fact, Truth, and Law—appearing in newness of life, as they have passed from the merely ethical sphere of things into that highest region of the spirit's life, where it is lifted into that supreme fellowship with the

infinite God which gives us the deepest meaning of Religion.[5]

Now if, as may appear from these illustrations, Truth be of many grades, according to the depth and width of its appeal to our personal life, we may well expect to find a corresponding gradation in the adequacy of language to utter it. And we may now see this clearly manifest as we leave the narrow Logical area, where all is sharply defined, clear-cut, precise, and pass forwards into the Scientific. Here, too, every effort is made to preserve clearness and accuracy of statement. The moment, however, we part from the sphere of absolutely definite intellectual conception, with its rigidly defined terms, which are at once the creation and the possession of the logical intellect, and enter the world of physical realities, and especially of organic life, then, despite the stringency which science must always endeavour to impose upon its conception and language, there comes over its terms and statements a certain indefiniteness, which would never have been tolerated in dealing with the logical and mathematical abstractions we have just quitted.

[5] See Note 15.

Natural objects do not submit to be defined as we can define a triangle or a circle. They are not the creation and property of the logical intellect, and they submit themselves only very imperfectly to its methods. Their attributes are many, perhaps innumerable, and the most advanced science is often uncertain how far it has been able to obey in regard to them its own professed canon of scientific classification, viz. to take account of all the distinguishing characters, and of these in their due order and subordination as constituent of the true nature of the objects to be classified.

Yet it is clear that any omission of these, or any displacement in the order of their relative importance, must be fatal to the science of them. There is always more to be known about them. What had seemed at the outset to be primary, is often, with advancing knowledge, discerned to be but secondary, and derivative. Definition falls off into description. Terms lose their sharpness of outline, and have fringes that shade off into the obscure and the unknown.

A very instructive illustration of this is found in the controversy with respect to Scientific

Classification, whether it should be by Type or by Definition; and the origin of the controversy is perhaps more instructive still.

It would seem to have come about in this way. The early scientific mind was already in full possession of its logical apparatus. Its methods of classification had necessarily been by the sharply dividing line, which had given birth to such terms as definition, precision, and the rest. These had naturally arisen in that sphere of mental operations wherein this mode of discrimination was not only necessary, but quite possible. It was inevitable, then, that when the methods of Induction opened up to the scientific investigator the whole realm of physical existence, and of organic life, the old ideal of rational procedure should be carried into the new sphere, and the endeavour made to apply it with the old strictness.

For this problem of Classification is the first thing that meets and claims the inquirer. It is prescribed by the exigencies of the case. The boundless multiplicity, variety, and complexity of the phenomena summed up in the great comprehensive word Nature, could in no other

way be subdued to the mastery of mind than by being thrown into groups of objects held to resemble one another. Classification was necessarily the first step. And the logical intellect claimed that the classes, in all their ranks and orders, should be sharply defined. Else the mind feels itself baffled, and suffers the pain proper to the baffled intellect, the unrest connected with outstanding objects of thought, and with confused outline.

The process, then, of Definition, with the precise conception the term imported, was carried into the bewildering multiplicity of particulars that make up the world around us. Upon these the proper function of the intellect in severing the unlike, and putting together the like, was now being keenly exercised: and of course with a fair measure of success. It was the only way that could have been followed: and in all subsequent compromises it remains still of necessity the ground-method of every strictly intellectual operation.

But Science rapidly advanced, ever enlarging the range of its investigations, and perfecting and elaborating its instruments of observation

and experiment. And with this there grew an ever-deepening sense of the necessity for accuracy throughout its whole process. Then it became increasingly felt that there was resulting an ever-enlarging discrepancy between its formulated definitions, and the actual facts as they existed in nature. Classes which could be kept fairly distinct when comparatively little was known, betrayed a tendency to run into one another; the intervals between the groups became rapidly filled up with stragglers. These were sought, and with some success in many cases, to be confined in intermediate classes of their own, by a further attempt at exact differentiation. But ere long it became evident that all such treatment could only be a temporary expedient. The difficulty of the case was only alleviated, not solved and satisfied.

Now to draw sharp lines for our own intellectual satisfaction, when they do not actually exist in the fields, and woods, and seas, must be a stultification of our scientific aspirations not to be endured. And Dr. Whewell boldly takes to task the older school of classifiers by sharp-lined definition, and tells them plainly

they are on the wrong tack. They are foolishly endeavouring, he says, to impose on Natural Science, which deals so largely with ever-changing, evolving organisms, the methods that were proper to Mathematical conceptions, among which these disturbing processes had no place. In fact, what we have already seen to be the one great adversary of logical procedure—viz. a sliding, continuous change of identity—was ever forcing itself to the front. And Dr. Whewell's counsel was to give up the vain endeavour to apply an impossible method: to cease to classify by definition, which should sharply draw the bounding line severing the A's from the not-A's: and, instead, be content with fixing upon a typical and representative A, and ranging the others round it in the order of their resemblance.

Doubtless the suggested method had much to recommend it. It certainly was nearer to the facts, and to that extent was, as certainly, more scientific. And, moreover, it had the great advantage and merit that by this partial withdrawal of attention from the inclusion and exclusion involved in mere definition, it naturally laid more stress upon that obvious and important

difference of degree in which members of the same class share in the attributes common to them all.[6]

Reverting to the direct line of our present inquiry, and considering expressly from the point of view of a Christian believer the precise nature and limits of Scientific investigation, let us in the first place, endeavour to put this in its just relation to that narrower range of intellectual operation which we first examined, viz. : the Logical.

Logic, then, found its clearest and simplest definition as the Science of the Laws of Thought. It is the regulative doctrine of what we may term the Logical Intellect. It appeared that this exact science reaches its culmination in formulating for convenient application certain rules, which, if observed, secure for us a valid inference from given premisses. And especial attention was bestowed upon the conditions which need to be strictly observed in order to obtain, not a mere semblance of demonstrative cogency, but its reality. It became plain that the one master-vice of logical process was ambiguity ; and the absolute elimination of this

[6] See Note 16.

was represented by the drawing of a sharp dividing line, on one side of which every object of thought must lie.

We were left then with the inquiry, How shall we obtain the premisses, which Logic does not allow us to question? How can we be assured that these 'data' are themselves true, *i.e.* consonant with the actual facts? For the futility of reasoning correctly from unverified statements is at once sufficiently manifest.

The answer is that they must either be certified to us as self-evident, axiomatic; or they must be guaranteed to us by some process of Scientific Induction. And it is to the necessary postulates and conditions that underlie this latter process that we have now to direct our attention.

It is the *same* mind, we must remember, acting according to the *same* laws that came before us in that first contracted sphere of their operation, where the utmost to be attained was mere mutual consistency of thought and statements, without regard to the question whether these were true or not. But now there opens up a new and vast region for this same mind

to face, with a view to understand it. The cognitive mastery of Nature is now the goal before us.

But this great word Nature summarises for us an infinitude of particulars, both of objects, and of uniformities of behaviour which are called laws. And these exist in baffling complexity.[7] At first sight, one might well ask, What reasonable prospect is there for the human mind of ever gaining any mastery over this complex infinitude of particulars? One thing is very clear, and it needs to keep a distinct place in our thoughts. We can have no adequate knowledge of these particulars in their *particularity* of existence and qualities: a matter of immense consequence when we pass from the purely scientific to the ethical sphere of things.

We can, however, and from the nature of our intellectual faculty we must generalise, *i.e.* we are bound to put like things and like impressions together. This is as instinctive a process as that other wherein the birth of mind begins—the dividing of things that differ. In this two-fold operation all men everywhere are every day and all day long engaged.[8]

[7] See Note 17. [8] See Note 18.

But this power which the intellect thus puts forth in its great enterprise of subjugating Nature to itself is clearly dependent on, or at least implies, two certain conditions, one in its own constitution, the other in Nature itself. For, on the one hand, the discriminating and assimilating intellect has place in a Personal life; which personal life is the life of a unitary being, summing up in itself a strange multiplicity in unity. On the other, corresponding to the Unity which is characteristic of his own personal life, the scientific man finds in Nature around him, with all its multiplicity of phenomena, a Cosmic Unity.

And that which supplies the motive-spring for the exercise of the two-fold function of the intellect upon the material of Nature may be described, with reference to these two conditions in personal life and in Nature, as being the conviction, that as in personal life all its multiplicity of interests, functions, faculties, endowments, is held together in a unity, so in external Nature, all things in a certain sense belong to one another. In brief: there is nothing that is not an integral part of a larger whole. This is

the faith on which all intelligent human effort reposes: that faith of science which is at last clearly exhibited and sealed in that wonderful word Universe, applied to the whole of this bewildering multitude—nay, infinitude of things.

Nature is a Cosmos—a Cosmos *without*, answering to the Cosmos *within* the mind. Until that idea and term were born into the world of thought, science was impossible. A Beautiful Order: that is the conception which underlies and gives birth to Science and to Art. The one emphasises the aspect towards our aesthetic feeling; the other that towards cognitive thought: the one the Beauty, the other the Order, of this two-sided term. It is, however, with this latter, the Order, that we are for the moment exclusively concerned.

And now comes into view the postulate which finds expression in that so-called Law of Uniformity which supports the whole fabric of scientific construction:—As there is a Unity in Nature, so there is a Uniformity which can be relied upon in all the operations of Nature. Nothing can well be clearer than that all scientific endeavour and conclusion, all that is asserted

so confidently as to the reign of natural law, has and can have no other foundation than such accessible experience as mankind has had of this Uniformity of behaviour in the objects and forces of Nature. But, for my own part, I cannot think that it is a conclusion that can claim to be so firmly based as is the wider and more general conviction that the universe is a Cosmos: which, though it doubtless implies an eternal harmony of existence, does not necessarily imply an absolute stereotyping of mechanical or chemical arrangements.

We must never forget that in the great word 'Law,' 'Law of Nature,' that dominates the whole scientific realm, there lurks an ambiguity which frequently misleads, though recognised at once when the term is examined. How often is it referred to as though the law itself were a positive Causal Power, to which when any phenomenon is assigned as an effect, it is assumed to be completely explained! Yet in the scientific usage of the term—different (it may be observed in passing) from that which we have adopted in the distinction of Fact and Truth and Law—it can only mean a certain Uni-

formity of existence or behaviour, which carries with it no explanatory force. Nothing can be clearer than that to refer a mysterious fact to a larger group of the same facts is no explanation, properly speaking, nor any abatement at all of the mystery of their existence; whatever may be the practical use of such reference, or its effectiveness in the assuaging of that intellectual unrest which arises when an outstanding item has not been assigned its place in the endless procession of causal sequences.

And if, as so frequently happens, a so-called 'Law' is itself explained by reference to a wider generalisation that is discovered to include it, however much is justly reckoned as gained thereby, in such widening of the scientific grasp of the facts of Nature, there is no approach at all to any dispersion of that central mystery of Being which our inquirer has, in all probability, long ago come to recognise as a necessary part of his spiritual environment.

But beyond this very evident negative position, that scientific explanations of every kind necessarily *run short*, and leave us still in the presence of the unexplained, there comes to light a positive

consideration, which to our Christian thinker, is of still greater interest. The former conclusion, exhibiting, as it does, the Mystery of Nature, is itself no slight corroboration to the faith of a man who has come to feel that the unknown—the inscrutable—is an element which can never be dispensed with in the development and perfecting of the life of a human spirit: an element hardly less essential than the clearest and fullest light. Yet some of this very illumination is now shed upon the scene when it is perceived that the outlying order and harmony on which all scientific process is based—that the postulate that Nature is a Cosmos, and because it is so can be investigated and its detailed order discovered and formulated—must of necessity imply that there is a Mind expressing itself in Nature which is akin to the mind of the investigator. This very investigation is, indeed, nothing else than the tracking, point by point, by the thinking mind of the man of science, of the universal Thought which is embodied in the world that he is studying, and has given to it its order and beauty. What is every scientific discovery, when we penetrate to

its centre, but the vital contact of two minds: the individual mind and the Universal Mind?

Surely this is what lies at the heart of the sense of joy—it may be of rapture, even—which arises when some signal discovery is made. Will any aver that it is all accounted for by the personal elation of the discoverer in competition with rival investigators; or even by the more generous pride of one who feels that his discovery is full of rich promise for the good of mankind? Neither of these goes to the true pure spring and motive of scientific research, and neither touches the final goal of satisfied attainment.

Apart from any interfering or additional motive, this one pure spring is the eager curiosity that seeks to know. But even here the personal relation, the instinct for the personal life to come into communion with Persons, will be found seeking its full satisfaction. And this keen life of the scientific explorer does not escape its influence, however abstract terms may seem to veil it from his eyes. To one, at any rate, who has found in fellowship the one satisfying interpretation of life, most clearly

exhibited in those hours of conscious, personal communion in which we are most fully aware that life is being raised to its highest power, it will not seem whimsical, but most rational to say, that the truest interpretation of the pure joy of the moment of Discovery is that there is, then and there, a leap from Mind to Mind. And to one who has recognised that the elevation of the human spirit to communion and fellowship with the Divine is the very interpretation and equivalent of the spiritual life of the soul, the perception that *here*, at the very heart of positive science, is found fellowship of mind with mind, will inspire a new conviction of the sacredness of science. And if he be himself personally engaged in any branch of scientific inquiry, every motive to that absolute loyalty to facts and their true interpretation which constitutes the consecration of the scientific spirit, will at once receive a new and signal impulse and inspiration.

And now let me close this section of our inquiry by indicating, in a sentence or two, certain obvious limits within which all that can be called truly scientific must necessarily be confined.

We have already endeavoured to make clear

that no scientific explanations can ever be in themselves any abatement of the ultimate mysteries of existence. But let us add to this general, and somewhat negative statement, a further important specification of limitation, viz. that it is almost entirely with the deciphering of the order of Sequence, of Causal Sequence, that science is concerned. Taking up the useful phrase we are all familiar with—'the Constitution and Course of Nature'—it is the 'Course,' the order of Sequence, the method of procedure which the phenomena uniformly follow, that mainly occupies the investigator. But in saying this, there is implied a definite exclusion of certain other great questions about Nature, which are for our inquirer altogether superior in interest and importance—the questions, indeed, with which his Religion is supremely concerned, viz. these three:—

1. The Origin of this marvellous procession of facts and events;
2. The End, the final goal towards which it is making; and
3. The Force which in its energising activity is the moving impulse of it all.

These three points confessedly lie beyond the scope of scientific investigation, and yet they are precisely those which, to a soul deeply conscious of intimate relations with the transcendent Reality which environs him, are of all the most important.

Science cannot deal with Origins; at least scientifically it cannot, whatever flights particular scientists have been tempted to make into that region. Till the order has begun, and continued, and there are scientific men to study it, science is non-existent.

And the Final outcome of it all, towards which all is tending, this too lies far out of sight, with this qualification, indeed, which may fairly be admitted—viz. that the careful, protracted study of the process, of the course already travelled, may certainly be said to point forwards in one direction rather than another.

While, thirdly, the nature of the one Cosmic Force, in which now for long the many so-called separate natural forces have found their correlation and unification, this is on every hand confessed to be altogether inscrutable to scientific research. And it is of almost pathetic

interest to note how some among those who scout our Christian verities, but who still are profoundly alive to those necessities of our nature which impel us to bow down and close our eyes if we cannot worship, actually welcome this very inscrutableness, this darkness of nescience, as the only legitimate opportunity for satisfying that religious side of our nature which refuses to be ignored.

Thus, then, it appears that these very things which are essential to the foundations of our religious faith, viz. that God is the Origin and Power and End of all that exists and is in process around us—that '*of* Him, and *through* Him, and *to* Him are all things'—these things are precisely the things in which Science has no competency.

While, on the other hand, Science with all its marvellous illumination of the order of Nature, in a soul whose deepest life is the life of Faith in a Personal God, takes its place, and is eagerly and enthusiastically welcomed as simply marvellous light upon His Ways in physical nature; as a much-needed correction of the earlier crude conceptions of them, yet leaving the spiritual vitality of those conceptions altogether unimpaired. It is

simply so much light upon the way in which the Creator upholds and carries forward the constitution and course of Nature.[9]

'When I was a child . . . I understood as a child, I thought as a child.' Once, for my own part, believing that God created the world and all that is in it, I had my own childish imaginings of method and process: the fashioning of the clay, the inbreathing of the life. In this crude form Faith in the Creator received its first embodiment. I have never experienced any reluctance to admit all that Science, when sufficiently attested, has further disclosed as to the actual process of Nature. But the Faith by which I lived has received no shock. It was, and is, only clothed now in a more noble and beautiful form. My child's faith is with me still. Simpler, more deeply grounded, more absolute indeed than was possible in childhood. All that has happened is a rectification of my childish thought: no detraction from the simplicity of my child's Faith; only a glorious addition to it, a reinvestiture of it, by every new disclosure of the exceeding wonderfulness of the order and beauty of the Ways of God.

[9] See Note 19.

LECTURE IV.

IT is for our special purpose very essential that we should recognise and keep steadily in view the natural relationship of sequence and dependence that obtains between the several spheres of intellectual operations: for it is with this very thing, as ministrant to the organisation and harmony of our Christian thought, that we are directly and explicitly concerned.

Too commonly, the several ranges of mental activity are taken up and studied almost as though they were separate kingdoms, autonomous and severally independent, instead of being regarded as of necessity but provinces of one empire, which claims suzerainty over them all. For they are held together in a unity, corresponding to the unity of the mind of the thinker, whose effort in each of them is virtually one

and the same, viz. to reduce them to such an order as shall give him a cognitive mastery over the detail of their contents. This it was, as we have seen, that made the term Universe, interpreted as a Cosmos, a beautiful order, so significant a word. It is this steadfast faith in an ordered unity which underlies and supplies the impulse to all intellectual effort after apprehension of the world which environs us.[1] We find ourselves compelled, by the mere exigencies of thought, to pass beyond the borders of the realm of scientific activity, and enter that wider sphere of intellectual operation which manifestly includes it, commonly named the Philosophical.[2] The instinctive faith, which at once supports and impels this movement, is that everything that can be known is but part of some other thing greater than itself. Thus the mind moves ever forwards and upwards to find its rest, if possible, in that which includes All. It is the same mind that was at work in scientific investigation: and it works according to the same laws, and from the same motive, and is making for the same goal: viz. the satisfaction

[1] See Note 20. [2] See Note 21.

of the instinctive craving of the intellect for rest in a unity of idea which shall organise all its cognitive possessions.

This pursuit is as natural an occupation for a human mind that has been quickened to alert activity—singular as it may sound to say so—as any of its most elementary proceedings: and it is of great importance for our purpose to keep clearly before us this conception of the natural interrelation and interdependence of the several ranges of our mental activity.[3]

In endeavouring to throw into some more precise and definite form this *prima facie* vindication of the essential *raison d'être* of Philosophy, it will be well to recall the residual conclusions left with us from our consideration of the nature and scope of scientific investigation.

Of these conclusions, very needful for our inquirer to keep before him, two were concerned with the necessary limitations of scientific inquiry, and to that extent were merely negative conclusions; while a third left us with a positive contribution to our discussion, and one of very peculiar interest.

[3] See Note 22.

In the first place, it has, I hope, come to be clearly perceived and acknowledged that it is no derogation from either the utility or the dignity of science to say that all its explanations, from the very nature of the case, are explanations that run short. Their functional utility is enormous. But they carry us only a little way towards any final answer to that questioning spirit which gave birth to science. Every one of them leads up into the unexplained, and, so far as science is concerned, the inexplicable. There is no abatement or mitigation of the ultimate mystery of the scheme of things which environs us, and of which we are ourselves a part. Science can never of itself afford completed satisfaction to the inquisitive mind that is the most keen and successful in its pursuit.

The aim of science is indeed a great and lofty one; and if the questioning spirit, the cognitive mind, were the whole of us, or even ranked as the highest of our nature's endowments, the case would be different. But our representative inquirer is, at any rate, aware, by virtue of his deepest religious experiences (which after all do but carry forwards and

upwards experiences common to every human life), that there is much within him which claims quite other satisfaction than any that even a perfected science can give. It is a perfected Life that he is in search of: and nothing can well be plainer than that of the total area covered by such a life, scientific explanations, with all their verifications and practical applications, occupy a very limited space. No man can have lived to much purpose who has failed to perceive that it is as truly and deeply a natural impulse to close his eyes and bow down, as it is to open them wide, stand up, and observe and experiment; *i.e.* that for the perfected opportunity of a human life the gathering shadows of eventide are as necessary as the dawn; the darkness as the light.[4]

It was further explicitly stated that, in regard to the origin of this marvellous procession of phenomena which we sum up as Nature: in regard also to the essential character of the Cosmic force which is carrying it forwards and whose uniform method science is occupied in deciphering and construing in detail: and in

[4] See Note 23.

regard, finally, to the ultimate issue and goal of all—in regard to these three—science has no competency whatsoever. Yet these are the three questions which, to our Christian thinker, who confessedly lives by his faith in God, are the points of supreme interest. If, indeed, science can make any contribution to them at all, it can only be with respect to the last of the three, in so far as the study of method, with which it is exclusively occupied, may reveal, as it appears to reveal, a movement which is not simply forwards, but upwards, *i.e.* to higher, intrinsically worthier, types and modes of life.

Finally, and as a result of our consideration that is not simply of the nature of negative limitation, but may rank as a positive conclusion, we reach a conviction that the only rational account of the Cosmos, that Order of nature which alone makes science possible, is that there is everywhere diffused throughout Nature mind and will, intelligence and power; and these akin to those which are found in the scientific investigator himself. This kinship we take to be the real postulate in all scientific endeavour and discovery.

It was further urged, at least as the writer's

conviction, that the pure gladness, the rapture of the discoverer's εὕρηκα, when purged of all that is merely utilitarian or self-regarding, springs from that very leap of the mind individual into the bosom of mind universal. It is but an illustration and example, appearing in an unexpected place, of that very spiritual contact and communion which, in the range of our emotional activities, is, by common consent, accounted the purest and deepest spring of a glad vitality.

But now let us note that the very same impulse which urged forwards the scientific inquirer on his career of triumph could not meet with final arrest at the further boundary of scientific inquiry. His work is pursued in faith, as all intelligent work is done—faith in the existence of an order in the world around him which answers to that which he finds in his own mind. This faith it is which quickens to expectancy and hope the instinct and impulse which ever seeks to subdue the multiplicity and complexity of Nature to the ordered unity of his own intelligence.

But within the sphere assigned to the investiga-

tions of Science it is the Order rather than the Unity which dominates the intellectual effort. The conviction of the Unity lies indeed in the background ; implied, doubtless, but not explicitly present. To construe the Order of Nature into the detailed uniformities of which it is made up is the prominent object and purpose of scientific generalisation. Still, the same impulse was bound to urge the intellect to a further quest of a unity which should hold together these scientific generalities. For the man is one: a unitary being. Knowledge loses its adequate interpretation, and the cognitive intellect its adequate satisfaction, unless, in the totality of things, there is apprehended a prevailing unity which answers to itself. Then it is, when this wonderful and beautiful Cosmos reveals itself under another name, familiar enough, but profoundly significant—that of Universe—and this aspect becomes the prominent one, that the Scientific reaches forward to the Philosophical.

It is just here that, without spending any time on the consideration of the innumerable attempts to define or describe, or even to illustrate, the meaning of the great word Philosophy, our

inquirer, approaching it from the side of science, may obtain possession of an idea which will sufficiently illuminate the whole range of philosophical speculation.

It may be simply given in saying that it is always the endeavour of the intellect to discover an underlying Unity in the plurality of things and thoughts. The area of the philosophical must be no fragment, no mere province of these, but the whole of them. There are sciences innumerable, but, strictly speaking, there is and can be only one Philosophy, however many and various be the possible theories which attempt its interpretation. For Philosophy, regarded as the area of our speculative activity, has properly no limits ;[5] it extends to the boundaries of all existence and of all thought. It is ever substantially the effort to interpret the totality of things by the unity of an idea.

This sounds, doubtless, a repellent abstraction ; yet, if we will be patient, it will not fail gradually to disclose its illuminating quality. Even in colloquial usage, a practical man's so-called philosophy of life means always, with all its

[5] Compare Lecture V.

looseness of expression, the ruling conception which governs his thinking, judgment, and conduct in the whole scope of his living. Again, if the term be more precisely applied to a certain specific subject, as, *e.g.* when we speak of the philosophy of art or of ethics as contrasted with the science of these, it carries with it still, and always, a main reference to the one governing principle applicable to the whole subject under discussion. It is ever, and always, a search for a unity which shall illuminate and interpret for the speculative intellect the totality of existence. And its motive spring is ever the satisfaction of the subject-mind, in the unity of its conscious intelligence, by the recognition of a corresponding unity in the object-world.

That this is so, is not only made evident to us from our consideration of the subject in itself, and by observing its natural and necessary relation to the narrower region of the scientific, but it is certified to us historically as the authenticated actual source of all our philosophy. When we ascend the stream of speculative thought, in search of its earliest springs, we find them in the fragments preserved to us

of those first bold pioneers of speculative inquiry, the Ionian Greeks of the 7th century B.C., with whom every History of Philosophy begins. Crude and, in a sense, grotesque was, of necessity, the form in which their speculations were thrown. And they appear the more so to us, because they meet us, for the most part, in isolated apophthegms, abrupt pregnant sayings with little of expository context. Yet the inner meaning, that which constitutes for us their philosophical significance, shines out transparently clear. And nothing can well appear more astonishing to a modern reflective mind, than the originality and boldness and reach of these first adventurers on the wide ocean of speculative thought. Furthermore, the ideas which they originated live and work with us still. In some cases, indeed, as in the dark pregnant utterances of the great thinker of Ephesus, Heraclitus, they have only in our modern times revealed the fulness of the meaning with which they were charged.

Truly, in this region, as well as in that of literature and art, do these

'Sceptred sovrans rule us from their urns.'

All our philosophy has flowed to us from this source. And of the principles involved in these first statements of philosophical conclusion, and in some cases principles explicitly formulated, much remains with us to-day, quick and operative, and most profoundly relevant to all our modern thinking.

It was natural that with Thales, and his associates and successors in the philosophical guild or circle at Miletus, the unity they sought should have been what we should describe as a material unity. But the one point for us to mark well is this: it was nothing less than a Unity in the Totality of this infinitely various and complex world.

It is customary to regard these Ionian thinkers as materialists, and the first founders of materialism, but though, traditionally, the appellation might be justified, yet we need to bear in mind that in that twilight time of awakening thought, there was not, nor could there have been, that sharp severance and discrimination of material from spiritual, which gives all its significance to our own use of the term Materialism.

We can see at once, that the process of mind which generated philosophical thought was nothing else than that natural instinctive effort of Abstraction, which, by throwing off all that kept objects separate from one another, laying aside all qualitative differences, not only individual, but also specific and generic differences, sought finally to throw them into one category. It is the same conflict with separateness that constitutes the very motive of the scientific effort, which, however, rests content with its far-reaching classifications and generalisations. But the marvel is, that instead of this gradual approach, by long successive stages, by way of scientific generalisation, to the culminating conception of philosophic unity, these audacious creative thinkers appear to have reached by a single bound this conception and conviction of a substantial Unity, underlying all contradictory appearances.

For our purpose, it matters not at all how they named or described it. Thales, the father of philosophy, boldly proclaims that 'all things are water,' ὕδωρ, *i.e.* a form or mode of moisture. It would be an interesting question indeed, and

by no means an insoluble one, to inquire how and why he should have selected this particular substance as his universal. But the point we fasten upon is simply this, that here is a thinker (or school of thinkers), who, by no creeping process of cautious abstraction, contending inch by inch with separateness, has leapt at a single bound from the unity of his own self-conscious personality to a unity in the world around him, which he utters when he virtually declares, 'All things are but modes of One thing.'

Thus it came about, that from the very dawn of speculative thought the world was regarded as a Unity—a Universe. It was gazed upon much as a quick, reflective child might gaze wonderingly at earth and sea and sky, and call it 'the world.' And the Greek was the quick reflective child of our race, open-eyed, of free spirit, and swift intuition. And so his marvelling, yet questioning gaze introduced Philosophy into the world.

Thus, then, while with ourselves it is rather our scientific procedure which leads us gradually on to our philosophy; with the Greeks, on the other hand, their sciences, when they

came to be formulated, were but specialisations of their philosophy. They were slowly carved out from the totality which was their earliest conception, and can hardly be said to have acquired any very specialised form until Alexandrian times.

But, reverting to ourselves and our own habits of thought, we may see that the rationale of the process of thinking which must at length conduct to Philosophy, is naturally given in this method of Abstraction. The belief that there exists an underlying unity of existence is the faith which supports all philosophical endeavour: just as the belief that this world is indeed a Cosmos gives support, as we have seen, to all scientific research. And the rational way of arriving at the conviction that, amid the multitudinous and complex totality of things, such unity exists, can only be by a continuous penetration through innumerable differences to that central supporting identity of existence, which has supplied us with the very idea and name of 'Substance.'

In the Pythagorean school of thinkers, who succeeded the Ionic, there emerges a conception

expressing a higher, and therefore a more widely embracing unity, than had been recognised before. The significance of Form, as against mere material substance, now becomes prominent. And it is herein that the most striking characteristic of this highly gifted Greek race becomes most clearly exhibited. For, as we all know, it is the Greeks who are, for all time, the masters—supreme and undisputed—of pure form. But the birth of an idea which introduces a new and potent factor into human life is a moving spectacle. We seem, in contemplating it, to approach holy ground. It is surely so here, where we witness the emergence into human thought of a conception that makes both science and art henceforward possible. Yet how naturally does the evolution proceed!

What poor sort of explanation is it, for one who gazes with admiring wonder at some collection of rare and beautiful pottery, to be told that after all, there is—in all the exquisite varied outline exhibited—one underlying material common to them all; that they are but one Substance—clay!

But Form implies proportion, symmetry, grace;

the delicately restricting limit which applied to the amorphous material subjected to it gives it all its meaning, its utility, its beauty. Moreover, there is exhibited herein a marvel which can never lose its wonderfulness for a reflective mind, and is pregnant with a profound significance, which, later in our inquiry, we must make some effort to develope. To see the potter at his wheel, his deft hand imparting its delicate impress upon the revolving plastic mass, is nothing less than to behold, in its simplest but most vivid presentation, the spectacle of mind being there and then infused into matter: of matter actually being informed by mind. Can we wonder that, later on in Greek thought, it should come to be that the whole meaning of the word ὕλη, 'matter,' should be found in this very thing; viz. that it was susceptible of Form? Its one characteristic potency lay in its capacity for being informed by mind. In itself it was nothing. Herein surely lies the genetic spring and source of all Art.

But it is on the intellectual side that we are at present concerned in regarding it. And here, in this strange wedding of matter with mind,

we find our first and clearest exhibition of that conciliation of logical contradictories, which has already been hinted at, and which comes inevitably to assume ever more of importance as we proceed. For undoubtedly these two, Body and Spirit, Matter and Mind, are of the nature of logical contradictories. Mutually exclusive they are; so that each is used in definition as the negative delimitation of the other. Yet are they here represented through the senses to the mind in one.

Later on we may seek to exhibit the far-reaching application of the principle that meets us here. For the present it is but with its first clear emergence in the field of human thought that we are concerned. And especially that in this emphasis on form is found the origin of that governing conception of the world as indeed a Cosmos, which is, as we have already noted, at once the necessary postulate both of science and of art. Till this was recognised and realised, neither was possible.

But our indebtedness to these pioneers of speculative thought claims one further word by way of enlargement and illustration.

The process of abstraction gives us the line along which at first they sought exclusively to make progress, driven forwards as they were by that instinct for a final unity, and that faith in its existence which gives us the motive power of the philosophic enterprise. This process of abstraction itself receives its severest example and illustration in what seems to us perhaps a thing of extreme simplicity, viz. the act of counting. Familiarity is apt to blind us to the marvel involved even in its most commonplace exercise.

How easily we can say, as we pass in mental review several objects lying before us: This tree, 1: this leaf, 2: this grain of sand, 3: the Sun, 4: the World, 5. One, two, three, four, five! Yet at every utterance of the numeral we have deliberately dismissed from our regard the most patent and overwhelming differences in the objects before us, and fixed our attention upon one sole quality. Each of them is for us at that moment simply a single unit. Nay, and so wide now is the range of application, that once we have drawn the line between the world material, the object-world, and the

world spiritual, the subject-world, we can, with perfect facility, cross the boundary and continue to reckon—This thought, 1: this feeling, 2: my spirit, 3. Beyond all space limits—the realm of the visible and palpable—we carry with us and apply the conception of unitary existence which we have elsewhere obtained.

It was further perceived that form, proportion, symmetry, harmony, all that implied restrictive limit, could be Numerically represented. The two aspects of the Cosmos—the beautiful order—became exhibited, not separately or independently, but in their mutual relation; and the world intellectual and the world aesthetic were seen to be intimately connected, and governed by a unity of principle. How natural then it was that these Pythagorean philosophers, as emphasising the intellectual side of the great idea, should have adopted as their philosophical principle that mysterious ἀριθμός, 'number,' which has generated the whole science of Mathematics, with its wide ranges of abstract reasoning, and of innumerable applications to the concrete sciences, and in this way to the practical utilities and conveniences of life. But it is for us to

note throughout that it is still the recognition of Unity in Totality that here, as always, supplies for us the key to the Philosophy involved.

Finally, in the philosophy of Parmenides and Zeno there is put forth the last effort of the abstractive intellect. As all physical differentiating attributes had been thrown aside, so, in this last spasm of philosophical endeavour, it was sought to abstract even those mathematical attributes, which had claimed apprehension, not by the senses, but, through these, by the intellect. The separate unities of existence were attempted to be got rid of. Then all separateness at last fell away. It was now not only Unity in Totality that crowned the intellectual achievement, but the two terms were merged in mutual equivalence. 'The All is One' was the mystic word of the Eleatic school. The totality was the unity, and the unity was the totality—and nothing was left but this *caput mortuum* of blank, unchanging, undifferentiated existence.

Thus did early Greek thought pass through all stages of the abstractive process—the physical, the mathematical, and now the ontological—till it perished in its own apotheosis of abstraction.

What a barren ending, we are ready to exclaim, of a line of philosophical thought which in its middle course had shown itself so vital, so pregnant with results of greatest value to mankind! But if we say this, and imagine there is nothing further to be said, we greatly misread and under-estimate its full significance.

True, it demonstrated fully, and once for all, that by way of mere abstractive process nothing could come that should realise the one great purpose of all philosophy, the satisfaction of the speculative intellect. Even this purely negative result was itself of immense moment. But Greek Philosophy did far more than this, for it bequeathed to all subsequent thought the clear conception of absolute Existence: existence that was a unity as against all plurality, immutable as opposed to all that was changeable, eternal as in sharp contrast with all that was temporal. This was a legacy indeed, not perhaps easily appreciated by us, who are apt to account as familiar commonplace what has taken centuries to evolve and make clear, but it was notwithstanding a most precious and permanent possession for human thought.

This indeed was the factor that entered most influentially into the making of Plato, who may well speak as he does, in a tone of reverent piety, of 'My father Parmenides.' And it has also entered into all that best thinking of our own which resolutely seeks, day by day, in all ranges of experience and endeavour, that recognition and grasp of the Permanent in the Changeable, the Eternal in the Temporal, which is but the philosophical underside of the life of Faith. What is this but that of which St. Paul tells when he speaks of looking 'not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal'?

Cor 4 18

But this conception of an absolute and immutable Unity having emerged as the culmination of the long effort of intellectual abstraction which is characteristically philosophical, and being planted now securely as the veritable central pillar of the temple of all speculative thought, it was inevitable that there should rise into a prominence no less conspicuous the antithetic conceptions of Change as opposed to the Permanent, of Plurality as opposed to Unity, of

the Fleeting as opposed to the Fixed, of the Particular as opposed to the Universal, of the Temporal as opposed to the Eternal. Inevitable it was, because no conception can ever be made vivid and sharply outlined to the mind except by contrast. It is ever this foil which must set off in sharpest antithesis, as negative to positive, the idea which stands central in the field of our mental vision.

Here also, as in the former case, we have our historical counterpart to what is given in the reason of the thing. For it is most interesting to observe, that just as the conception of unity and fixity of Being found in a particular school its especial expositors and advocates, and was by them pushed to an extravagant exclusiveness of philosophical position, so also this antithetic yet really complementary conception of the world, as an infinitude of particulars, in ceaseless change and flux, found its representative exponent. There is the great name of Heraclitus, whose abrupt, obscure, pregnant apophthegms still ring in our ears, and find many an echo in our hearts. οὐδὲν μένει· πάντα ῥεῖ, 'nothing abides: all things fleet,' he cries. 'Life is a river into which no

man can twice dip his feet.' What is all this to our inquirer but the terse, pungent expression, in phrase of crystalline clearness and sharpness, of that very sense of the vanity and fleetingness of all things earthly that so often weighs upon his soul and casts a brooding shadow over many a bright scene?

But now let us observe what may well repay us for the time and attention spent upon this historical summary. Let our inquirer who has had patience to bear with it gather up now into his hands the full fruitage and heritage that has descended to him from this remote past, and he will find himself in legitimate possession of the leading ideas, simple, clear, profound, which will give him a just and adequate apprehension of what Philosophy is, and what it can and cannot accomplish for him. There is surely nothing to prevent one who never dreams of laying claim to the title of philosopher, but who is simply a thoughtful Christian believer, from gaining thus much insight into the matter. And it will greatly further his purpose to do so.

These leading ideas, then, are three in number; the three that have just been noted, in the

order of their rational evolution, and typically represented in the actual history of philosophy by three well-marked schools of that early Greek thought, where all our modern speculation has its living springs. Each of these schools gave us a principle, which at first was formulated apart; each claiming single and exclusive pre-eminence, and hostile to every plea for the introduction of necessary complementary elements; mutually destructive they were, when, as at first, sharply set in logical opposition to one another. They may be restated then, as—

I. The principle of absolute Unity of Being, excluding all change and diversity, Permanent, Eternal.

II. The principle of infinite Plurality, multiplicity; of Becoming as excluding Being; of ceaseless Flux and Process.

III. The principle of an ordered Harmony, wherein lay the meaning of things, by-and-by discerned to be a harmony of *opposites*, which interpreted the world physical, intellectual, ethical, as a Cosmos, a beautiful order.

These are the three elements which, introduced into the world of thought separately, and, for the

most part, in declared antagonism, received their earliest and perhaps their noblest conciliation when they entered the alembic of Plato's mind. With Plato there came definitely into the world of human thought what can never leave it, viz. a recognition of the fact that the fleeting phenomena which dissolve into one another and pass before the eye of the soul, to all seeming an idle pageant of phantasms, are not idle, but are the medium through which that soul may discern and clasp the Realities which inhabit Eternity, and which yet claim closest kinship with the soul of man.

Then the Pythagorean Harmony comes to be seen, not only in the several grades of physical existence, but in all ranges wherein thought can exercise itself, and to find its most striking application in the harmony of contrasts and of opposites. It is in this very thing that we find our measure and standard of the dignity, nobleness, and beauty of any object, be it a work of art, an organism, a life. Just in proportion as the contrast, the opposition, is fullest and sharpest, provided there is no fracture of integrity, no breaking away from the sovereign controlling

unity which holds the several elements together, does each claim higher rank in the scale of being.

Such is the harmony which finds its illustration and example in the glorious symphonies of the master-musician. Such is the harmonious composition of sculptor, painter, poet. This it is that determines the place of organisms in the biological scale. This gives us the measure, in ascending rank, of the value of a Human Life, of a Friendship, of Society.

The humblest thinker or critic of his own and of other men's thoughts can never afford to dispense with the three ideas thus given us: Unity, Variety, Harmony. Do not let us regard them as mere elements to be unfolded and compounded in some academic analysis of Platonism. They are indispensable ideas: luminous, dominant, living. They belong to us all; and must ever take and hold their place in all thought that can, in any sense, be termed philosophical.

But there is clearly more in the several pairs of antithetic conceptions lately mentioned than is involved in simply speaking of them as a harmony of *contrasts*. They stand opposed to each

other as logical *contradictories*, mutually exclusive. Some logical enthusiast will doubtless break in upon our dream, and in that sharp, incisive tone characteristic of his order, will proclaim that they cannot exist together. We must take our choice between the one and the other. We may revel in our symphonies, our mystic harmonies, but, brandishing over us his 'dividing line,' that trenchant blade! he will never suffer us to make up our music out of his Scheme of Opposition.

What shall be our plea? What but this? To his *solvitur ratiocinando*, we can but oppose our *solvitur ambulando*, *i.e.* in this case, our *solvitur vivendo*. We find ourselves in actual possession of these couples of antithetic notions.

They have been disclosed to us as the One, the Many; the Permanent, the Mutable; the Eternal, the Temporal; the Universal, the Particular. At first they appeared in the course of philosophical evolution as separate and mutually repellent, then in their conciliated unity of existence. In view of them we venture now to affirm,

First, that as in the Harmony of lesser Contrasts there is uniformly an ascent in the scale of values as the contrast widens and sharpens,

so does this ascent culminate when it reaches the point of Contradictory Opposition.

And second, that if in every philosophical system of any age or place, the recognition of Unity in Totality is the central, and characteristic, and determining idea, so also will the unity in question when construed philosophically turn out to be, in one mode or other, a conciliation of Contradictories, such as in the logician's hands would simply fly asunder, when released from his oppositional scheme.

Let me close this brief survey of the evolution of philosophical ideas by observing that it leaves with us a discovery, and a consequent practical problem, bearing very closely upon our present specific purpose.

The discovery is that there does actually exist in our complex human nature, and at its centre, a Faculty plainly related to this Universal and Eternal element in things around us: that while it is indubitable that we have, through and by means of our sense-organisation, a power of apprehending the amazing multiplicity and variety of phenomena in their relations of co-existence and sequence; so it is also no less certainly

approved to us, that there is that within us which reaches out through all, to a Reality of Existence which answers to our own in its Unity, its Totality, its Harmony of contrasted and opposing elements. While to those of us who are alive to the significance of such a discovery, it must also become clear that the supreme practical Problem of life is to so use this central faculty of the soul as to recognise and grasp at all times the Universal presented to us in the Particular, the Permanent as it gives all its meaning and value to the Fleeting, the Eternal as it gleams forth upon us from the Temporal. This is the paramount opportunity of life; its duty and privilege; and it is ours throughout every day. Or, to borrow again from the Apostle, there is that noble and all-comprehensive phrase which gives us a compact summary of all of these: 'Lay hold of eternal life (1 Tim. vi. 12), 'of the life which is really life' (τῆς ὄντως ζωῆς) (1 Tim. vi. 19).

These, I say, are the things driven home to our minds simply by a steady consideration of what Philosophy in its essential nature truly is, and how it came to exist in the world.

These are things which, had we lived in those twilight times, and in pagan places, we might still have delighted to see and clasp and proclaim. For they are involved in the very nature of our necessary thinking, and, as we have seen, found striking historical expression in the utterances of those early sages.

But what of our Christian thinker, for whom I am seeking to trace some steady line of consecutive reflection? A Christian thinker, I say, who, however imperfectly acquainted with the history of philosophical speculation, has, in other ways than are open to the mere thinker, found in his Christian faith the one sure rest for his heart and the one safe guidance for his life? Will not such an one share my feeling, a feeling of delight almost akin to rapture, when he perceives that, couched in this unfamiliar phrase of philosophical dialect, is presented with startling clearness the substance of that very Faith of his, which it may be he had sometimes been tempted to think must, in some way, be found in conflict and antagonism with Reason?

Thus to think is an error so sadly common

that it may not be out of place to interpolate here the trite remark, that surely it is with Sight and not with Reason that Faith can be justly contrasted.

To this, however, I will venture to add the assertion that, of all things that may claim Reason's sanction, there is nothing so intensely and deeply reasonable as is the Faith, whereby, in a true sense, all men live, and which is so interpreted and vitalised for the Christian believer that it stands as the one sure way to the Life Eternal—'Believe and Live.'

LECTURE V.

WE were occupied in our last lecture with the ascertainment of such a concise, yet comprehensive, view of Philosophy as should sufficiently illuminate its origin, meaning, and aim; yet should, at the same time, exhibit the natural and necessary limits of its powers.[1]

Passing from the first simple dictum, that in all that has a right to be named philosophical there must be a Unity apprehended in the Totality of our thought, a unity of idea which can hold together, and harmonise, and interpret the whole range of intellectual endeavour; we have further come to recognise that in the working out of this philosophical interpretation due place must be found for three principles:

I. The immutable unity of absolute Being.

[1] See Note 24.

II. The ceaseless flux of phenomenal Becoming.

III. The principle of order and Harmony.

These three principles have now been seen to possess no such separate and exclusive self-sufficiency as was claimed for each of them when it first made its appearance in speculative thought. They fall into their place as complementary elements of philosophical conception. They belong to no particular time or place or theory, but have the stamp of universality: so that they still abide, a test and standard of any system of thinking which can fairly claim to be entitled philosophical.

But Philosophy, though it moves in so wide an area, still, like Logic and Science, has necessary limits to its competency. From its very nature, as the exercise of the speculative intellect, it is confined within bounds beyond which, however, other powers and capacities inherent in our human nature can freely pass.

At first it might appear that, inasmuch as it is concerned with the totality of things and the totality of thought, there is an express repudiation of limit to the scope of its activity and

authority. But we have seen, and this very Philosophy itself has enabled us to see more clearly, that the great word Truth breaks away, as we contemplate it intently, from its ordinary limit as a formulated statement. Nay, it cannot be absolutely confined even to a speculative idea, which may give occasion to a multitude of such statements. It only attains the full measure of its significance when we read it as synonymous with Reality, and, further, as distinctly connoting a reality commensurate with our whole Personality.[2]

In this philosophical region of mental activity the appeal is made, not to our whole human personality, but only to that section of it which we denominate the speculative intellect. But we have found that what lies at the core of the idea of *truth* is disclosed when we relate the great word to that other which is its subjective correlative, viz. *trust*. So that, used in the full scope of its meaning, it must be extended to signify, *that upon which we can absolutely depend*: that of which we can be as absolutely assured as we can of our own per-

[2] See Note 25.

sonal existence. And it was suggested that the relative magnitude of any particular truth which thus appeals to us and certifies itself, is determined by the extent of this appeal, and of our response to it, be it narrower or wider.[3]

It appears that the area of that environing Reality which answers to our whole nature, and which, in many modes, is ever breaking through into our life and claiming us, is immensely wider than that mere section of it with which the scientific or speculative intellect is competent to deal. Yet unquestionably this surplusage of transcendent Reality is approachable by other sides of this composite nature of ours, and is brought into actual living contact with it: and the approach and contact have in them a certain real apprehensibility which certifies to us its actual existence, and even something of its qualitative character.

It is not denied that there are in every case certain aspects of this transcendent reality which do, and must, come within the range of clear thought and language. I would freely admit that, in this sense, 'All that is real is also

[3] See Note 26.

rational': but what I maintain is, that it is only an aspect that can be so apprehended and dealt with. It is this 'relegation to an aspect' —to use Newman's phrase—which makes so much even of the clearest language merely symbolical, so that it can never be suffered to rank as a full and equivalent expression for the things themselves.

Having thus delimited the scope of philosophy, let us advance our inquiry in another direction.[4]

Anyone who will consider attentively the earlier manifestations of our spiritual life—using the attribute here in its generic sense, as contrasted with the life corporeal and physical —may readily recognise the spring and first outflow of the several vital currents, which in their further developments give us the well-differentiated areas of spiritual activity, which we name respectively the Intellectual, the Aesthetic, and the Ethical.

That these three provinces of our life, notwithstanding the clear line of demarcation, maintain to the end a deep vital relation to one another, is not only generally admitted,

[4] See Note 27.

but is really necessitated by their very community of origin, and by the fact that they all represent various modes of the energising of a unitary being, to whom, as to their living centre, each must finally be referred. I believe that a Christian thinker, though he may have no claim to distinction as a student of science, or of philosophy, or art, or morals, may yet obtain, by a little steadiness of reflection and consecution of thought, a substantially clear and adequate view of the natural, necessary, and beautiful relationship subsisting between them.

Let then, such an observer, bend a keen, scrutinising gaze upon that seemingly wholly sensational existence with which every human life begins: and let this seemingly simple sensational experience be analysed.[5] Let it be carefully observed, however, that the analysis of a living thing must be made, in chief part, not in space simply, but in *time, i.e. as it grows.* How shall we know what any organic thing is, *e.g.* what a seed is, whose potentialities constitute its characteristic nature, the very significance of its being? Only in one

[5] See Note 28.

way can this be revealed to us. The skilled analyst can do little for us—nothing, one might say—in the earliest stage. Let it *grow*, and it will conduct its own analysis. Let it grow in an environment so well adapted to its nature that its growth shall not fail to bring out, to educate, in full and mutual proportion, all that lies in it, as yet latent, but inherent and implicated in its being. Then, and only then, will it make manifest to us what it really is. Yet it would seem there are savants in abundance who are so in love with the study of origins, that they consider the best way to obtain the interpreting key to Nature is by burrowing amongst its lowest strata; and expect to gain their truest reading of human nature by following the same method. Hence they are fond of producing—to the alarm of right-feeling, but uncritical people—out of the depths of undeveloped or deteriorated humanity, their interpretation of the true nature of the man who walks the earth before their eyes, in the guise of wisdom, virtue, and holiness, as a child of God.

This simple, sensational life, then, gradually

reveals in the process of its evolutionary growth a *perceptive* element, which little by little disengages itself from the wholly subjective sensation in which it is embedded. There emerge, with increasing clearness, into the field of mental vision, objects of thought, perceived now to lie apart and separate from the perceiving mind. This is the dim twilight of the dawning intelligence. When this presentation is first made, we have, in the shock of contrast and comparison out of which it issues, the birth-point of thought. The dividing-line between the self and the not-self is first faintly drawn; and subsequently follow in natural succession, generalisation, inference, and all that we mean by intellectual activity. Thence comes gradually into being, given the stimulus and guidance of sound education, a world of objects of thought, with its myriads of items of perception and knowledge. Still, as the vital process continues, there becomes manifested an organising intelligence at work upon these separate items which make up the material upon which it acts, and which gradually lose their separateness and incoherence.

Thus that course is fairly entered upon which, in its generalisations and verifications by experience, conducts to the self-conscious Scientific effort, and following along the same lines attains in Philosophy the crowning endeavour of the mind to reach some cognitive and speculative mastery of the world.

This whole process is governed at every stage by a sense of subjection to the controlling and harmonising authority of an ideal power, which, to the eye of the intellectual soul, grows ever more distinct and august as the 'Truth,' whose throne is set up on high in the midst, and whose authority suffers no slightest item to escape payment of the homage which is due.

There is, moreover, another development of this strange complex life of the spirit. As it pursues its way, it manifests a further organising power, which by and by constitutes another world—the world of aesthetic emotion and production; the world, not of science, nor of philosophy, but the world of Art.[6]

Perhaps it may conduce to clearness of conception, if we can briefly exhibit the natural

[6] See Note 29.

mutual relation which subsists between these two spheres. We shall do this best if we put side by side the highest and most typical representative of each; observing how these two are related: the Philosopher and the Poet.

Let the term 'poet,' however, be in this connection construed in its widest, which is also its original etymological significance, as a maker, a creator; not therefore simply one who uses melodious speech as his material and medium of expression; but rather the creative artist, who is open to employ *any* medium of concrete presentation by which he may give adequate utterance to his idea of the Beautiful.[7] In each and every case, the work of the poet (ποιητής) is always a *descent* from an idea to its creative embodiment. Further, the idea in question must be one that is at once satisfying, inspiring, and impulsive to the sense of Beauty, and which therefore claims of the mind which it has possessed, some adequate expression of it in the concrete, *i.e.* in such material as shall appeal to us through the senses for apprehension and appreciation.[8]

[7] See Note 30. [8] See Note 31.

Thus then, as the philosopher by virtue of his very function as one in search of intellectual unity of conception of idea is ever *ascending* in thought; moving ever further and further away from this world of particular, visible, tangible, audible things; retreating ever into the abstract, shedding concrete qualities as he hurries upwards in his philosophical progress after universality and unity; so the creative artist, on the other hand, starts on his course from that very universal as it exists in idea in the realm of aesthetic conceptions, and *descends* from it to this same world of the particular and the palpable which the philosopher has forsaken. This he does in order to give particular body and form to his ideal Beauty; using all such sensible experiences in the world of form, colour, and sound as, when duly selected and combined, may do some justice to the idea which animates and inspires him.

When we are possessed of this general conception of what Art really is, viz.: the embodiment in particular creations of ideas quickening and satisfying our sense of Beauty, the principle we have reached reveals its universality in the

power of application it immediately exhibits in regions not usually reckoned to belong to the world of the fine arts. Readily, and without jolt or jar, it crosses the line—if, indeed, there be a line—which divides the Aesthetic from the Ethical.

Here we are presented with a new and infinitely more precious material in which ideas can find their realisation. That material is such as is furnished by the instincts, impulses, passions, activities of beings not only endowed with aesthetic sensibilities, but also intelligent and moral. So that, beyond all that is called noble, sublime, or beautiful in statue, or picture, or symphony, or poem, there stands before us, at least in idea, and approximately realised here and there amongst the dwellers on the earth, the noble and beautiful character, 'the perfectly fashioned Will.' Not different in essential nature, but merely a wider, richer application of the identical principle which governs artistic creation, is this higher, diviner range of poetic product, viz.: the expression in an individual human life of the Divine idea.

This is a line of reflection which will need

to be followed out to further and still more wonderful conclusions. At present it will be enough to have gained a glimpse of the natural link connecting art and morals.

What we have to do now, is to take up this last, the Ethical, and observe how here, too, no less than in the spheres just considered, there is disclosed an authoritative central conception, which, if it had free play, would, in a manner precisely analogous, organise the life of Conduct, and produce there also a beautiful order.

This Ethical sphere, this moral province, claims, however, a closer and more sustained attention than any which is demanded by science or philosophy or art. For its range is universal, and in its elevation it comes very close upon, and indeed enters necessarily into, that life of religious Faith which was the starting-point of our whole inquiry. In this region of human conduct, where duty speaks in tones of absolute authority, and righteousness rules from a throne august, inviolable, all men are dwellers and subjects. If conduct be, as Arnold says, three-fourths of life, it is the life of all sane and responsible beings that is dealt with here.

It is not enough, then, to assign to Righteousness simply a kingdom side by side with the realms subject to those regnant sisters of hers. For she is disclosed as herself the abstract source of all imperative that can claim the will. It is the potency of her hidden sway which imparts to both Truth and Beauty their right to rule, their claim to obedience. It is the Will that is claimed here; and it is in the act of will that the veritable expression of personality is found. It is of immense consequence to perceive clearly that neither thought nor feeling alone can be accepted as the safe, indubitable exponent of what a man really is. As Kant says in the opening sentence of his memorable treatise: 'There is nothing in the world, or even out of it, that can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.' Not until thought and feeling have risen to a level above their own, and each has contributed its part to that decisive act of will, which is the man himself in action, can we be certainly assured of what he truly is. The secret of the moral life is disclosed when it is discovered that this autocracy of will, when cleared of all that

would enslave it, and really enthroned in command of all motive forces of the nature, is itself subject to a mysterious Authority, which, though it be with or within him, is at the same time above him. It speaks down to him in tones that claim absolute obedience. It is not inducement that is offered; it is not expostulation or pleading that is addressed to him; but it is that unconditional categorical imperative that can never receive an adequate interpretation of its claim—so manifestly absolute—until it be conceded that it issues from a source infinitely above him.

This is the marvel of marvels of this human nature of ours. It is by virtue of this relation to the Supreme that Duty levels, and levels up, all human lives. To each of us, independent of all the myriad differences which separate one from another, this 'stern daughter of the voice of God' speaks, and speaks in precisely the same tone—the voice of Duty.[9]

It will then appear that, just as there lay embedded in what seemed a simple passivity of sensation, an active element of perception and

[9] See Note 32.

intelligence, which, gradually emerging, has wrought out, in continuous intellectual process, that world of thought which ever makes for its central Truth: so there lies also implicit in this germinal passivity of sensational impression another mode of active power, not now occupied with intellectual discrimination and co-ordination and judgment, but having its character as motive to overt activity—to conduct. In motive this free will of ours finds its material for the gradual organic fabrication of the moral world. And motive, if its true normal could be maintained, would in like manner make ever, as the needle to the pole, towards the central Right.[10]

It will be well, for the purpose we have in hand, to note two points in connection with this moral life which have not always been kept sufficiently distinct. The one is connected with a just conception of the natural Scheme of human Duties; the other with the Authority which endows them with their absolute imperative—*i.e.* which makes them what we mean by Duty. Our intelligent truth-seeker can never escape the confusion of thought which it is his main endeavour

[10] See Note 33.

to avoid, unless he face these two separate though related questions.

What, then, shall furnish us with at least some clear principle which shall in its application provide an intelligent ground-plan for what I have named the Scheme of Duties? The principle in question must be, in its own nature, a universal principle. It must be such as shall include within its scope of application every morally responsible person. Hence, though it may be natural, and for himself indeed inevitable, for the Christian inquirer, whose case I am trying to keep steadily in view, to limit his regard to what is termed Christian Ethics, it is very clear that this is but a species, though it be, as we believe, a perfected species, of Natural Ethics, *i.e.* ethics in general. It is desirable, for several reasons, that these should not be in the first instance confused. Those who do confound them incur, in addition to an injurious confusion of ideas, a very serious loss. They are apt to deprive the Religion for whose claims they are so reasonably jealous of its natural moral corroboration.[11]

It is implied in this plea for universality that,

[11] See Note 34.

notwithstanding the enormous diversity found in the particulars which in various ages and countries have claimed men as duties, there does still exist at the heart of this universality of Duty a fixity, a unity, a permanence of base without which it would be absurd to speak of universality of principle. Failing this, it would be to lay the foundations of morality in the shifting sands. It would be, indeed, its virtual abolition and extinction.[12]

But while a fixity of principle must be conceded, it must be allied with what may seem at first sight incompatible with it—a most perfect elasticity of application. This also, it is evident, is but a further corollary from the claim for universality. Any contention for the fixity of base is vain, unless it can be shown that the principle admits of natural valid application to every shifting phase of human experience, whether exhibited in societies or in the narrower sphere of the individual life.[13]

The consideration of this all-important province of our spiritual activities which we name the moral life, requires, however, some brief

[12] See Note 35. [13] See Note 36.

notice of the two primary elements which enter it as constituent factors—the one Perceptive, the other Emotional.

This is a matter which is no doubt rather psychological than in itself strictly ethical, dealing as it does with the characteristic difference between thought and feeling. But these enter very essentially into our moral life, as the moral judgment and the moral sentiment: the one as the light that guides, and the other as the motive heat that impels the will. It will be needful, or at any rate will prove helpful for our inquiry to state as simply as possible the nature of each, and how they stand to one another in reciprocal relation.

It will be sufficient to fix our regard on the passivity and necessary subjectivity that characterise feeling; and, by contrast, on the corresponding activity, freedom, and necessary objectivity that are the note of all thought. These are sufficiently appreciated when we consider that when we feel, we are, of necessity, *subjects* of the feeling; while when we think, there is a disengagement from this subjective necessity; and with minds free and active, we

are engaged in contemplating and handling an *object* of thought.

Now there lies involved in this brief compact statement a certain essential distinction between these two—the intellectual and the emotional—which, when explicitly stated, can readily be apprehended and verified in our common experience of life. It is that in this necessary separation of object from subject which pertains to all thinking, we recognise a certain dualism, essentially characteristic of all thought; while, on the other hand, in the necessary, all-absorbent subjectivity which is the very nature of every emotional experience, we recognise with equal distinctness an antithetic unification of subject and object, as essentially characteristic of feeling.

Knowledge, which is the end and consummation of thought, is always a relation between the subject that thinks and knows and the object of thought that is known. A necessary relation, then, at once holds together these two, yet holds them asunder, and this no less in affirmative than in negative statements. Without this interval between subject and object,

thought and knowledge cannot exist. On the other hand, when it is the emotional nature that is engaged, there is a necessary tendency to abolish this interval. There occurs an implication of the object with the subject, which annuls the condition of all clear thinking; an assimilation, in which the two are no longer held apart but are unified in the experience of the moment. This unification is of the essence of the situation; just as in the former case the essential thing was the dualism, which in its projection of the object suffered it to become indeed an object of thought, and set in motion all that process of comparing and judging into which our thinking can be analysed.

The dictum has already been quoted with approval, at least in reference to some sense of it, that all that is real is rational, *i.e.* has an aspect which avails to the reason, and can be handled by it. And it is precisely a rational insight into some of the most authentic experiences of life that we have to seek to obtain. Rational insight it is that begins and carries forwards that process of rendering our thought coherent, consecutive, organised, which

is the aim of all our present endeavour. Let me offer a simple illustration. Have we never, for instance, witnessed such a scene as the following on a railway platform? I have myself many a time, and found it a moving sight, full, too, of instructive suggestion—a mother meeting her young daughter who has been absent for a year, say at school. The train is sliding into the station. She takes up a position apart, that she may scan the faces at the doors and windows of the carriages. The 'interval' she needs for recognition. But this scrutiny accomplished, there follows at the earliest moment the warm enfolding embrace. It may make one smile to talk technically, in this connection, of the 'abolition of the interval' and the 'implication of subject and object.' Yet beyond question, this is, psychologically speaking, precisely what is being enacted before our eyes.

But see! After that first close embrace, in which the cognitive lapses into the emotional and affectional, you may see the mother deliberately hold the child off from her at arm's length, that she may scrutinise and read that

face she loves so well. Now it is the feeling that lapses, throwing all its force into the questioning, critical gaze. She would read now, with quick intelligence, the signs of health—or, alas! it may be its opposite—signs, too, of developing mind, heart, life; such sweet lines, and shadings, and soft deepenings of expression as the spirit's growth can trace in a sensitive young face. Now it is quickened thought that is busy. But in a moment, look again. That inquisitive, intellectual phase has passed, quickly as it came. And it is once more the embrace, but closer, warmer, than the first.

Thus, not in scientific phrase, nor in mere parable, but in actual exemplification, taken from the centre of our busy, eager human life, the psychological truth shines forth; not now in bare abstract statement, but clothed in all the warmth and colour of our full humanity. But once alive to its significance, we shall see it everywhere in operation. Let it be now a sermon to which we are listening intently; a discourse marked, amid other qualities, by striking intellectual force and keenness. Our thought is eagerly engaged. We follow the

line of its argument or reflection with every faculty of the mind keenly alert. But in an hour, when, it may be, the majority of the audience have departed, we take our place in that quiet, sacred, most blessed after-service, when preacher and people are gathered together round the table of the Lord; to remember—yes, and to commune with—Him who loved them and gave Himself for them. How changed the mood! No critical interval now! The phase of keen thought has passed; lapsed into something different, closer, more intimate. It is homage now; love, surrender, the embrace of the soul. How entirely natural, true to life, to human nature, all this is!

The key to many things is now in our hands. Every day and all day long illustration comes crowding in upon us. On the one hand we note, alas, how appreciation is apt to fail us, when the interval which thought claims is not there. Our loved ones are not loved as they should be, because, forsooth, we are too close to them to know them. A temporary parting sometimes serves to bring out a figure in its full outline. But,

alas, many a time it is the parting of the great Divider, that has at length revealed the worth, beauty, power, of a nature and character comparatively unregarded, and too slightly esteemed when we consorted with it in the common intercourse of home and work. 'It is expedient for you that I go away,' has many an echo in the experience of our human fellowships.

On the other hand, it is here too that we find the interpretation of our friendships, and all their natural demonstrative expressions—the greeting, the grasp of the hand, the caress, the kiss, the embrace. All these instinctive expressions of feeling arise as naturally from that which we now see to be involved in its very essential nature, as those antithetic, and often even antagonistic, moods and attitudes of mind spring out of the very qualities which characterise all thought and cognition. When we pass upwards from this sphere of our human relationships to that closely connected, but supreme and central region, towards which all these lines of reflection are intended to converge—the life of Faith—what can more

accurately and comprehensively describe its essence than to say that it is the ever-enlarging and deepening fellowship of the human spirit with the Divine, in knowledge, love, trust and obedience? What does this imply, but that while we give fullest scope to the exercise of mind, of thought and knowledge, as entering into that communion, we recognise all this as but ministering to that which includes but goes infinitely beyond it, viz. our sharing in the life of God? We all acknowledge that in Religion, as the life of a human spirit, it is the heart, not the mind or the understanding, that is the most deeply concerned. To love God, who first loved us, is its central life. That this is so, all acknowledge: but our reflective analysis has surely done something to enable us to see why it is so.

It is feeling that unites: thought by itself divides. Since then this fellowship of spirit with spirit is the very essence of religion, and since this Gospel of Jesus Christ has for its one aim and end the reconciling of the world to God, it follows that the main stress is laid not upon that which divides, but upon that

which unites:[14] and that it is, as Amiel says, 'the heart alone that can possess God.'

Before passing on to the application of these principles to the moral life, it is fitting that we should note, not simply the antithetical character of these primary elements of our spiritual nature, thought and feeling, but also the beautiful and just reciprocity which holds them together in harmonious relation.

It is sometimes said, speaking quite generally, that alternation is the secret of healthy, happy and effective life, while uniformity, monotony of occupation, depresses and kills. What is thus asserted as a general principle of conduct in the management of one's life, finds a special and beautiful application here. The first simple illustration I ventured to give, from the meeting after an interval of separation of mother and child, exhibits as clear and instructive an instance of the reciprocity I speak of between the two phases of intellectual and emotional life as can well be conceived. It was not simply that the cognitive part of the dual experience required detachment and interval,

[14] See Note 37.

which the emotional immediately abolished in the close embrace that succeeded; but it was further made apparent that the two were interrelated. It was the recognition that conducted to that first warm clasp: which in turn supplied the motive to the searching study and scanning of the child's features and expression: while this as rapidly passed into that succeeding closer and warmer embrace.

It is thus that we may regard the natural mutual relation of thought and feeling. Each ministers to the other, and together they make up the rhythmic movement of life. Whether applied to Truth or Beauty, or to the Moral ideal, or to that highest and most interesting object of contemplation and attraction, Personality, this natural reciprocity discloses itself.

It is commonly the attraction of feeling, however slight, which gives birth to the intellectualised attitude of attention; while this latter is ever revealing new and unsuspected meanings, interest, beauty, which, when the intellectual phase has passed, conduct to a closer approach, in which feeling is the dominant element. It is the assimilative effort now; the surrender to the

full enjoyment of that which the attentive gaze has revealed. It is the homage of the will to the claim of the Supreme Will, which the fixed regard of the soul has caused to shine out clear from the duty which meets us. It is the actual vital assimilation to the whole substance of the mental life of the truth we have been studying. It is the actual participation in the life of the person whom we have been learning to know. This is the joy of absorbent emotion, while the vital movement goes ever forwards: for delight is sure to generate a closer regard. So, wave-like, our life advances in fulness, in value, in joy. But it is not when mere abstractions appeal to us and claim us that the fullest illustration is given to the principle we are considering. Not until ideal qualities meet us in a Personal synthesis, answering to our own personality, does our experience of this rhythmic pulsation of emotion and intellect attain to its fullest exemplification. The history of our choicest friendships attests its worth and reality; while in the fulness of its beat we find the measure of the quantity and the quality of our life.

Then we find ourselves impelled by the mere

energy of vitality to lift up our eyes and our hearts to one Object Supreme, who must hold together in the unity of a Personal synthesis, answering to our own, all those ideal points of aspiration which, in the degree in which we respond to them, exalt and satisfy our whole nature. And we gain some deepening insight into that great saying of the Lord: 'This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.'

LECTURE VI.

As we now approach more nearly the consideration of the Moral life, the simple psychological statement given in the last lecture, of the characteristic difference between the Intellectual and the Emotional life, and the reciprocity between them, will be of some service. As moods or phases of mind, these have appeared as antithetic, often, indeed, directly antagonistic; yet so rhythmically related to each other, in their alternate detachment and attachment, that together they constitute a satisfying conception of what a harmonised human life should be. For it is clear that if only these two constituents of conscience and the moral life could be at once fully developed and rightly adjusted, we should be in the way to achieve a condition of true moral health. A perfectly just appre-

hension of duty, and a perfectly loyal response of feeling, would give us precisely that impulse and direction for the will which is the condition of consummated character.

In this region of our experience these elements, or factors of the situation, have received the characteristic appellations of Moral Judgment and Moral Sentiment: thought and feeling, that is, occupied with that which is the one proper object of Ethics, viz.: The voluntary conduct of ourselves and others considered as right or wrong. In the one case, there is the act of Judgment, wherein, as in all judgments, we have a completed act of thought. This is the result of comparison with a recognised standard, issuing in the assignment of the act, the disposition, the person, to a category distinctively moral. This is but the intellectual side of the moral experience; and conforms to the universal law of intellectual operation, demanding, for its secure performance, that detachment—in this case, judicial detachment—on which we lately commented. On the other hand, in that second half of our moral experience which we name the Moral Sentiment, we have simply feeling, only

now moralised. It is feeling, but not now in its generic character as liking the pleasant or disliking the painful, but it is here specialised to the moral quality, and appears as approbation or disapprobation. This is but the emotional side, as the other was the intellectual side, of our moral consciousness. Here too is to be noted the operation of the universal law of emotional experience, which ever tends to implicate the object with the subject; and in this instance two important consequences follow.

Firstly, this quickening of the feeling becomes the spring of conduct, calling the will into active exercise, so that it shall, in overt act, indicate and carry out the decision of the moral judgment. Without this, such determination would leave us as inert as we are left by an intellectual assent to the conclusion of a mathematical demonstration.[1]

Secondly, in obedience to the principle we have been considering, this necessary implication of feeling with judgment in every moral act, tends, in proportion to its passionate energy, to make impossible that detachment which moral judgment demands for its true pronouncement.

[1] See Note 38.

One point in connection with this deserves at least a casual mention. There is a certain inevitable obscuration of the object, when the necessary interval between it and the subject is abolished. For the perfect fulfilment of our moral function, the moral judgment and the moral sentiment should co-exist in perfect proportion, so that the acts or persons approved or condemned may be seen in their true moral outline, and that the feeling which is immediately consequent upon the discernment of their true character may be in exact proportion to a perfect moral estimate. Unhappily the conditions of our human life on earth render any such absolute moral rectitude impossible.[2] Indeed, few convictions are more impressively forced home upon us as life proceeds, than the difficulty—in most cases the impossibility—of attaining to any secure estimate of the actual moral value of a man's life and work. And may I not also assert that from this confused tumult of our human life there is ever rising an appeal, for the most part tacit, away from every human tribunal and from the bar of all human opinion, to some court on high,

[2] See Note 39.

where all is perfectly known? All men everywhere in their hearts cry out for the 'day that shall declare it,' and 'the fire that shall try every man's work, of what sort it is.' Surely we have here one of those significant facts which no Christian inquirer who is eager to obtain some rational insight into the content of his Christian faith can afford to neglect.

But let us now proceed briefly to consider the first of the two great questions which, in accordance with what was said in the last lecture, may be stated as the main determinants of any theory of morals, viz.: First, Where shall we discover a secure basis and just Directory in formulating any scheme of ethical rules prescribing our human duties? and, second, Whence the Authority which makes these rules obligatory, *i.e.* which makes them duties at all?

In regard to the first of these questions we must needs be content with the attainment, if possible, of some one principle, which, whatever inevitable difficulties are sure to be involved in its practical application to the differing conditions and stages of individual and social life, will still remain as our determining guide in

drawing out any ground-plan of human duty.[3] It is the generation of the Moral Cosmos with which we are here concerned. The will is the agent. There is an authority which claims it from above, and which reveals itself as absolute, however it may be interpreted. The material, so to speak, is provided in all the multiplex variety of appetites, instincts, desires and impulses to movement, which have emerged in the course of our developing life.

What remains to be considered is, Where is to be obtained that directory of conduct which shall impart guidance to the authority hitherto merely described as absolute and supreme? Authority that is blind is null. For 'Idea,' then, such as the philosopher is ever in quest of, we must now substitute 'Ideal.' And yet it is not so much a substitution after all, but rather the elevation of a speculative conception, which is on a level with the mind, to a height above it, whence it is warranted in addressing authoritatively the will.[4]

Whence, then, is this authority derived? How comes it to be invested with that fixity of centre,

[3] See Note 40. [4] See Note 41.

and yet endowed with that complete elasticity of application which we have seen to be the indispensable attributes of a satisfactory and consistent moral system?[5]

Of all conceptions that are likely to prove helpful in this approach to the subject of Morals, there is none more serviceable than the analogy, made prominent in Platonic thought, but familiar enough to us all, between the health of the physical and that of the moral nature.

The laws of physical health may, by virtue of the term 'laws,' be regarded as that branch of ethical obligation which is concerned with the bodily life; and these laws turn out to be simply the scientific facts of physiology interpreted into truths, and then in some strange way raised to a higher level than the merely cognitive, and re-stated in the imperative mood, as bearing upon conduct. But if this distinctly appears as the rationale of all those so-called "laws of health," which are in our own day so prominent a subject of scientific investigation, and of inculcation in education, and of social and legislative enforce-

[5] See Note 42.

ment, we can hardly be wrong in applying the same principle when we pass from this limited sphere to a full and completed conception of Ethics as concerned with the health, *i.e.* the perfect realisation of the *whole* nature of man.

In the more limited sphere we see at once how any omission or distortion of facts, any misreading or misinterpretation of their significance, in their bearing upon the healthy life of the physical organism, leads inevitably to a corresponding failure in the regulative imperatives that are based upon them. Sources of error and consequent danger beset us at every stage of the process we have tried to epitomise; in the correct ascertainment of the actual facts in themselves and in their mutual relation; again in the all-important interpretation of their bearing upon the total life of the organism; and, finally, in their formulation into detailed rules such as shall be at once intelligible and and practicable.

If this appear to be a bare statement of the veriest common-sense, it may none the less commend itself as embodying the principle we are in quest of, as we now enter the widest

range of human conduct, where the issues are still graver than those involved in the life of the body, and where is apt to rage much stormy contention between conflicting schools.

What to our inquirer may well shine forth clear from all obscuring mists and speak to his reason in calm, convincing tones is this: Everything in the just determination of human duty —the laws of health of the whole nature of man—must depend absolutely upon the right reading and interpretation of that nature. Its whole contents must be included in the survey, and these in due order and subordination, according to that hierarchical character which manifestly belongs to it.

Two things are herein made clear. First, that all the baffling diversities that have characterised ethical theories from the days of Socrates and the Sophists to our own time are fundamentally due to a radical difference of view as to what constitutes the perfection of human nature, and wherein it consists. There is required the recognition of all essential and characteristic endowments and powers; and these in their relative order and subordination as consti-

tutive of a perfected human life. Every theory in which, as in most theories, the determination has been obtained by a one-sided valuation, so far violates this proportion, and must be accounted to that extent faulty and defective.[6]

Secondly, it is equally manifest that the determining criterion in any just estimate of ethical values calls for a conception of a Human Ideal at once perfect in outline and authoritative in claim, and, I am inclined to add, an Ideal that has somewhere been actually realised. This natural upreaching of our nature in search of what can nowhere be found in the world around, at least suggests that somewhere beyond and above it must exist an actual realisation in human personality of the perfect Ideal which exerts so strange an authority over us.[7]

Let us suppose, then, not only that our governing principle has been accepted, but also that we are in possession of a just and noble conception of the human Ideal. We are then face to face with the final stage of its adaptation and application to the infinitely various human

[6] See Note 43. [7] See Note 44.

lives to which it not only makes its appeal, but issues its authoritative behests. This it is which, as we have implied in a former section, constitutes a great practical difficulty—a difficulty so great that it has given some plausibility to the sceptical plea that morality can never find an impregnable basis in reason.[8]

When we come to inquire, then, wherein precisely does this practical difficulty of application consist, it will be found, I think, to be twofold.

Firstly, that the moral life, like all life, exists in continuous stages, from its earliest dawn to its completest development. It is from this insensible continuity that the difficulty, both in the formation of rules of conduct and in their subsequent application, mainly arises.[9] The very crisis, with all its seeming abruptness, to which the moral life is liable, discloses itself as being, more accurately stated, but the precipitated result of insensible and continuous change. The course of moral progress is perfectly represented in that 'path of the just' which 'shineth more and more unto the perfect day.' There may

[8] See Note 45. [9] See Note 46.

be—as in the natural day—that glorious birth, the sunrise, when the golden orb flashes his flaming beams from the hill crest, and floods the valley with light. There may be the alternation of sun and cloud, storm and calm, and all the vicissitudes of the hours. But who shall say when the dawn begins; and who can fix the ever-moving shadow on the dial, which figures to the eye the waxing and waning day?

Similarly, who can fix the point where, in a human creature, the moral life begins? It is doubtless convenient, nay, even necessary, for us here, as in the intellectual realm, to draw our approximating lines. Their definiteness helps us both in the expression and in the application of our ethical code. Still, how poignant, at times, is our sense of their insufficiency, as well in the one case as in the other? We may say that the moral life consciously begins whenever there first emerges to view in the outlook of any life, with more or less of distinctness, a *better* than the present, and a better that *claims*. It is here that we perceive the origination in human life of Conscience, of that principle of duality characteristic of all clear thought.

The decision of the will, which is its determining feature, requires a dual, for it is essentially a choice between two alternatives. This a lower, and that a higher: and in the sharpness of the competition between them lies the keenness of the moral struggle. But often the duality is but faintly perceived; the gradations are infinite in their succession as are those of the brightening dawn. Hence there results—what often is a source of much distress—the utmost apparent contrariety in acts which yet, for the agents, are equally right. For one who is at the outset of the upward course, that is the right step—it may be, the only right step—which for one far beyond him would be a degrading fall.

The light 'shineth more and more unto the perfect day'; and the light, as it brightens, brings new reaches of moral claim, of duty, into view. This is the divine reward of the dutiful man. But he violates truth and righteousness both, if he turn upon his neighbour, and demand from him what he recognises vividly as a claim imperative upon his own soul. Yet there is one thing common to him and his neigh-

bour alike, common to all without exception, from lowest to highest. Duty is to each the next step forwards to that perfect day which symbolises for us the perfect life.

Secondly, it is not only that this insensible continuity, characteristic of all life, is ever baffling us, and rendering difficult the application of our principle to the actual life of man; but who can affirm that this life is the normal life of health? Yet our governing principle is drawn, as it must be, from the Ideal which is given by a perfectly developed human life, and thus implies not only completed growth, but perfect wholeness, *i.e.* holiness of nature. The analogy between virtue and health, which gave us the introduction to this section, may come in here with its own special illumination. Pathology is a word whose application is equally wide in the moral and in the physical sphere, and in all that indeterminate realm which lies between them. It is so because these spheres are essentially connected. The laws of health as addressed to the normal condition of a healthy man require careful and delicate qualification when applied to the same man in his sickness.

Without expanding further this second consideration, let me say that the difficulties and perplexities thence arising throw no shadow of doubt or discredit upon our interpretation and appreciation of this great subject of morals on its practical and regulative side, but they do emphasise immensely the appeal that we have already heard in the course of this discussion, for a guiding, governing Spirit from that region above and beyond this merely moral sphere; and for a Light that shall in very deed prove to be, in the Hebrew prophet's words, 'a Sun of Righteousness with healing in His wings.'[10]

But it is not enough to recognise our need of a perfected human Ideal to guide and direct us in the formulation and application of ethical rules; we must face the deeper question: What is the ground and source of their Authority —their right to rule us?

We are now in the presence of the most noteworthy and illustrious fact in the life of natural man, if we may use the phrase to indicate that no appeal is intended for the

[10] See Note 47.

present to the Christian consciousness. It is unquestionably a fact that each of us carries about with him something that speaks down to him from a height above him, and such a height as answers to an absolute claim upon our will. This something has always a well-determined and characteristic quality which will not suffer it to be confounded with any other thing. If an appeal is made, with a self-evidencing sincerity and directness, and with faith in the essential fundamental moral constitution of those addressed, there will be found, springing up to meet it, the response, be it strong or feeble, which witnesses to the inherent homage of the human will, *i.e.* of the man himself, to a mysterious Power above him which in some way demands an unconditional obedience.

There may be, and there probably will be, whole strata of encumbering feeling and apathy, and of that so-called self-interest, of every variety of colour and texture, with which the stream of selfish and ignoble living has, like some sedimentary deposit, overlaid the character—a self-interest coined into any number of convenient

maxims readily available for current use. Still, let one with the directness of insight and fervency of spirit of an Apostle Paul, reason of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, then, even in a hardened, luxurious, and licentious Felix, the confession, however overlaid and buried deep, of the true nature of man, will, for the moment at least, be extorted. In a few moments more it may possibly, alas, be smothered, or stamped down beneath the heel of a resolute will, or flung aside and dissipated into thin air by the flippancies of the cynic and the scoffer, or the sophistries of the ingenious disputant; but its presence, its nature, its power, have for the moment emerged, and been then and there attested.[11]

Let us now make pointed application to this life of Conscience, with its complex scheme and endless series of duties, of a principle which we obtained at an earlier stage of this inquiry, when occupied with the essential characteristics of all that can rightly claim to be called Philosophy, viz.: the discernment of Unity of Idea in the multiplicity and totality of our thoughts,

[11] See Note 48.

and more specifically the recognition of the Universal in the particular.

Such an application will serve to bring out distinctly the fact that Duty itself possesses a unity of existence, however distributed into an infinity of several claims and acts. Embodied, so to speak, in a multitude of particulars, each with its own specialised conditions of time and place and circumstance—yet the moral value and dignity of these is after all but one: derived from the fact that, be it what it may, it is our *duty*. Any question as to whether it bulks large or small, whether it is done in absolute obscurity or in the eye of the whole world, interferes not one whit with its sovereign quality as being that which claims absolutely our will. Whether it be difficult or easy matters much as affecting the test and standard of our loyalty to it, but affects not at all its inherent unity of nature. In naked skeleton outline, it is in every case the universal manifested in the particular, whether the particular be what we call great or small. Its whole meaning and dignity lie in its universality. The majesty of Duty towers as does the majesty of Truth over all modes of presentation.

It is here that we may say that Duty levels, and levels up, the lives of all men. Even when the hidden source and spring of its authority is not discerned, and when in consequence it wears an aspect for the most part stern and forbidding; even then, when austerity seems its great characteristic attribute, it has still to the dutiful soul revealed its inherent glory and dignity, so that the allurements of gain and pleasure fall off unheeded.[12]

Bearing in mind, then, this unity, universality, and supremacy of Duty, which thus imparts its sovereign quality to the meanest as well as to the noblest-seeming act or suffering to which it summons us, let me remark further, that for a human being actually to realise his humanity in all its fulness of outline and attributes, is—naturally considered—the all-comprehensive duty for each and all of us. I say 'naturally considered' for the present, because the question must finally be asked: 'To whom do we owe this self-realisation? To ourselves, to humanity, or to God?' But prior to any answer to this question, it can hardly be denied that to become

[12] See Note 49.

actually what he was made to be, to realise, that is, his humanity, is indeed the summary of a man's duty.

This does by no means signify that a man's thoughts should be self-centred. On the contrary, an examination into the elements of such an ideal reveals that unless there be found some means powerful enough to redeem a man from self-centred regard, however refined, and purified, and elevated, or even spiritualised the form it takes, the goal can never be reached, the prize must be for ever abandoned. But my contention is, that every duty, as it meets and claims us, no matter in what guise it is clothed, is our next step to this glorious consummation; that the fulfilment of whatever special function and office it claims reaches out beyond itself; implies what is not special, but generic and all-inclusive, viz.: the fulfilment of our humanity.

It is this aspect of the subject which now brings into view what can never be omitted in any, even the scantiest, treatment of the moral life, viz.: Ideals. The one marvellous and significant thing about Ideals is this, that while they have their existence above and beyond us,

and are seemingly severed by a distance impassable, they yet claim us with all the imperative of duty; a very pregnant hint this, that the true source of that strange obligation that gives all its meaning to the noble word Duty will also be found to be above and beyond us.

The Ideal is often, in an unheeding or ill-considered way, contrasted with the Real; and hence, perhaps, by the majority regarded as an idle empty phantom, whose substance must be sought in the dreamer's Utopia. Yet such an antithesis is altogether misleading, nay, is utterly false. It is the Actual, surely, that is the true foil to the Ideal. The marvel lies just here: it is by virtue of its inherent Reality that this so-called empty phantom, the Ideal, claims authoritatively to mould, to inform, to transfigure that Actual into its own image. This is an amazing but quite undoubted fact in this human life of ours, and it is as significant as it is astonishing. For the implication is inevitable that this claim is grounded upon the fact that it is with the Ideal and not the Actual that the larger measure of Reality is found.

We have to face, however, the universal failure, though in varying degrees, even of the most loyal and strenuous, to achieve their ideal; while to the vast majority the very word is but a name for a fleeting vision, fair, it may be, but idle as a dream, which, phantom-like, appears for a brief moment, and then melts into nothingness. And I suppose multitudes are never visited by anything clear and definite enough to be called even a vision. It is owing to this that the word has contracted associations of emptiness and vanity and unreality; 'vision' has lent itself to 'visionary'; and the whole subject is by the mass of men abandoned to the world of illusion. That this should be so is entirely intelligible, and indeed natural, but should not for a moment be suffered to hide the real significance of the fact before us; for beyond question a fact it is. What, then, does this fact mean?

An Ideal is a vision; it is, indeed, and, alas, too often, a fleeting vision, 'appearing for a little while and then vanishing away.' But it is unquestionably a vision, transient though it be, of our true self, or of our truer self. For it speaks down to us with an authority that

meets us nowhere except where

'Duty, stern daughter of the voice of God,'

addresses us. The Ideal claims us at the centre as Duty does; it claims our will, and the imperative is absolute. Nor can there be found any test and measure of Reality more certain than this. When this vision meets us, it is not simply that it attracts us because it is beautiful, so that we are drawn to gaze at it, and linger over it, as we might some autumn evening lean upon a gate, gazing fascinated and absorbed in the splendours of the setting sun sinking to his gorgeous rest. Visions of this sort do not claim us in this fashion, though they attract our gaze, and in this attraction do bespeak some real affinity between our souls and beauty. But this Moral Ideal is of another order; attraction is no full account of its power over us. Many a time it holds us, but we are not attracted. We struggle to be free from its haunting claim. If it kindle, it also makes us ashamed; it mars our peace; we would be quit of it, but it holds us fast. It is a vision of our real self: what we ought to be, what, if we respond to it, we are

now, indeed, through all that encumbers and obscures, and what one day we shall be seen in the full eye of that day to be. Yes, and not the most heedless can recognise it for what it is, without at least the passing homage of the spirit for a brief moment in the presence of an Authority that has right to rule.

As Duty points to a hidden source supreme, so in like manner do our ideals testify, and their witness is to the same effect. And if we receive it with any vivid sense of its truth and significance it will not be long before we recognise with a joy that is indeed full of glory, that the ideal which inspires and claims us is verily nothing other than a glimpse in vision of that true real life of each of us, which an Apostle declares at present to be but 'a hidden life,' but hid in God with Christ, whence it shall one day be made to appear. Therein lies the reason why its claim is absolute. 'If ye then be risen with Christ, seek those things which are above, where Christ sitteth on the right hand of God. Set your affection on things above, not on things on the earth. For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who

is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory' (Col. iii. 1-4).

This, however, is to anticipate. For the present we have, in dealing in outline with this Ethical section of our inquiry, obtained at any rate some clear apprehension of the main points, viz.: Firstly, that we need for any satisfactory handling of Duty, regarded as distributed into any scheme of rules of classified duties, such a true reading and interpretation of our human nature as shall give us a just Moral Ideal. Secondly, that we need to know wherein resides the ultimate source and ground of that peculiar Authority which is the constitutive principle in the life of Duty.

Anyone who sees clearly that these are the two focal points, so to say, of the Ethical life and its right understanding, may perhaps go further, and say that what is at least needed, whether it be obtainable or not—needed for the full satisfaction of a human life on this side of it—is that the Moral Ideal, and the Seat of Authority which makes it obligatory, be shown to be one and the same, resident, both of them, and realised in a Person, who, while one with

us in race, is yet, as the very meaning of the moral claim attests, infinitely above us.

It is, again, almost impossible not to anticipate, and ask our Christian inquirer whether this is not the very meaning of a Christianity that centres in Christ—Christianity, I mean, as construed on its moral side. We have found that the characteristic thing in Duty, that which gives it its whole meaning, is the unique absoluteness of its claim upon the will, *i.e.* upon the man himself as he lives and acts. And it is this significant fact we have now to fasten upon and try to interpret. Whatever account may be rendered of its genesis, its constituent factors in our nature, the stages of its growth and education, and of all that is summed up in evolutionary process, its present claim upon us is a thing beyond dispute. Once clearly pronounced, it admits of no degrees, no weighing and measuring. The imperative is beyond question what Kant called it—a categorical imperative. It speaks down to us in direct command from some height above us. It does not plead with us; it proposes no inducements to throw into the scale, though we may plead with one another and with ourselves,

and seek in many ways to strengthen our faltering will by urging whatever prudential considerations may be at hand. The central fact of the situation abides unaffected by any or all of these. There is nothing prudential in the clear note, when Conscience echoes to the soul some voice supreme. And should our apparent obedience in response prove to have been due, not to loyalty, but to a yielding to one or other of these added extraneous inducements, then, and to the extent of it, there is, literally and precisely, a dereliction of duty. Let no one confuse the matter at this point by introducing the difficulties, often so tragically grave and full of pain, which meet us in the effort to discover clearly in what precise direction the path of duty lies. That is a matter of infinite concern for our probationary life, but is nothing to the point here. It is then, indeed, that there comes into play all that difficult and delicate balancing of claims, all that weighing and measuring of opposing considerations, which test so searchingly the quality of spirit we are of. But when all this is over and the voice speaks clear, then we are

face to face with Reality. When my duty appears and stands approved to me consciously as such, there is an august and awful directness of claim. Some mysterious Absolute is then and there in immediate contact with my will. Two alternatives open up before me, sharp and clear—to do it, or to leave it undone. That is all.[13]

We have then to press the question: What does this absoluteness in duty and in ideals mean?

Surely it means that the command is complete in itself, is unqualified, unconditioned, categorical — Authority absolute, speaking down to us simply as imperative—'Do this' or 'Do it not.' And when I use, as I am compelled by the exigencies of the case to use, the figurative word 'above,' will any say that its figurativeness deprives it of clear meaning? We speak all day long, without ambiguity, of our superiors, of those above us who have right to command us. But the commands of no one of these are unconditional, absolute. They are limited, qualified, though within these limits Duty's clear tone may be heard. One

[13] See Note 50.

has to ask: 'How much above us are they? Within what range does their authority extend?' and many other questions which imply that, in this case, the claim is not absolute. But when the absolute claim shines forth from the height above us, and Duty speaks, and we ask, 'How much above?' and we try to bring in our measures and our estimates, as we do when, in the region of the prudential, we are calculating our prospective loss and gain, we are compelled to put them all aside as having no place here. The superior here is, and must be, not superior alone, but Supreme. This height above us is no measurable distance. The height, the distance upwards, is Infinite. No other word will do. If the claim be Absolute, then it follows that it descends upon us from the Infinite. And we are left with this to consider, when, out of the unknown, the seeming void above us, a Voice so speaks, and to it our Conscience so responds that all that is of the nature of reason within us compels us to believe that it is an utterance from the Infinite above:

'Who, then, can it be that thus speaks?'

LECTURE VII.

My endeavour has been throughout to furnish some aid to the thoughtful Christian, who is no specialist in scientific or philosophical or ethical study, but who is seeking to furnish himself with such guiding, illuminating principles as shall help to put his best thoughts into order, and be his best mental preparation should he at any time enter more directly and fully upon such pursuits.

I am assuming therefore that his actual point of view is that of a man who has in the deepest sense found his life in the practical acceptance of the Christian faith; a man whose position may be summed up in the experience of the Apostle Peter at the moment when the question pointedly faced him: Whom of all who claimed to be guides and teachers of

men in this dark, perplexed, and perplexing world, should he trust and follow?—and in a moment of swift spiritual illumination and intuition, he cried: 'Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life.' Of this same truth his spirit has obtained a secure and permanent hold; but, unlike the early disciple, he is a man who, living in our modern days, has read and meditated much, whose discursive thoughts have ranged over many fields of intellectual interests. He is feeling ever more deeply the pressure of the desire to bring his scattered thoughts and ideas into some kind of co-ordinated relation, and, above all, to relate them to the truth on which his faith has laid hold. He desires to bring them, not in any forced and arbitrary way, into captivity to Christ; to see how every range of human inquiry and interest is free to a Christian; every province, naturally and of itself, subject to Him who claimed not only to be the Saviour, but also the Light of the World, and whose word is this amazing one—severing Him in an instant from all who have ever claimed to teach men: 'It is I Myself who am the Truth.'

But I think I may rightfully claim that though bearing in mind the case of such an one as I have described, I have not suffered the assumption to prejudge or prejudice any conclusion so far arrived at. The survey we have attempted has at least been conducted in a clear, impartial, neutral light, without special pleading of any kind; so that whatever apologetic force it may ultimately be found to possess has not been consciously aimed at. To set forth simply a few luminous conceptions proper to certain large areas of human interest and inquiry has been all my endeavour. Controversial apologetics have purposely been left on one side. So far only as light has a necessary controversy with shadows: so far, and so far alone, have I been concerned with the sceptic or the agnostic.

Our reflective inquiry has necessarily been pursued in ever-widening circles. The limited Logical area widened naturally into the Scientific; and this as naturally again broke bounds, and revealed itself as a dependency on that which aims to consummate the satisfaction of the scientific and speculative intellect, and is named

Philosophy. Then has come finally into view an all-important factor of the situation, viz., the Will: the central power of the personal life: its exponent in action: the determining agent in character—character, which Novalis describes as 'the completely fashioned will.' Then our treatment necessarily expanded, and the interest heightened. For neither the scientific nor the aesthetic nor the speculative can ever, from the nature of the case, be the supreme interest for a human life. Not the speculative: for there is truth in the familiar expression that it is not the mind alone, but the whole spiritual nature of man which is the organ of truth or reality. And it is in this view of things that we may obtain our clearest conception of what legitimate Mysticism is, and may rightly claim. I say legitimate mysticism, because I would exclude all such as is simply a retreat into the obscurities of the unintelligible and the incognisable when intelligent cognition and definite statement are legitimately required. This mere idle escape from the controversial pursuer into a darkness or mist, where the fugitive can no longer be traced, deserves all the censure and even con-

temptuous denunciation which, on the lips of so many, is deemed the one method of dealing with mysticism and the mystics.

This it is which has almost spoiled the word for serious philosophical use. But if we would redeem it for such employment, despite any difficulties which are likely to beset us in any further handling of the conception, we shall do well to regard it in the light of the principle just laid down: and we shall then perhaps acknowledge that as there is an illegitimate and unwarrantable mysticism, so also there is a mysticism which is natural, legitimate, nay, inevitable, seeing that it is called for by the necessities of our spiritual constitution.

It was affirmed in a previous lecture that the area of that environing Reality which answers to our whole nature, and which, in many modes, is ever breaking through into our life and claiming us, is immensely wider than that mere section of it with which the scientific or speculative intellect is competent to deal; and that the surplusage is yet approachable in the way of unquestionably living contact by other sides of this composite nature of ours; and further, that

this approach and contact have in them a certain real apprehensibility which certifies to us the actual existence, and even something of the qualitative character of this transcendent Reality. But this vital apprehension of, and participation of the soul in that which exists in this outlying realm may be rightly named mysticism—a mysticism which is legitimate, for it is necessary, and which, I venture to assert, will never be exorcised by the utmost endeavours of the keenest disputants. Its roots are too evidently in the very constitution of our being. We disavowed any denial that there are in every case certain aspects of this transcendent Reality which do, and must come within the range of clear thought and language; and in this sense room was given for the admission of the saying, 'All that is real is also rational.' But it was claimed that it is only an aspect of the real that can be so apprehended and dealt with. 'It is,' it was said, 'this "relegation to an aspect"—to use Newman's phrase—which makes so much even of the clearest language merely symbolical, so that it can never be suffered to rank as a full and equivalent expression for the things themselves.'

To what was said by way of delimitation of the scope of philosophy, we have now added some definition and vindication of what I have ventured to term a legitimate mysticism. But the speculative is found wanting as the supreme human interest. Even the satisfactions of Art, as well as of science and of philosophy, are addressed only to certain provinces of the spirit's life. When, however, truth and beauty find in Ethics their application to Character, to life as a whole, then, obviously, we are on the confines of that widest realm which includes all others that we have traversed.

To bring this outline of reflective thought to a close, let us try to gather up such of our results and conclusions as have a direct bearing on the purpose, of which throughout we have sought never to lose sight. Every point on which we have touched, every region of inquiry we have hastily traversed, is capable of such large expansion and exploration that I close with a keen sense of the poverty of my attempt to bring out with any adequacy the full significance of each. Still, there may be, I hope, some benefit in even so contracted and succinct a

survey, if it shall have furnished some pregnant hints or suggestions to a reflective mind; some luminous ideas, and consequently some new glimpse of a fuller harmony, a more beautiful order than had hitherto been perceived in the interrelation of the several great spheres of human interest.

Let me be suffered once again to re-state in a sentence or two, the motive, aim, and method that have given unity and consistency to the subject we have been treating. The motive has been a deep, quick sense of the loss so many intelligent Christians suffer, because they have never been able to relate in any vital way their faith in Christ with those wide provinces of human interest which claim them as intelligent, educated, and cultivated men. These lie around the metropolis of their soul's life as either provinces revolted, or as alien lands, wherein, if they travel, they find them to be a strange country, where no homage is paid to the sovereign of their souls, governed by laws that seem to owe no allegiance to the Law Supreme, and where the dwellers speak a strange tongue, a language of their own. It can never be

wholly hidden, from the heart at any rate, that this is not as it should be; and with many there is a very pathetic sense that their spiritual vitality is thus lowered, their buoyancy and joyousness clouded and depressed. And it may even be that at times there is generated a chill suspicion that their precious faith is not, after all, securely based.

Our aim, then, in correspondence with this impulse, is to arrive, if possible, at some such discernment and recognition of the just interrelation and interdependence of these several realms as shall heal this unnatural alienation: to get beneath the surface-antagonisms and the sharp antinomies that baffle the understanding, and endeavour to obtain at least some grasp of the unity of meaning which must hold together our life and the world in which we live. Even a glimpse of such order and unity will do something to relieve intellectual distress; while in the degree in which occasional glimpses give place to clear vision, there may be granted some bright undeceiving view of a wonderful harmony relating all to one another, by virtue of the deep central relation of each to the very

truth on which the Christian faith has laid hold. Then will the reason find its satisfaction, as well as the conscience and the heart; the feeling of estrangement and alienation will give place to one of warm and closest kinship. There will be a perception of a real community of origin, identity of life, and oneness of goal. And it may finally even appear that the fountain head, the ultimate source of the living interest, attraction, and claim recognisable in each, is to be found in the contents of that very faith which has for its supreme object the living personal Christ.

As to the method which has been followed in pursuit of so wide and lofty an aim, it has obviously been the only one possible in the case, viz., the method of reflective thought, carried steadily forwards, advancing and ascending from the most outlying region of intellectual interest to those which lie ever nearer to the holy land; from the lowest ranges, through the higher, to the highest: aiming at every step to gain some clear, just, and even exact conception of the nature, function and limits of each well-marked sphere of the spirit's life and activities. And if any, even the most moderate, success

has attended our endeavours, it will now appear, and with increasing distinctness as our regard is keen and absorbed and prolonged, that in the several arches which compose the great viaduct for the spirit's passage, the keystone of each of them—that which binds their converging structure into a solid unity—is nothing less or other than the central truth of the religion of Jesus Christ.

With this premised, it is for us now to summarise the residual conclusions left with us from our reflective and critical survey, and note the several contributions of each to some just and full appreciation of that which is for us confessedly supreme. But before we take up these in their order, with a view to the application to each in turn of our central conception of Religion, it is obviously needful that we should make some attempt to formulate this conception, at least sufficiently for the purpose in hand. The necessity for brevity and succinctness here again, and in an especial degree, imposes a limitation which it is not easy to maintain. A central conception must suffice, shorn of all the details which on many sides

necessarily qualify it; with the proviso that in dwelling upon it, there shall remain open an entire freedom for all such additional and, on the practical side, most momentous considerations.

There lies then at the very core of the Christian conception of religion—the throbbing heart whence the spiritual life derives all its inspiration and power—the essential belief that Religion, in its all-inclusive sense, is the elevation of the human spirit to an ever-deepening and enlarging fellowship with the Divine Spirit. God is Spirit, the Father of spirits: and we too, His children, are essentially spirit likewise. That faith, then, by which the Christian man lives, is therefore in its essential nature an entrance and progress without limit into a life of communion with Him. This personal relation of spirit with spirit is, and must be for ever the idea which governs, illuminates, and inspires the meaning of the great word Religion. It is here and here only that life can be adequately interpreted—that life of which our Lord spake when He said, in words which are the crowning, all-inclusive word of His Gospel, 'I am come that they

might have Life, and that they might have it more abundantly.' Jn. 10 10

This word, 'Life,' then, expresses for us the supreme all-determining idea. 'Salvation,' that other, and to so many, the one characteristic expression for the Christian end, cannot be suffered to usurp the supreme place. That it should have come to do so is natural enough, for it is that aspect of the greater word which approaches the nearest to a fallen, sin-stricken race: it gives us the negative side, so to say, of the great positive. It derives, and rightly, its transcendent consequence from the actual condition of mankind. It is therefore naturally the prominent word of question and appeal. 'What must I do to be saved?' But this does not mean that it should ever be allowed to obscure to Christian thought the absolute supremacy of that greater word, which derives its fulness of meaning not from the actual condition of mankind, but from the essential nature of man, which I interpret to be that he is made to participate in the life of God. This is finally his *raison d'être*, the final cause of his being: 'To possess God, and to enjoy Him for ever.'

A man is saved that he may *live*: it is not that he lives that he may be saved. This surely, is the necessary order in which the two terms, the two ideas, stand to each other.

There are, indeed, two senses in which this word Salvation needs to be interpreted. The primary, and so the practical one, emphasises its negative side; the other simply furnishes a qualifying attribute to the supreme word Life. The first is that which distinctly regards the state of sin and misery out of which a man is to be delivered. As has been said, it looks backwards. The preposition which follows the word is the preposition *from*. But it is self-evident that in anything concerning the destiny of a human life, the backward gaze can never be the paramount view. It is the forward, not the backward look, which is the all-determining one. For we are moving forwards every moment that fleets, every breath we draw. Not what we have been; not even what we are, but what we are to be, is the question above all others. The importance of these former questions, great as it is, is still derivative and secondary. It is derived from the solemn bearing of the past and present upon

that future where our supreme interest lies. It is not *from* but *to* that is the preposition that expresses the true meaning, the just gauge of values, in the life of a human soul. All this is but to repeat in other words that salvation is in order to Life: and to corroborate our first assertion that Life is the governing, illuminating word of all religion.

The other meaning of the word 'salvation,' which, so far as custom, that 'norma loquendi,' goes, remains for the most part implicit rather than expressed, though, etymologically considered, it really gives us what is contained in the very meaning of life, viz. that it should be life in health. All disease, physical or moral, in any of its innumerable forms, is only a falling short or a perversion of the fulness of life. The word 'salvation' then, in this sense of it, simply lends a qualifying attribute to the greater and positive word 'life.' It is an attribute; one, moreover, which is not so much an adjunct, as itself an integral part of the connotation of the word.

And now we may proceed to say that if it is Life, 'life more abundant,' which gives us the central idea lying at the heart of the Christian

conception of Religion, it will be found that it is in the Fellowship of spirit with spirit that life at once reaches its highest power and is interpreted. It can be shown, I think, that it is in fellowship that life, through all its vast hierarchy of being, from lowest to highest, has its significance. The very first step in the process of living in a germinating seed is always a breach of self-centred isolation. The potential life which lay dormant within it, when once the quickening influences have reached it—the moisture and the warmth—exhibits itself always in an endeavour to enter into vital relations with what the scientific man calls so suitably its environment. The tiny thing swells, breaks from its limiting husk, strikes down into mother-earth its fine filaments, and shoots upwards to enter into harmonious relations with the great sun, the air, the light, the dew, the rain. Its whole process of living is, as we all know, a reciprocity of action and reaction with its environing material and forces. The measure of its perfect life is given by the fulness and perfectness of this harmony of reciprocity. Let some wanton hand tear that clump of sweet violets from its nestling-place in

the hedgerow and fling it out into the way. In a few hours you pick it up and say it is dead. What did it die of? The answer is plain, and most significant. It died because that fellowship was ruptured which is at once the equivalent and interpretation of Life. Surely this is no whimsical analogy, but the most literal, even scientific truth. It lived by communion: it dies when the communion is broken. Just so, I aver, do human souls live; and so likewise do they dwindle and die. From the lowest forms of life up to that mystery supreme which meets us, hidden in excess of light, in the doctrine of the Trinity, as an expression such as we may receive of the life of the ever-blessed God—everywhere it is revealed to us that Fellowship is Life, and that the Personal relation is the highest sphere of existence, in which both are exhibited. And I may now venture to affirm that wherever in the sphere of personal life this Fellowship has place, and in the degree of its perfectness, there is manifested a fact as exactly and absolutely certain as any that science can ever certify to us. Two things are found always, and in this order: an accession of Life,

along with its emotional correlative accompaniment, an accession of Joy. Fulness of life, and fulness of joy: these are the two signs and seals that certify to us that Christianity is from God.

And now to bring this general conception into direct connection with the doctrine of our New Testament, as set forth in that section of it which I take to be the consummation and crown of Revelation—the writings of St. John. I find that the characteristic expression for that faith in the Personal Christ which is, I am assuming throughout, the centre and spring of the life and joy and peace of our Christian inquirer, is this: πιστεύειν εἰς Χριστόν. Now here is a phrase which contains within itself, expressed in the most limpid, unambiguous language, the two elements which constitute by common consent a perfect Fellowship and a perfect Life. The English cannot be sufficient for us here. Any kind of translation that is not a mere paraphrase simply obscures the thing which at this point needs to be most clearly revealed. I must then ask indulgence for a brief word of grammatical analysis. The

great word πιστεύειν, 'to believe,' yields its essential meaning when tracked to its root—in a crude form, πιθ, a form most clearly akin to our own word 'faith,' Lat. *fides*, etc. It expresses essentially trust, reliance, repose. This is one element of the composite fellowship we have been lately analysing. Raised to its highest power, it is an absolute trust, rest of the soul in a Person. Such, as we all know—some of us from the choicest experience of life—is the ground condition of those rare friendships whose very life is in communion. The verb implies, I say, a perfect *rest* of a human spirit in the spirit of another. But if there is anything entirely certain in the interpretation of Greek words, it is that the preposition εἰς which follows it, the preposition 'into,' with its accusative case, in all its variety of usage, always and without exception carries with it, at its centre, the antithetic conception of *motion forwards*.

So, then, we see in this simple, most perspicuous Greek phrase, a meaning which our English is not pliant or finely vital enough to convey, viz. a combination of two antithetic and logically contradictory conceptions: one of

which—stating it quite barely—is *rest*; while the other, which is wedded to it, is its contradictory, *movement.* It is not 'I believe in'; it is 'I believe into.' And, further, both the rest and the movement are baptised, so to say, into the element of Personality—the personal relation. It is Jesus Christ in whom the Christian soul rests absolutely, and into whom it, even while it rests, is ever vitally moving forwards and upwards. What is this but that other constituent disclosed in an analysis of a perfect friendship, a perfect fellowship, a perfect life? An absolute trust, abiding alone, is but a stagnant, dead, inert thing: a stone securely built into a wall. On the other hand, an ever-continuous movement, cut off from repose, is a vain, empty restlessness. Neither of these is life. But the two, in balanced harmony, give us in outline the perfected ideal of a human life. This is open to the verification of every one of us who has even just begun to live and to reflect on life. And so it appears as the consummated New Testament doctrine of the essential end, and fullest interpretation of the Christian religion, that it gives us these obvious

elements, common to life generally, here exhibited in that highest range of it, viz. the personal relation. And the person in this case is represented as being the Person Supreme: 'God manifest in the flesh,' who speaks thus of Himself, 'He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father.'

I could imagine Plato, in his day, discussing in the fulness of that blended philosophic and poetic faculty which so gloriously distinguished him, and was at once his power and his charm —discussing wherein the perfection of an ideal human life consisted, and finding its interpretation just where we have found it, viz. in an absolute trust and an infinite progress of the spirit: both of these found in communion with that half-personal Idea which crowned his hierarchic series. And lo, here, in a simple, most clear, and unambiguous phrase, we have the dream proclaimed an actual truth—the central truth of the Christian faith. The End is Life. The Way to it is Faith, construed as Fellowship, with its double implicate of rest and movement; and these not in relation to thing or place or idea, but finding their sphere in the personal

relation with that unique Life in which the divine and human meet and are one.

I ventured a while ago to say that whenever the profoundest truth met the human understanding, the only way in which clear thought and speech could deal with it must always be by paradox or figure. And is it not so here, now that we are face to face with this most fundamental truth of all? What is this strange conciliation of logical opposites but paradox indeed? And where else shall we find this blessed truth so perfectly presented as when we read our Lord's own parable of the Vine-branch and the Vine? 'Abide in me.' Yes, indeed, but it is no dead, stagnant abiding, as the stone rests in the wall into which it is built; but with it, and in it, at one and the same moment, is that ever-flowing movement of the current of life, as the branch shares the vitality of the vine in which it dwells, and finds in that communion its life, its fruitfulness, its beauty, all given and perfected.

But now it only remains to take up in order our series of residual results, and to make brief and pointed application of them to this central

truth of our Christian faith. In doing so, we should return for a moment to the point at which we opened our inquiry, and which we adopted, not only as our point of departure, but also as some link of connection with the preceding series of Lectures, dealing with Creed. We glanced at the necessary limitations which must attach to any and every such formulated statement of doctrinal belief, *i.e.* of those truths which are the formal interpretation of the facts on which our Christian religion is based. This led on to some consideration of a still wider principle, viz. the inevitable failure of all language to give adequate expression to that substantial reality, which holds for us the final significance of the word truth : that objective truth which answers to our subjective belief. Thence it appeared that this truth, in its ultimate sense of that which can be relied upon, trusted with as certain an assurance as that which we possess of our own personal existence, discloses itself as existing in a certain gradational scale, answering to that hierarchy of faculty and endowment in ourselves to which it makes appeal. We found that the explicitness of articulate ex-

pression in propositional statement reaches its maximum of adequacy when dealing with fixed intellectual conceptions from which all ambiguity and all change is strictly excluded; also, that as there enter into the substance of what it is sought to express, other emotional and imaginative elements, words tend to lose more and more of their sharp, precise outline; and, if it be still attempted to use them in their strictness, can only give so much of the meaning as falls within the competency of intellectual conception to grasp and handle. The *whole* reality, then and there in vital contact with the spirit of a man, is relegated to an aspect; and to the extent of this relegation falls short of full expression.

So, then, Truth being interpreted as that which can be utterly trusted, relied upon, acted upon, there opened up a series, gradational, hierarchical in character, each member of which widens out its area of meaning according as it embraces in its appeal to the person believing, and in his response to it, more and ever more of his whole personality. Thus we pass from a merely logical truth to a scientific truth, a philosophical truth,

a poetic truth, a moral truth, until we are brought to that which, as I think, gives us both the appeal and the response to it at their maximum of width and depth and intensity—personal truth. Here is involved, on the one hand, the highest form or mode of Reality which appeals to us—Truth as it is in a person—and, on the other, that completest form of belief, of Faith, which it claims. It appears that we are so made that the highest form of trust of which we are capable, and which the perfect satisfaction of our nature requires, is trust in that person who shall be at once the highest and the nearest of all to which we have access. Such a trust can then doubtless be analysed, and divided out into all those other forms of statement which endeavour to distribute the fulness of the contents of this faith in modes adapted to intellectual apprehension and handling. But it can never, by any or all of them together, be adequately expressed. Suppose one who is fully alive to the fact that faith, in its fullest and widest significance, is the response of our nature to that environing Reality which, in innumerable modes, is ever

breaking through the fleeting shows of time and sense, and claiming us at one side or the other of our many-sided nature. Suppose him also to have recognised that our response—and that in proportion to its quickness and fulness of vitality—always consciously exalts and thrills our whole consciousness of life. And, finally, let him have grasped the truth that is stated abstractly when it is asserted that Personality is of necessity for us the highest category of existence, of reality, and that, consequently, the appeal in this case is not simply to this or to that side of our multiform nature, but goes to that central essence of our own personality which answers to it. Then, if his eye should light upon that familiar saying of Paul, which flows so freely from Christian lips, 'Truth as it is in Jesus,' he can hardly fail to be arrested. It may be he will come to acknowledge that, whether it be true or not, it is at least just such a presentation of truth as reason has led him to desire and aspire to, as one who is possessed by a passion for Reality, and has come to acknowledge that the Reality for which his nature craves must be that which

answers to it in its fulness—Reality personified. Here, again, in words absolutely clear and limpid in their meaning, truth is presented as residing in a Person: and that Person human like himself, yet one in whom God dwells.

And if, further, our Christian thinker takes up that amazing saying of the Lord Jesus, which baffles all efforts of the logical understanding to handle and interpret, and which yet, in the light of our present considerations, goes straight to the heart of what reason reveals as our supreme need, 'It is I myself that am the Truth,' will he not be disposed to thank God anew for so strange an assertion, not simply as being a saying sweet indeed to the soul, while profound in its mystical character—both which, indeed, it is—but also now as being as reasonable as it is mystical; nay, as being the very consummation and crown of that meaning of the word 'Truth,' which is imperatively required by his own nature? No otherwise could either Faith or the Truth which is its object fill out the perfect sphere of meaning of which both were capable and which both claimed.

But now let the brief discussion of the nature and office and consequent limitations of Logical method, with which we opened our review, yield us the contribution proper to its own province in the light of what we have just been saying. If it turn out that the highest mode of Truth is personal, then that logical function of sharp discrimination, that drawing of the dividing line which gave us our generative conception of the science of logic, must of necessity possess a very limited application, though within these limits thoroughly justified. There is, therefore, intended no derogation whatsoever from the just claims of the science of theology on its dogmatic side. Like all other sciences, it is the product of the application of the mind working according to those 'Laws of thought,' which it is the function of logic to elucidate and apply. Still, in the degree in which the whole substance and contents of Religion overpass, from their very nature, the range of such scientific treatment, there remains a vast surplusage left over for altogether different modes of apprehension and appreciation. For if the central reality of our Religion is

indeed Life in its fulness, and life interpreted as fellowship of spirit with spirit, then insensible continuity of approach enters into the very soul of that communion which is the life of the personal relation.

Let anyone whose privilege it is to enjoy sweet, ever-enlarging and deepening fellowship with a trusted friend endeavour to handle friendship as theology handles religion. He may well be justified in making the attempt, and find delight in it: some of the choicest pieces of literature are records of this very kind. But let such an one, possessed of the finest insight and the most complete and delicate control of the resources of language, apply himself to the task of setting forth in logical propositions, clearly stated and finely articulated and co-ordinated, as complete and finished an outline of what that friendship, fellowship, has meant for his own life as love and skill can frame. And then—when, we will suppose, the work is perfectly done—let him read it, and set it side by side with the full, rich sweetness of the personal reality, and what a poor, meagre, skeleton outline will it appear! What an amazing surplusage is that which he has

utterly failed to touch! Yes, but what does such a failure mean but an enhancing to his spiritual perception of that to which his whole nature finds its life in responding? And if this be so with human fellowship—with all its gaps and limits, and the flaws which attend its vital communications—how must the case stand when it is the Person Supreme, the All-knowing and the All-loving, the highest and the nearest, who approaches the soul of man? For here the appeal and the claim are without limit; and the response to them carries with it the fullest sense of glad and glorious vitality of which our nature is capable: an absolute trust in the Infinite Love.

LECTURE VIII.

PASSING from the sphere of bare dialectic into the wide fair field where Science is eagerly prosecuting her own work, the investigation of Nature, we were left with a still further disclosure of the limitations of logical method, more especially because the operations of Science are so largely concerned with organic life: a sphere of things where the infringement of the determining line makes itself manifest on every hand.

But besides this, we noted that the very postulate on which the whole magnificent structure of Positive Science is based is that there exists in Nature a certain Cosmos, a certain beautiful Order, which has its answering correlative in the mind of the investigator. It became clear to us that while it is in the rapture of a great discovery that the life of the scientist

reaches its maximum, such power to track out and apprehend natural law would be a thing inconceivable unless the Constitution and Course of Nature (*i.e.* the co-existences and sequences of phenomena) were in every part the creative expression of a Universal Mind which, in the signal act of discovery, claims kinship with the mind of the inquirer. If this be admitted as reasonable, as necessary indeed, what does it import, among other things, but an indirect corroboration of our venture to accept Fellowship as our best interpretation of Life: this time the life of Science? And so even here in the scientific region, where the word fellowship sounds so strange, except as representing the bond which unites the brotherhood of scientific men, we find that leap of mind to mind, that spiritual contact and intercommunication which gave us our best interpretation of life at its highest. It is the fellowship which is life that lies at the heart of the great joy which swells the breast of the discoverer in the moment of his triumph; limited, doubtless, from the very limitations of Science, to that sphere of the cognitive which is occupied with the mastery of the merely intellectual relations of things. Yet is

this sphere most certainly a province of the perfected life of man, and within its limits we may find the same principles which, in their fullest application, enter into that paramount range of human experience which we name Religion.

Finally, we noted that scientific inquiry and discovery, with all its width of range, is after all but occupied with the deciphering of natural process, method, orderly sequence, and leaves us with no answer to the great underlying questions of Origin, Issue, and Force. Whence came this marvellous ordered procession of event and change which we sum up as the Course of Nature? What is the Cosmic Force which is carrying forwards the ceaseless flux, with all its series of evolutionary change and transformation, which Science is so keenly occupied in deciphering? And what is to be the final issue of it all, if finality be indeed a word allowable?

But now let the Christian man, who has found satisfaction for mind and heart, and impulse to his will in trust in the ever-living, ever-present, ever-working personal Christ, manifest once in the flesh, and now manifest in the Spirit to his own soul as the very life of his life—let such an one, I say, read

once more that saying of Paul, which has many replicas in the New Testament: '*ἐξ αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα*' ('From Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things'); or that great word in the prologue of St. John's Gospel, where the creative source and process are expressed in terms of lucid simplicity: '*πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*' ('All things came into being through Him'—the Logos). What is this but the great postulate of Science interpreted in crystalline phrase to Christian faith? What is it but the dropping into the incomplete converging structure of the great arch of Scientific research, of its keystone—that which makes it finally reasonable? This essential relation of the creation of Nature to the personal Christ, the Saviour of the soul, is that which, in consecrating it as being an integral part of Religion, gives to Science its crowning dignity and glory by assigning to it its own place in the divine order of human achievement.

Now if, with these ideas, as clear-shining lamps, shedding down from above their interpreting light upon the vast field of scientific inquiry, the shadows which had made it for many a Christian soul a region alien and

suspected are dispelled: if Science is disclosed in its true and beautiful meaning as simply the rectification of our thoughts on natural process, the ever-enlarging understanding of God's ways: if its very existence is seen to rest upon the presupposition of a Universal Mind, expressing itself in the beautiful Order of Nature; surely this release from a jealous mistrust will react upon the life of the spirit, and infuse into it a happy confident buoyancy. That loyalty to facts which is for ever the master-key of the scientific discoverer, will henceforth be not only moralised, but spiritualised also, as being at once the scientific mode of rendering homage to Truth and of rendering obedience to Christ. If the ultimate source of the homage which Truth claims have its seat above all that lies within the competency of science to discover, none the less does its sovereignty and sway hallow every single item of scientific method. The devout soul is now in full possession of the freedom of this fair kingdom, and the scientific spirit receives its consecration. Its realm is now no alien land, no revolted province. Its investigation of Nature

is but the tracking of God's thoughts: thoughts rendered into the imperative by the Will which is the one spring of all power. 'All things are yours,' cries Paul, in a moment of rapt vision. Yes, and among them Science is ours: for God is here, and it is holy ground.

But further, what of that wider realm of speculative thought which science everywhere implies, even when disposed in its positivism to decry or wholly to exclude? What of Philosophy, of which the world in general is so shy; and which the Christian world is so apt to denounce as a mere creation of intellectual pride, vainly puffed up—'Science falsely so called'—opposed to the simplicity of the Gospel of Christ?

Did we not see that in its very origin, and throughout its whole devious course, its animating soul has been the aspiration of the mind, ever onwards and upwards, towards some central Unity of thought: that, unable to rest finally in the widest generalisation of scientific law, the mind seeks instinctively for a Universal Mind, in which alone it can find the satisfaction proper to its characteristic nature? In the postulate, already adverted to, which makes science possible,

viz. that the order of Nature bespeaks a Mind diffused through its every part, of which this Cosmos is the expression, there appears now the adumbration of a larger truth still. The observed uniformities of co-existence and sequence, the discovery of which is the goal of scientific inquiry, can never be the ultimate satisfaction even of the intellectual part of us. Uniformities must somehow reveal themselves as related to and dependent upon a Unity which includes them all: else the quickened mind can find no rest. Mind must rest ultimately in Mind: in that one Supreme Mind, without the existence of which this world which science would interpret in detail is inconceivable.

But if this be so, what is the whole *raison d'être* and effort of Philosophy but an echo of that aspiration which thrills us in the Psalmist's cry: 'My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God'—even though here the concern be with one aspect—the intellectual side—of that total full-orbed human personality, which finds in Religion its completed fulness of satisfaction, quickening and rest? Unity in Totality, sought in the speculative area of our total spiritual activity, was our genetic

idea for all that can rightly be named Philosophy. The interpretation of the universe in the light of a Unity of Idea, this is the far-off point to which the speculative intellect, in all its systems and theories, ever aspires.

We noted that the three conceptions which gradually evolved themselves in the early Greek philosophy—each appearing and claiming for a space an exclusive supremacy—were these:

I. Unity of Being, with its constant insistence on permanence, fixity, immutability.

II. Totality, with its emphasis on the fleeting: the continuous flux and process of 'Becoming.'

III. Harmony, with its insistence on form and number: its rhythmic order, which claimed in some fashion to control and harmonise the other two.

These several conceptions, as their meaning gradually developed, blended with one another, and, with perhaps an especial stress on the first-named, concurred in the making of Plato. And they remain for all time the constituent elements in all Philosophy, ancient or modern. Thus the problem of problems was ere long disclosed as being for the thinker the discern-

ment, the recognition, of the Unchangeable in the fleeting: the One in the many: the Universal in the particular: the Real in the phenomenal.

Now, if all this sounds repulsive in its metaphysical abstractness, yet this it is which our Christian thinker needs to grapple to his soul as the central, all-determining idea, which will give life and meaning to all that claims him in the name of Philosophy. And if he will but be patient, it will unfold and disclose its fulness of significance when applied to the central verity of his soul's life of faith. He may come to see distinctly that this philosophic search for the real amid the fleeting shows of phenomenal existence, as they flit past hour by hour, is but the rendering in the terms of strict intellectual conception and expression, of what he himself is every day engaged in, as he seeks to live that life of Faith which is the summary of his Christian calling. For what is it to walk by faith, not by sight, but to discern and clasp, not simply with the mind, but with the will, the conscience, and the heart, the things which, manifested in time and its fleeting contents, are themselves eternal? What is it to lay hold on eternal life, but to

take as a clue, through these fleeting days, that pure gold thread of eternal reality which runs through all the flimsy material of our hurrying life, and gives it all its meaning and its value?

But further, it appears that thought, when it reaches its highest and widest sphere of exercise, demands imperatively a certain harmony of contrasts, nay, a conciliation of what to clear intellect reveal themselves as not merely contrasted, but absolute contradictories. Is not the One the contradictory of the Many? and the Fixed the contradictory of the Fleeting? and the Universal the contradictory of the Particular? Yet is the mind forced onwards and upwards to require that these shall melt into a Unity, which shall hold together these polar opposites in a perfect whole. This is certainly implied in all Philosophy that has clearly apprehended its generative motive and its final goal.

And here, again, I would ask our Christian thinker to set up this lamp in the dark, confused world of his thinking, and suffer it to cast its illuminating rays upon the several provinces where his thoughts are busy. Is not this same

strange conciliation of contradictories implied when of any particular truth he asserts that it is true? What does such an assertion mean but simply that this particular statement bears with it, at its core, a Universal, which alone warrants the predication of the adjective? And what is it that confers such infinite dignity on the most insignificant of our daily duties—duties which meet us conditioned by numberless particulars of time and place and circumstance—but that each one of them expresses as its very soul a Universal common to all duties? What, again, is it that makes a particular object, be it thing or act or person, beautiful, but the essential implication with the existence of the innumerable particulars of a Universal which we call Beauty, a universal which is the logical contradictory of these particulars, and yet which constitutes each a unitary object on which thought and feeling may dwell with delight?

But let us venture to pass on to the highest application of this same principle. What is the mystery of the Incarnation when stated in bare skeleton outline of philosophic phrase? Is it not, amid much else, this very thing which has

met us and claimed us all along in every region where our highest faculties of spirit are in exercise? Is it not this same so-called conciliation of contradictories? Here, assuredly, we have the Infinite and the Finite, the Universal and the Particular presented in the Unity of a Personality. Surely it need not revolt us to put it so. Such statements have, of course, all the limitations that are inevitable when reason deals with a Reality that transcends reason. Still, shall the highest we know and trust be other than reasonable? Thus may we enter, at least in part, into the rapture of our Lord when, on a certain day, His ardent disciples, in a moment of clear, swift intuition of the Real in the Phenomenal, beheld in Jesus of Nazareth, the Carpenter—in this particular separate individual man—the Eternal Son of God. And so our Philosophy, in rising to its noblest speculative height, at once reveals its necessary limitations, and yet sets its seal of reasonableness upon the fundamental verity of our Christian faith. Again, now into the converging structure of this wide arch of Philosophic thought, the keystone which binds it together and makes it

one fit support of that fair palace which is the proper home of the soul's life, is dropped from the hands of the reverent believer. Philosophy is as free to him as science, and brings in her hands even a richer offering to the feet of his sovereign King, the Lord Christ.

But we ought not to stop here, though it is a high level and a wide prospect which we have reached. The principle, indeed, with which we started compels us to go further in the interest of that all-comprehending Unity which requires that *all* that claims us anywhere should be subdued to the unity of our total personality. The necessary canon of certitude itself compels us to widen our outlook. For Truth we found, as we proceeded, to be ever enlarging its significance; so that not mind alone, but the whole spiritual nature of man, was seen and acknowledged to be its organ. This it was that compelled us to make the great word at length synonymous with Reality, *i.e.* all that appeals to us and claims us as being as truly existent as are we ourselves. It was here that there came into view that large surplusage which gives for us a reasonable meaning, a legitimate place, to Mysticism, as

occupying a necessary province of a completely developed human life. By this surplusage is meant so much of that transcendent and supreme Reality as by no merely intellectual effort (notwithstanding that it has a clear aspect towards the reason, and is so far amenable to scientific and speculative handling) can be adequately expressed in articulate word and phrase and careful definition; while yet it is certified to us as being really existent, with the same cogency as anything that can be so dealt with.

Now of this outlying region, one large, fair province fell to the occupation of our aesthetic sensibilities. It is the realm of the Beautiful; the fair world of the artist, the poet ποιητής, in the most comprehensive sense of the term; the *maker*, the man with creative gift, whose characteristic function it is to embody in some form of the concrete, to express in some individual beautiful creation, the ideal which dwelt first in his own soul. This expression may be given in any medium apprehensible by the senses which is capable of becoming an exponent of such ideal existence. The artistic product, the ποιῆμα, may be a statue, a picture, a musical symphony, a

poem ; but whatever it is, it is such as will allow our aesthetic and imaginative feeling to pass through it to that soul of Beauty which gave it birth, and endowed it with all its meaning for the spirit which gazes and listens. It is simply impossible that there should be no deep and essential relation of origin and dependence between this realm of the spiritual life of man and the Religion in which he is to find his perfected life.

We affirm, then, again, that the Aesthetic is also an aspect of that Supreme Reality which claims us on so many sides : that it is Truth on its side towards our sense of beauty, as morality is the same truth on its imperative side, finding its organ in conscience, and addressing itself to our will ; just as truth in its ordinary and more limited sense is that aspect of it which faces our cognitive faculty, and is amenable to intellectual handling.

The relation between these several provinces compelled us to acknowledge that they must have one common source, and a consequent relation of kinship in all their varied developments. We just obtained a glimpse of a conceivable Intellectual Cosmos : a beautiful order among all our

thoughts, controlled and organised by a central Truth; and this appeared as the perfected ideal for the life of intelligence. Similarly there appeared a world, itself also a beautiful order, in which all that has place is informed and inspired and fashioned by a sovereign Beauty. And to relegate such a world, in which myriads of quick, passionate natures are living their best lives, to the chill outlying secular region with which Religion has no concern, becomes even absurdly impossible. Did we not find, when discussing the several vocations and functions of philosopher and poet, that while the former is pursuing that course of abstract thought which is proper to his calling, he is ever *ascending* from the individual, the particular, the actual, to the universal and ideal: on the other hand, the true ~~ποιητής~~, also pursuing the method proper to his creative vocation, is ever *descending* from the universal and ideal to give expression to it in some one particular of its innumerable modes of imaginative creation? But now let our intelligent Christian inquirer, in the light of this simple view of the matter, look around him on this fair world, and then reverently look up, and think of the

Poet Supreme, with whom dwells that 'Beauty of the Lord our God,' which is everywhere striving for expression; an expression which has received a characteristic name: the Glory of God. Will there not flash out upon his soul, with a new and radiant meaning, that saying of St. Paul, 'We are ~~His ποίημα,~~ His poem?' Surely a Christian is intended to be, and shall one day actually be, just this thing: a veritable poem of God: a beautiful expression of the mind of God.

And may we not carry this analogy a step further? If it is the one inspiring motive and purpose of the creative artist to give the most complete and adequate expression to the beauty that has appeared to him in vision—if this is at once his glory and his joy—think of the pain, how keen and poignant it is, when the vision eludes him, or his material is intractable, or his mastery of the technique of his art fails him, and all is marred. Who can tell the pain of a frustrated achievement to a keen and sensitive soul? What then, shall we say, when again we look up, and think of the glory of God striving to penetrate this clouded, soiled, and encumbered

human life of ours? Truly, material fails: yet are there wonders wrought. How bold is the Hebrew singer in the words 'The heavens declare the glory of God'! And as we gaze at the splendours of some autumn sunset, its purple and rose, its crystal and gold and flame, we confess the words are not too bold. There is that within the gazer's soul that rises in response. Yea, verily, it is glory, it is beauty, whose spring must be found somewhere in the highest, the Divine. But think how the case would stand if form and colour and light were all the material open to the hand and spirit of the Poet Supreme. Who could measure the ineffable pain of expression so balked and blurred? But there is other material at hand. There is—to pass over all else—there is human character: the life of man made in God's image: so do we from our souls believe.

Here then, is enlargement of scope indeed. Here is a material, a medium, answering in essential respects to the glory divine which is striving for expression. It is true: so says our faith; true, but, alas, how far short fall the actual facts! How poor this human material appears

as the scroll of human life unfolds before us, and the thronging figures meet our eyes! Here and there, it is true, there gleams forth from the throng some pure soul, some saintly life, clad in some degree with that beauty of holiness which is, of all things we can know, divine. But is this all that is possible, all that can be achieved? Can it be all, if God above be indeed at once the Holy and the ever Blessed One? Would not blessedness fail, if this were all? Who that realises the artist's poignant pang and shame, but must answer, 'Yes.' But to our Christian thinker this is not all? What lies for him at the very centre of his Christian faith, the support of all else? Is it not the 'Word made Flesh?' Is it not this mystery of godliness: 'God made manifest in the Flesh?' Is not Christ the 'Image of the invisible God': the 'Express Image of His substance': the 'Effulgence of His glory?'

What is all this from our present point of view, but the perfecting of the divine self-expression; the perfect blessedness of the Sovereign Poet of the Universe? And so this brief outline of the aesthetic life, of the genesis of art,

its method of procedure, its characteristic pains and pleasures, has brought us, ere we were well aware of it, into the immediate presence of the mystery of the Incarnation. If this unforced, natural, and I think inevitable following out of one clear line of reflective thought, in this one specialised region of its active exercise, has conducted us to the central verity of our Christian faith, surely we may cease to plead apologetically for some limited and special grace, whereby to confer some Christian sanction to the world of Art. We find it already consecrated. If every true thought, so every beautiful thing is found already, and from its very nature, to be in obedience to Christ. And our Christian inquirer may now find a new interest and a new joy in putting side by side two words that lie far apart in the pages of Holy Scripture. God looked down upon the fair world that He had made, 'and behold, it was very good.' Again He looked down from heaven and beheld the perfect image of the invisible God, and said, 'This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.'

Surely then, if the essential life of Art be

found in expression, in visible, palpable, audible form, and its end be delight—again may the lips of reverent faith pronounce over this new region of human interest and achievement the consecrating word: once more is dropped the crowning key-stone into this fair arch, which takes its own rightful place in the spiritual building which is temple and palace both to the soul that has learnt at last something of the glory and the beauty of the life for which it was created.

Yet is there one other loftier and wider span, which crowns, as with a perfect dome, the whole structure of a perfectly developed life. It is the Ethical, the Moral, where Truth and Beauty meet in something higher than themselves—something that has endowed them both with that strange Imperative that claims the will. This, from its very nature, reaches a loftier height and covers a wider range. For Conduct is a wider, loftier thing than either science, or philosophy, or art, since it covers the whole area of the voluntary life, and touches every item of responsible living. So high is it, that we discovered in Duty a strange absoluteness that is to

be found nowhere else in the life of man. This it was that invested it with a unique and august quality which separates it from all other claims and attractions that can be measured or weighed. It was this that compelled us, when we had set up our three thrones, at first co-ordinate, as of three sister-powers,—the True, the Beautiful, the Right—regnant each in her own sphere as if with equal sovereignty, each with her own throng of devotees and worshippers—compelled us to acknowledge, when we looked more closely, that the authority of two of them was an authority secondary and derived. Sovereign over all was that which made its appeal not simply to the intellect or the feeling, though with aspects towards both of these, but issued its command to that within us which is the one true exponent of the central personal life. Hence it was that while science and philosophy and art lie far removed from the mass of mankind, Duty is omnipresent in high and low, the instructed and the ignorant, the cultured and the boor.

Here we obtained at least a glimpse of the great and comforting truth that this highest

thing of all was denied to none. The inequalities of privilege and opportunity, everywhere else discernible, were, in this most characteristically human attribute of our humanity, abolished. So that here too, the highest is the nearest; the most glorious is the most accessible. What Christian thinker can fail to be moved to marvel and adore, when he observes the almost exclusive stress laid in the teaching of his faith upon that which is open to all: Duty, interpreted as the doing of the will of God—'The world passeth away and the lust thereof, but he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever'—or when he remembers that the calm, strong word which ushers in the advent of the Son of Man, the Prince of Life, into the world —'Lo, I come . . . . to do Thy will, O God —is not denied to the lowliest disciple: the thread of gold running through all that endless succession of duties which make up his life of obscurity and toil? He too, as each day dawns, is called to take upon his lips that same great utterance of the One Life which possessed a perfect autonomy: and to say, yea, even I 'come to do Thy will, O God.'

This is the meaning of Duty as the Religion of Christ interprets it. It is Truth, it is Reality on its imperative side. Yes, but it is not these as abstract ideas. These can never speak authoritatively to us, who are no abstractions but living persons. It is, therefore, Truth in a Person, which, on its authoritative, imperative side is the Supreme Will, that claims our own will when Duty meets us. Duty, like truth, meets us 'in Jesus.'

In endeavouring, at an earlier stage, to possess ourselves of the conception that should govern all our thought concerning this crowning human interest of Ethics, we fixed upon these two questions as fundamental and common to every moral theory: First, Whence springs this absolute claim which all recognise as the very soul of duty? and second, Whence shall we derive our governing, directing principle that shall throw our several duties into their shining ranks and orders? And the only answer to the first that seemed reasonable and satisfactory was this: That absolute claim certainly betokens an infinite height above us, and a Unitary Source from which it issues. For in our conception of a perfected

moral order, no duty could possibly finally antagonise any other: a central Unity of Authority is implied in them all. And, for the second question, we were driven to acknowledge that, ideally considered, the ground-plan of any general scheme of duties could only be given in the just reading and interpretation of this human nature of ours. Ethics must found upon psychology, construing that word in its fullest and broadest sense. This just and adequate interpretation of all the facts is then invested, from that one Source of supreme authority, with an absolute imperative, that raises the scientific interpretation to the rank of a moral claim, the ethical law being, as ever, the authoritative embodiment of the truth.

Both of these questions left us with eyes straining upwards, with blind hands feeling around us, for something clearly implied but nowhere to be seen or felt. There was no glimpse of the hidden throne, whose authority made us tremble and yet rejoice. A Categorical Imperative spoke out of the darkness above us.

And, on the other hand, where shall the

true type and norm of human life be found? Our nature yearns for the ideal man, but we scan in vain the soiled and distorted figures from which we are left to gather our idea of man. That this could never be an average gathered by a wide induction from our observations of humanity is clear enough. But in the souls of those who, with pure purpose, are straining eyes and hands upwards and around, there arises a great desire for an Unveiled Throne and for a Perfect Man; and these two not as separate, but as One.

Now, at this point, let us suppose our Christian inquirer himself endeavouring to think out this question of morals, of duty, as clearly and strenuously as lies within his powers; and then suddenly recurring to his normal attitude as a devout believer in the Lord Jesus Christ—the Son of Man and the Son of God. Does he not find the answer to his two questions—an answer given in the Supreme Person with whom his own spirit is in daily fellowship? The ethical problem receives for him its solution. What his intelligence craved as its needed satisfaction is actually with him at his side;

nay, abiding in his own soul. Nothing can claim to be supreme over a free human will, that highest thing on earth, except one thing, and that a Will Supreme, in direct contact with his own. And this is precisely what, ethically considered, Jesus Christ is to his life—the Divine Will manifested to and in his human conscience.

And what is that Name which this same Sovereign Lord ever loved to claim and adopt as His dearest title? What but 'the Son of Man'—the perfect norm of human nature—whom to follow is found in his deepest experience to mean being most fully and joyously alive; into whom he is exhorted to grow, till he reach the full stature of his manhood; and to whom it is promised he shall one day be made like?

So reasonable in its bearing upon these great moral questions is the faith in Christ, by which, as he has always known since first he came to it, his highest life is realised. He will now clearly see that Ethics, unless it remain a truncated fragment, incomplete and uninterpreted, must complete itself in Religion—in that which brings it, in source and method and

issue, into intimate, direct relation with the Divine.

But, for the Christian soul, there is added to these words, completion, interpretation, that further and more glorious word, Transfiguration. For this Lord Christ, who in His divine humanity has revealed Himself to his conscience as the incarnation of the Supreme Will and the perfect human ideal, has also disclosed Himself to his heart as the perfect expression of the Divine Love. And that faith which is interpreted by fellowship—as well in its repose as in its inspiring activity—is disclosed as an actual participation in the life of God, with all its outlook into the illimitable vistas of life and immortality. No wonder, if this be so, that Ethics, Morals, Duty undergo a transfiguring change. Their import remains the same; the outline of the conception is not infringed; but for the rest, all is different. That communion of spirit with Spirit has transferred, or is little by little transferring the Authority which was once external, a threatening Sinai, to a seat within the soul. 'Thy law is within my heart.' The law is no longer restrictive; it is liberty. It is the law of his

being. Yet none the less is it the Law of God which speaks in Duty. The paradox meets us once again. It is now that 'perfect law of liberty.' Duty, once so hard a word, so stern, so ready to start up as the opposite of privilege, now shines out as the privilege supreme.

How all this is pictured for us in perfect lines when we read in the Gospels of the Transfiguration of the Lord. We see one ascending the steep of Duty's path, knowing not whence arises that strange claim to which he is yet so grimly loyal; with face set like a flint, eyes averted from every primrose path of dalliance that would lead aside from the way, effort in the straining limbs; knowing not why, still must he do the right. But lo, he reaches a height where a bright cloud rests. Nay, the heaven above opens; and a voice not of earth greets him: a hand omnipotent, yet tender, grasps him. The Father of his spirit is there, and he is in His embrace. The Brother and Lover of his soul claims him. The Spirit, Lord and Giver of Life, breathes life and peace into his heart. Then the meaning of all is at length revealed. Duty is privilege indeed. The hardness and stern-

ness that repelled have passed. The very garments, worn and travel-stained, have now become raiment that is white and glistering; and the face is as of one who, without cloud, communes with God.

Here then, we must bring to a close this brief and imperfect outline—brief and imperfect indeed, compared with the breadth and length and height of what has been included in its survey. Yet here and there, it is hoped, through all this confessed inadequacy, some bright pregnant glimpses may have been obtained of the perfect round of what Christ our Life has made the possession of a believing soul; and some aid at least afforded to those whom it has been especially desired to help.

If indeed it be, that in an absolute trust and in an infinite progression we may all recognise elements that constitute our ideal of a perfected human life; and if it be that in fellowship with persons this life finds its highest mode and form: then, as we look up to those far-off points of light in the spiritual firmament above, to Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Right those stars, that in the best of mankind have

always attracted and stirred the soul to its purest enthusiasm—it can never surely be our final word, that these ideal points of human aspiration and endeavour, with their strange power to attract, and claim, and rule, shine down upon us, as separate stars, from some heaven of abstractions. They must, surely, ultimately be found to be but modes and aspects of a Unity as Real and as Personal as that which constitutes the identity of those whom they thus claim: there must be, holding them together in one, a Personal synthesis, corresponding to that which holds together in a unity and identity which cannot be infringed, our own several human capacities and powers.

Thus it is, that these converging lines of reflection, which we have been occupied in tracing, cannot but lead at last to a Supreme and Central Person—One who shall be revealed at length as at once the Highest and yet the Nearest: the Holiest, and yet the One who Loves us best. And in this all-inclusive Fellowship with Him will be found the heart of a Religion which, while it gives due place to creeds and polities and ritual, must find its

throbbing life in none of these, but in a perfected Communion with God and with one another. Then indeed, will those rapt words of St. Paul, which for the most part escape our narrow, shallow thoughts, come at last to find a natural home in our souls, and be full of meaning when we venture to take them up into our lips: 'All things are yours, whether . . . . the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's.'

NOTES.

LECTURE I.

Note 1, Page 8.

When we consider the tide of silent influences which has now for half a century been sweeping up against these rocky barriers of dogma, it is no matter of surprise that there has come about, in almost all quarters, a gradual depreciation of formulated statements of doctrine or belief. These influences have sprung naturally from the Scientific Spirit in general which has for so long given its tone to our modern thought, while they have been accentuated by that special mode and manifestation of it familiar to us under the name of the Higher Criticism.

This so-called 'retreat from dogma' is, indeed, sometimes construed simply as one symptom among many of the superficiality and levity of the age in which we live, but it is at least susceptible of quite a different interpretation, and one which in my opinion is much nearer to the truth. My conviction is that there exists and is operative amongst us a more eager and even passionate desire to get at the truth of things than has ever prevailed before.

This would seem to be the inevitable result of the diffusion of the scientific temper which characterises our time, and is

a consequence of much deeper moral significance than that which bulks so large in the eyes and imagination of most, in the practical application of scientific discovery to the improvement of what may be termed in contrast the machinery of living. The moral quality of life is a thing infinitely more momentous. And it is surely in this quickened sense of the absolute necessity for facing in every case the actual facts, *i.e.* in loyalty to the truth of things, that the supreme utility, nay, the consecration of Science and the Scientific Spirit, is to be found. Thus the very thing which has proved the master-key to discovery all along her career of triumph, has rendered a deeper service still, in kindling in every range of inquiry a purer and keener passion for truth and reality. And it is, I believe, this eagerness to get at the actual facts and see and measure them aright, this impatience of mere phrases and explanations which are felt not to explain, which has led men to conclude, when they face the grave questions of the moral and religious life, that it is a much safer and easier, and altogether less precarious thing to interpret religious belief by its expression in conduct—*i.e.* the kind of life the believing man lives—than to attempt to gather it from a study of any formulated system of dogmatic positions to which he may profess, and in all sincerity, to have given in his adhesion.

NOTE 2, PAGE 10.

Cf. Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, ix. p. 1: 'Our being, with its faculties of mind and body, is a Fact not admitting of question; all things being of necessity referred to it, not it to other things. Such as I am, it is my all: this is my essential standpoint, and must be taken for granted, otherwise thought is but an idle amusement not worth the trouble.'

So Illingworth's comment on the above: 'Personality is the gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass.'

Again Mansel, in *Bampton Lecture III.*: 'It is from the intense consciousness of our own real existence that the conception of Reality takes its rise in our minds. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists: relation to Personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist.'

The same thing is expressly stated by Illingworth: *Personality, Human and Divine*, Lecture II. p. 43: 'Personality is our canon of Reality, the most real thing we know, and by comparison with which we estimate the amount of reality in other things. For, however difficult the notion of reality is to define, we may accept the evidence of language, in itself no mean metaphysician, to the general view that there are degrees of it.'

Note 3, Page 13.

It is thus that the possibilities of Education and Culture are so dependent for us upon the poverty or the wealth of the language into which we were born. Our mother tongue has descended to us, a great inheritance open to us all to enter into and possess: and this not merely as Literature in its classic forms, but in itself as Language in its separate words and phrases, each of which is, so to speak, a crystallised deposit, recording a certain classification made by those who have preceded us.

Note 4, Page 16.

The width and sharpness of the intervals which separate defined terms, are felt to do violence to the Reality which is claiming to be expressed; and so the sliding gradations of tone, rhythm, and music come in insensibly as allies.

Note 5, Page 17.

In examining the intellectual justification of our belief in a Personal God, Illingworth remarks, Lecture III., p. 80: 'We

must remember that the instinctive nature of its origin reappears at every stage of its development. It is not, it never has been a merely intellectual thing, for it is the outcome of our *entire personality acting as a whole.* Our reason, our affections, our actions all alike feel about for contact with some supreme Reality; and when the mind, speaking for its companion faculties, names that Reality a Person, it is giving voice to the inarticulate conviction of the heart and will: an instinctive mystical conviction that is in truth "too deep for words." For in Pascal's language, "The heart has reasons of its own, which the reason does not know."'

Note 6, Page 23.

This is the reason for that instinctive cry for Revival which rises at times with pathetic eagerness from our churches when the sense of languishing and failure grieves and oppresses them. It is no new *word* that is called for, no addition to the precious communications that speak to them from the page of Psalm and Prophecy, of Gospel and Epistle; but it is ever the *Spirit* for whose outpouring they plead. So powerless are spoken words even to those most eager to receive them, and though it be the Eternal Word Himself who speaks, until the unspoken but communicated Spirit shall have poured life and power into them, and Himself abides to interpret and quicken. And, once more, this is strikingly presented in that specific promise of 'guidance into the Truth,' which anticipated the departure of the Master from His disciples, and exhibited expressly the expediency of it. That promise is of no added words, statements of truth, Articles of Belief, but it is of a guidance *into* the Truth, which in verbal outline was already theirs.

Note 7, Page 24.

If any should suppose that such an exposition as that given in the text is compromised or condemned by being roughly

stigmatised as a mere retreat into an idle mysticism, let him only consider how this very thing enters most certainly and conspicuously into a veritable experience, in the fellowship of friend with friend. Here, at any rate, we are on *terra firma*: and I will try neither to exaggerate nor extenuate in my statement of the case: only asking that every word should bear its full and not its weakened signification. Let two friends—real friends—meet and commune together. Let the meeting be one where mind comes into vital contact with mind, and heart with heart, and spirit with spirit, and all this in an atmosphere of unfeigned trust and affection. What happens? Something very wonderful, very sweet and beautiful: yes, but all most essentially and intensely real.

As they speak, one to the other, the heart of each is unlocked: their lips are loosened: powerfully and most influentially these two act and react upon one another. The horizon of their thought grows wider: feeling flows in fuller, deeper volume. These two persons are at these moments intensely aware of a large accession both of life and of joy.

Surely there is no exaggeration in so describing the situation. But let us analyse this communion of friends, and do we not find at once that there are two elements different in kind but intimately related that are operative in it? There is the spoken word. And happy above others are those to whom speech is pliant to their impulse to expression, and who can read off without effort in articulate utterance a transcript of their thought and emotion. Happy are those who can—to use the significant commonplace—'express themselves.' For self-expression is one great mode of Life itself, and failing here we shall fall sadly short of the heights which Fellowship can attain, and of the power that lies therein to be of use to other souls.

But will any say that this is all that is at work in the scene I have been trying to depict? Surely not. Let the spoken part of the communion be perfect; yet every word and

phrase, nay, every glance and tone and gesture calls for an unspoken interpreter: let there be failure here, then all fails. But let there be, on the other hand, that sharing in a common life which is the essence of comprehension, and this in its fulness: then does all succeed. Nay, as we have seen, in proportion as the subject-matter of communication, in its height and depth and fulness, escapes the competency of even the most finely selected words, these will grow unnecessary: they will fall away, and there will descend upon these two a fellowship of comprehending silence. Then it is that we have revealed in the plenitude of its power the presence and grace of the unuttered but communicated spirit. As this is the guide into Truth, so also is it the guide into the Life which answers to the Truth, and into that joy in the Holy Ghost which follows when Truth and Life have adequately met. No wonder that when we recur to the context of that promise already quoted, we should hear the Master say, 'I have yet many things to say unto you; but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when He, the Spirit of Truth is come, He will guide you into all the Truth.'

Jn. 16 12.

LECTURE II.

NOTE 8, PAGE 35.

So stated, the end proposed may perhaps sound altogether extravagant and out of reach: yet surely a thoughtful man may make at least some progress towards it. Proceeding with firm, well-considered steps, in the light of the luminous conceptions proper to each several province of inquiry, which constitute, as it were, the focal points giving to each its separate unity, he may gradually find himself a little nearer to the goal. He may find, as he advances and ascends,

not only a widening prospect, but to the extent to which he is able to possess himself of a just interpretation, and to apply it to each province in turn, he will, I think, become aware of a Cosmos—a beautiful Order, insensibly arising amid the chaos of his unrelated and conflicting thoughts. These several provinces will lose that air of estrangement and secular alienation that had been so distressing. Nay, there may even be gained also a fuller insight into the essential meaning and quality of the Religion by which he lives. And with each discovery will be found a healing of old antagonisms, and a strengthened corroboration of his faith. On the other hand there will not fail to fall upon human life, in the *full* scope of its interests, a certain grace of consecration which had failed it hitherto. For, as it is the inspiration and consecration of every common life to let each item of its experience be brought into living relation with the Divine Realities which are its foundation and spring, so also is it the consecration of Science, of Philosophy, of Poetry, of Ethics, when, in a man's thought of them, these several realms of intellectual and spiritual life are similarly interpreted, and seen to be vitally and organically related to the central verities of Religion. Then they appear in their true light, and are found to be inspired and governed by the self-same ideal powers which in the fulness of their development are recognized as Divine.

In short, it is surely possible for a Christian man to be at home and free in every sphere of human interest, and to *find* all sacred. This would be not simply to discover a poor *modus vivendi* for his religion in relation to them, or to be content with a benevolent neutrality in regard to them, but it would be to find in the very contents of Christian Faith that which will make a man free of them all. He may then pass easily from one to another, from lower to higher, with no sense of jar or jolt ; while from the highest, where beyond dispute his own best life is lived, there will be shed down a kindling and interpreting light even upon subjects which are

most remote, and to common apprehension perhaps out of all connection with what is denominated the Spiritual Life.

All my endeavour, then, is to contribute something that may prove helpful, even if but by hint or suggestion, to an end so much to be desired. It is a task in which insight is required rather than learning. What is chiefly needed indeed is some power to realise our ideas with distinctness and fixedness, and an ability to move steadily and consecutively along a few clear lines of thought. This being so, it will be of no advantage to quote largely from authorities, for it can only be incidentally that any such appeal for corroboration is called for. The harmony of thought we are in search of can hardly be obtained at second-hand.

Similarly, our argument does not depend for its cogency upon a specialist's acquaintance with the details of the several spheres of mental operation that come under review, though bound to be never ultimately out of harmony with them. It is the governing principles in each that are for our purpose sufficient.

Furthermore, it is possible, I believe, to follow out such a course of meditative reflection in a spirit of entire impartiality; to avoid all special pleading, and even any explicit apologetic. Whatever of polemical bearing may be found is simply incidental to the attempt to exhibit clearly positive truth, and is not inspired by any desire for victory over an opponent. Yet the endeavour to preserve such equity of consideration and estimate throughout our inquiry may well be perfectly consistent with the absolute conviction that our Christian Faith is validly based. The central truths on which it has laid hold have satisfied the claim which our whole composite Spiritual Nature puts forth. Our Life is met by it, and is consciously in contact with the Reality that answers to it whether in aspiration or in repose. But I am supposing a case where the co-ordination of the Thought is in arrear of the Life. As it has been said, 'We live first and then think.' All my attempt, then, is to contribute something

towards such an organisation of our thinking as shall put it into fuller harmony with our spiritual hold of Reality : with our Faith, our Love, our Hope. We may accept the maxim that 'All that is Real is Rational' as axiomatic, provided we interpret it as meaning not that the *whole* substance of Reality can be rationally apprehended and intellectually formulated and handled : but that in all that has validly approved itself to be as truly real as is our own personal existence, there is an aspect, a section larger or smaller according to its specific character, which can be scientifically expressed and rationally dealt with. And one main advantage to be derived from our proposed survey is some clearer discernment of the limits within which this may reasonably be expected.

When Socrates pursued his ceaseless questioning of his fellow-citizens, with its relentless exposure of the inconsistencies which made the seeming-wise appear to the interested bystanders an empty fool, nothing seemed proof against the shrewd keen irony of a method which reduced all knowledge to a blank. Who could wonder that as the odium and irritation grew, he should stand forth in the eyes of the multitude as the arch-Sophist, who was corrupting the youth and sapping the foundations of morality. And yet we know that the impelling motive of that unique consecrated life, that which made it the fountain-head of all philosophical thought, was the conviction that never faltered, the faith simple and absolute, that Righteousness was essentially reasonable : that Right was but Truth on its imperative side : that if once it could be driven home to a human soul that its first great need was a frank confession of ignorance, then the foundations of virtue and happiness could be securely laid in a sound self-knowledge. This so-named subverter of morality, with his mordant questioning, was the one man of his time who was laying broad and deep the foundations of morality in Reason. And in an age when the primitive traditional authority was rapidly lapsing, and carrying with

it the supports of a morality that was but one of custom and usage, this man, having as firm a faith in Reason as in Virtue, was effecting the transfer from such a precarious and shifting base to that true reading and interpretation of our essential human nature which must for ever furnish us with the one legitimate basis for every just system of Ethics.

NOTE 9, PAGE 40.

Much eager metaphysical controversy has naturally raged concerning the nature and authority of these ultimate supports, and the trust which can legitimately be reposed in them. They are commonly referred to two categories, the Axiomatic and the Empirical: those, viz., of which no further account can be given than that they are axioms of our Intelligence, self-evident and incapable of proof; while to those of the other class, no further authority is allowed than that which belongs to Inductive generalisation, the fruit of Experience scientifically ordered and verified.

Naturally, also, there is no absolute consensus of philosophical opinion as to the clear line to be drawn between these two categories of first principles. Much that used to be without hesitation regarded as the direct utterance of mind, of ideas and truths literally innate, has in our day come to be viewed rather as the consummated product of long ages of Experience; while even those who in some form or other still hold by the doctrine of innate or connate ideas, have been driven to admit that, even granting them a source of originality that goes deep down into the very bases of the constitution of our Intelligence, they are certainly still very dependent upon the experience which alone can evoke them, and render them explicit to consciousness.

Discussion, too, of course, there may be as to the final and absolute value of their claim to certitude: to such an assurance of Reality, that is, as shall be on an equal level with the conviction of our own personal existence, resting, like

all else that can claim to be called 'Knowledge,' in the last resort, upon the trustworthiness and veracity of our faculties. But with all these questions, interesting as they are, we have here no direct concern.

NOTE 10, PAGE 53.

I think it can be maintained that the principle which governs all strict logical process, and which, therefore, when clearly realised in thought illuminates the whole subject for the understanding, is given in 'the dividing line,' on either side of which everything must be conceived to be with which Logic can adequately deal. Grant this simple diagrammatic representation in its application to the Thought of whose Laws Logic is the professed Science, and the whole doctrine of the subject as expounded in the text-books can be consecutively developed. The whole endeavour of the Science is the stringent application of this line of clear cleavage: in the first instance, as we have seen, to get absolutely rid of ambiguity in the meaning of the Terms it is compelled to employ as representing the objects of thought with which it is really and properly concerned. Then follows a further application in order to rid itself of the same vitiating flaw so often found to lurk in those Propositions which have been synthetically constructed out of its terms, and which become the premisses from which its inferences are formally deduced.

But still the process continues. Let us suppose these necessary preliminaries rigidly performed: a supposition, be it observed, which, except in regard to the most conventionally defined terms, as in the spatial conceptions of geometry, is never perfectly realised, and for the most part is flagrantly violated. Then, in the next place, this Science whose methods and limits we are considering proceeds to its main subject of Inference, that to which all else is subsidiary. Still, all it can do to ensure validity is to make further application of its one

prerogative power. The dividing line comes now to be applied to those two all-inclusive categories of thought and things, technically termed the 'Quality' and 'Quantity' of Propositions.

In regard to the first-named, one concern of Logic is to part Agreement from Disagreement by a clean-cut absolute distinction, so that every proposition when forced into its clear logical mould comes out as Affirmative or as Negative. This is the sharp clash of 'Yes' and 'No' in the field of Argument. No compromise is admitted. The partition is absolute. If it falter or fail, with that failure all Syllogistic demonstration loses its right to compel assent to its conclusions.

It is in like manner, but less satisfactorily, that Logic deals with the second category. Again it is the severing line it seeks to impose, when the Quantification of its propositions comes to be dealt with. As in the earlier case it was the 'Yes and No,' the 'Is and Is not,' so now it is the 'All' and the 'Some' which make their appearance in the Logical antithesis. Less satisfactorily, I say, in this case, because while the affirmative and the negative lie absolutely apart, dividing all between them: neither of the antithetic terms over-reaching the other, but constituting the most perfect exclusiveness that Logic is capable of: the Quantitative pair of antithetics, on the other hand, commonly named the Universal and the Particular, and represented by the 'All' and the 'Some,' do not admit of the same thoroughgoing exclusive differentiation. For it is clear that these deal with the same subject-matter, the difference between them lying solely in the presence or absence of *limitation*; for the Particular is clearly *contained* in the Universal. The 'Some' which stands in opposition to the 'All' must be in reality a *part* of it. So that as logic can never look beyond what is actually stated in its formal propositions, no logical assertion of the Truth of a Particular proposition can be taken to imply the Falsity of its antithetic Universal, for it

may turn out to be merely carved out from this. Thus, in practice, the very stringency of Logical Rule may result in a less accurate correspondence with the actual facts of the case than an ordinary colloquial statement would imply to a listener. To say that 'Some men are fallible' would certainly be taken to imply that it was *only* some who were so, and would be justly held to be wilfully misleading if the speaker was as well aware as any of us that an infallible mortal does not exist. But Logic, whose interest in morality is *nil*, and whose sense of humour is on a par with it, would not even smile, and to any reproach would not fail to maintain a stony indifference. Logically, the statement was perfectly true. Certainly 'Some' men are fallible. With regard to other 'Some,' or to all the remainder, Logic is indifferent.

Since then 'Some' is contained in 'All,' it cannot exert stringently its one prerogative except in a one-sided fashion. All it can do is to allow a free passage from the whole to the part, from the Universal to the Particular, but refuse passage absolutely when attempted in the reverse direction. And, indeed, it is in this latter case that perhaps the most valuable practical service is rendered by the Science to a race signally open to the seductions of rash Generalisation.

LECTURE III.

NOTE 11, PAGE 57.

This follows from the fact that strict logical process is limited to the securing of a valid passage for our thoughts from the contents of given statements to others which were virtually contained in them. Its characteristic function is to exhibit explicitly in the conclusion what was already con-

tained implicitly in the premisses, and its especial utility lies in its power usefully to combine and yield in one clear proposition what had been severally stated in two.

NOTE 12, PAGE 59.

We are now passing beyond that comparatively narrow range of our intellectual activity which is engaged in the critical handling of formulated statements with a view simply to secure their mutual consistency and valid restatement in convenient form. There comes now into view a more interesting but more difficult task. This is the endeavour to obtain a valid correspondence between our thoughts—our knowledge wrought out in careful statement—and the actual facts of the physical order around us which we call Nature. It is the sphere of intellectual life commonly denominated the Scientific that next claims us: that great realm crowded with enthusiastic explorers and investigators, the scene in our day of innumerable triumphs. To ascertain the facts, as our senses are able to apprehend them, and our mind to throw them into generalised form: to endow them, in virtue of their uniformity of behaviour, with an imperative mood, so that they come naturally to be named Laws, which can then be practically applied, and the scope of man's mastery over the forces of Nature indefinitely enlarged: this is the end and inspiring purpose of the man of Science.

Here, again, as in the narrower field from which we have just emerged, we are assuming that it is possible for an intelligent Christian inquirer and truth-seeker to obtain a just and adequate view of the true nature, function, method, and limits of the scientific endeavour, though perhaps with no claim to a detailed acquaintance with any one of its numberless branches. Indeed it is possible that the specialist, by virtue of the very concentration and absorption of interest and faculty in one subject, may be less favourably placed for forming a just and comprehensive estimate of the

whole area of man's spiritual faculties and activities. The omission, however, of any one of these, or any failure of due proportion in the estimate of the part assigned to each of them, must prove a serious impediment to one who is above all things desirous of bringing his Christian belief into a right intellectual relation with them all.

NOTE 13, PAGE 61.

It is in this reciprocal action and interaction that the organism, which in this case stands for our composite and unitary being, must find its life ; and were a perfect adjustment and correspondence in the vital process attainable, our development towards complete self-realisation would be carried forwards to its issue in a perfect well-being.

NOTE 14, PAGE 63.

At a later stage it will be necessary to inquire more closely, how it is that this most significant and most glorious thing in a human life comes to be : how Truth can ever take on this strange majesty of Command. But, for the present, all we are concerned with is to make clear the relation actually existing between the three terms and the conceptions they represent.

NOTE 15, PAGE 66.

These illustrations may serve to make it clear that if Truth thus defined be in every case the relevance of Facts to Life, then will all truths rise or sink in the scale as this relevance is to the higher or to the lower ranges of our life.

While further, in this strict mutual relation of Truth to the Personal Life, we may see that the latter is the larger, the final word, and that the trueness of any Truth, can only be certified in the experiences of the Life : that any truth shall approve itself to us as certain, can only mean that we can

rely upon it as absolutely as we can trust the fact of our own existence.

It is owing to this that it is often convenient and entirely justifiable to widen the scope of meaning we have just assigned to the great term 'Truth,' and suffer it to expand to the fulness of meaning of 'Reality.' And it has this advantage, that while 'True' and 'Truth' are apt to remain too much identified with propositional statement, so that to some it seems justifiable to demand that everything that is true shall be able to be expressed in a formulated sentence: the term 'Reality,' on the other hand, is less exposed to the danger of being narrowed to a mere antithesis of False. By 'true' in this fuller sense, we mean not only true in statement, not only actually existing, but further, answering perfectly to the fulness of the idea. We read in the Gospel that 'The Law came by Moses: but Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ.' Here surely no imputation of falsity is cast upon the Law, which was itself 'holy, just, and good'; but what is meant is simply that it was, after all, but 'a shadow of good things to come,' and not the very substance of the things.

So when our Lord declares of Himself, 'It is I that am the true Vine,' again the affirmation is that the fulness of the idea that found such beautiful symbolical expression in the fruit-bearing tree, was yet but given in part therein, while in Himself it was perfectly realised and perfectly expressed.

NOTE 16, PAGE 72.

One may remark here that Language, as an expression of bare Facts, to say nothing of the Truths which are their interpretation, has again revealed a certain inadequacy. The sharp cleavage, the clear-cut outline of its terms is seen, even here in this scientific region, to have given place to a fringe which, as it loses substance, goes off ever further into the nebulous and the unknown. And we may judge how

much more noticeable this must of necessity become when, passing from formulated scientific statements, we ascend to those greater interests which concern our emotional, volitional, and spiritual life. In this sphere of things, where the invisible and eternal Realities dwell, it is not the mere insensible gradations exhibited in the evolutionary processes of physical nature which baffle us; but there is the endeavour to give articulate expression to the invisible and the impalpable, to that Reality which approaches us not only by way of intellectual apprehension, recognition, and discernment, but also by *every* avenue through which it may find access to the spirit. While, on the other hand, expression is sought for that answering subjective experience where all is interfused with Feeling: where Imagination lends its wings to Thought: where Conscience promulgates its austere decrees; and where finally the finite spirit of man is drawn into fellowship with the Spirit Supreme.

Note 17, Page 74.

These objects are commonly designated by the neutral scientific term 'Phenomena.' For whatever of deeper substantial reality they may possess, they do at all events *appear*, and manifest themselves to the senses in an apprehensible way, and so through them to the mind of the scientist.

Note 18, Page 74.

This seems indeed to us so instinctive, so inevitable, that we are apt habitually to ignore the possibility of any other kind of knowledge. Yet Omniscience, which is Science perfected, has no such limitations. Each separate item—be it person or thing—is known in its separate entirety. Clearly, then, it is not that the phenomena of scientific classification and generalisation actually *exist* in classes. They exist separately: but the mind throws its net over them, and so gathers such imperfect cognitive mastery of them as it can attain.

Note 19, Page 85.

And here in so far as Evolutionary order is illuminated by the phrase, 'The survival of the fittest,' when this somewhat ambiguous word is interpreted to mean not merely the fittest to survive, but the fittest in point of intrinsic excellence and worthiness, it becomes simply such a corroboration of Faith, which has its own reasons for believing in the character of the future issue, as Science may be expected to supply.

LECTURE IV

Note 20, Page 87.

And yet even so stated there is a falling short of the complete truth. For the word 'Apprehension,' signifying such grasp of Reality as we are capable of, cannot fairly be narrowed down to the limits of the cognitive. It must be suffered to expand its significance in a manner answering to that which we found to be necessary when dealing with that Truth which may be named its objective. The ground of assurance of certitude in such apprehension must extend beyond the area which is dominated by the Unity of Intelligence, till it include all those other companion powers and faculties for which indeed the *mind* can act as articulate spokesman, but which yet are manifestly wider than itself. And such enlargement must finally reach to the full extent of our total personality. This, as it is for us the highest category of existence, so surely must be, as Illingworth maintains, our one final Canon of Assurance. For except in what can be exhibited in formulated statement it is not the *mind* alone which is for us the organ of Truth when expanded to that larger sense of Reality, which we found to

be implied in it, but *our whole spiritual nature*, and this in the fulness and harmonised order of its manifold constituent elements. For the present, however, let us keep well within the bounds of the speculative and discursive intellect, which has occupied us so far.

Note 21, Page 87.

But the lines along which all scientific inquiry proceeds conduct us inevitably beyond the limits commonly assigned to science. There is nothing arbitrary about this further movement. Realising the true motive which gives to scientific investigation its first impulse, we cannot fail to perceive that it must carry us forwards into that further region beyond, which has commonly been given the name of Philosophy. To put the case quite simply, one might say that we are so made as to think, and to think-on, and Philosophy is nothing else than the crowning stage of this process of thinking-on. It is but the further march of mind, whose first step is taken when the child asks for the first time the reason why.

Note 22, Page 88.

This is none the less necessary because the great majority of persons live their intellectual life without any clear sense of its nature and character. To these the very names, 'Logic,' 'Science,' 'Philosophy,' are but strange, blank, unilluminated terms, suggesting nothing but the arid inutilities of academic pursuit, matters of no interest or concern except to the selected few ; while in regard to Philosophy, the last of the three, a section even of the scientific world are ready to repudiate it as a vain and profitless pursuit. By these, Metaphysics are regarded with disdain as the limbo of the idlest phantasms that have mocked and wasted the powers of human intellect. It

is their boast, indeed, to have chased them from their own selected field of Positive Science, an area well walled in and lighted by electric lamps. Still, not all their disciples can be kept from straying into those tempting outlying regions where the mists are apt to gather and rest. These wanderers may at least bear witness to the absurdity of ignoring the existence of what is implied at every step and stage of scientific research. We philosophise—as Sir W. Hamilton says—simply because we *must*: the necessity is laid upon us so soon as the mind is once alive and awake to its powers. The same necessity which compels us to think at all, urges us to think-on, and then to try to get our thoughts into order.

The aim of Science is indeed a great and lofty one, and may well claim on many accounts the enthusiastic devotion it receives. It is only when it exaggerates its rôle in the development of our total human life, or in that social evolution which is but the same thing writ large, that it provokes a reasonable opposition.

NOTE 23, PAGE 90.

This is not to be in love with ignorance: with darkness for darkness' sake. It is but a legitimate jealousy of any extravagant and exclusive claim that outrages the due proportions of the full humanity that is ours. We look to Science for some adequate knowledge of those general Laws which rule in the several spheres of phenomenal existence that lie open to its investigation. But we cannot afford to forget for a moment that this expression, however convenient, is highly figurative; that these 'Laws' are simply observed uniformities of Existence and Behaviour which are themselves ultimately unexplained. The so-called 'Rule of Law' is itself but this very uniformity, and conveys no inkling of any source of authority which warrants the adopted term Law. If then, in any one of these separated spheres, the method of the operation of these so-named Laws, singly or

in combination, has been discovered, and so formulated that each item of attested fact falling within it can be cited as an instance of the uniformity in question, *i.e.* can be scientifically explained, then is the Science complete. It reaches the fulness of its competency; no more can rightly be claimed of it.

LECTURE V.

NOTE 24, PAGE 119.

In doing this it has been our main object to vindicate Philosophy, on the one hand as against the Positivist, who would idly endeavour to discard it altogether as a pursuit merely illusive and nugatory, and on the other as against the Christian Believer, by whom it, no less than Science, is apt to be regarded as an object of suspicion: often, indeed, by reason of its arrogant assumption, as a foe to that simplicity and humility of spirit upon which his religion ever lays so great a stress.

I have sought to show, on the contrary, that Philosophy holds a place, and a high place, legitimately its own: that it is entirely natural and therefore necessary, since a mind once fairly quickened and alert must needs philosophise: and that it is in itself entirely consistent with the most sincere humility of spirit. Finally, I have tried to gather up the leading elements constitutive of a just conception of what philosophy essentially is. These residual conceptions we have now to carry with us as we pass on, and to attempt finally to exhibit them, not as obstructions to Faith which must be polemically encountered and overcome, but rather as being such a contribution as from this source we may expect to our apprehension of that full-orbed Truth and Reality which is our ultimate quest.

Note 25, Page 121.

This would seem the only intelligible meaning, adequate to the case, that we can fairly give to the term. We are bound by sheer necessity, and in no mere spirit of presumption, to make ourselves—our whole self—the test and measure of all that claims to be really existent. To this extent, at any rate, our Philosophy, no less than our Science or our Theology, is bound to be anthropomorphic.

Note 26, Page 122.

To anyone who is convinced that Personality is necessarily the highest category of existence: or, putting it otherwise, that it is Trust in a Person which satisfies most completely that spiritual instinct for secure reliance which in its degree is met and satisfied when anything is known to be *true*: it will appear simply natural to find our Lord saying of Himself, '*I* am the Truth.' Such a statement, however it may be termed mystical, and although it is, I suppose, in the strictest sense unparalleled and unique, would seem, after all, to be but the culminating point to which we are both attracted and impelled when we regard steadily the simple meaning of the word 'Truth.'

Note 27, Page 123.

Though our final aim is the application of these principles and distinctions to the consideration of that Central Truth of our Christian Religion, which I am presupposing has approved itself to our Inquirer as the Supreme Reality answering to his life: yet it seems desirable, in making out our route to that subject of paramount interest, to bestow some brief but close scrutiny on those intermediate regions which are named the Aesthetic and the Moral. For we shall here, too, most certainly find ourselves touching certain sides

and aspects of things which also evade any merely logical or scientific, or even philosophical expression and statement, though there be still other aspects of them which may well claim to be so handled. Some consideration of these will fitly prepare us for that final contemplation of Religion in which it exhibits itself not only as the complement and harmony of all that has preceded, but as the perfected satisfaction of our whole composite spiritual nature.

NOTE 28, PAGE 124.

It would seem an astonishing fatuity of interpretation to conclude that this seemingly wholly sensational existence should be erected into the primary characteristic of human nature, because, forsooth, it is the first to appear on the scene : and to infer that all else that by and by asserts itself as development proceeds, must be regarded as modes of sensation more or less disguised. As though Priority in Time could be rationally construed as Primacy in Importance! All Nature everywhere proclaims that in the order of evolution it is ever the generic that makes its first appearance, and then later the specific characteristics which give to the product all its meaning. As well might one gravely assert that because the foundation and the ground-plan of the cellars come necessarily first in the building of a house, therefore the key to the whole construction—its *raison d'être* in the mind of the builder and the occupier—is to be sought in excavations that preceded the structure ; or insanely expect to sample the quality of the pear tree by a slice from the root, because without a root there could be no tree, no fruit. Yet it is hardly too much to say that the whole elaborated edifice of the Sensational Philosophy rests ultimately upon no better foundation. Our Inquirer will do well to accept it as a Canon of Interpretation, applicable in every sphere of organic Life, but most especially when it is human nature that is under review,

that all *Interpretations* are from *above*, not from below. The *lower* must in all instances of evolutionary process find the key to its significance and characteristic qualities in the *higher*, not the *higher* in the *lower*. That which consummates the process exhibits the true bearing and function of all that has preceded it.

Note 29, Page 127.

This is a world which claims its own enthusiasts, who pay their homage at a shrine of their own. These name their Goddess, Beauty. Happy are they who at the very moment when they are most alive to her authoritative claim, recognise in that very authority and attraction an echo of the Voice Supreme, which is heard in a neighbouring realm as Truth. It may at least suggest itself to us, that both Beauty and Truth must be but phases of the Eternal from whom this nature of ours in its unity yet marvellous variety has at once its source, its inspiration, and its final rest.

Note 30, Page 128.

We are not, of course, here concerned with that important branch of the subject which deals with the kind and quality of the material, nor with that mastery of the technique of artistic production which is so essential a part of the Artist's endowment and education. This material may be furnished by pure form, as in glyptic art; or it may be outline on plane surface, with all accessories of colour, light, shading, perspective, and scenic setting. Again, it may appeal to the ear, and the material be supplied by musical notes and chords; or, receding still further from the sensuous medium, the poet may find in rhythmic language the material in which he works. But through all variety the effort of the true ποιητής is always a descent from an Idea to its creative embodiment.

NOTE 31, PAGE 128.

Whence, also, it will follow that all who have any aesthetic or moral or spiritual affinity with the generative conception of any artistic creation shall, as they gaze or listen or imagine, find themselves drawn into communion and fellowship with it, and with that kindred soul of the artist, who has accomplished its transference from the region of Ideal existence into this outer objective concrete world.

Thus, as at the heart of the Scientific endeavour we found in Fellowship of spirit with spirit its hidden spring of Life and gladness; so here likewise in this world of Art we are met by the same fact; here, too, not as an incident, but as its central and essential source. The impulse to Expression in this realm is but a mode of that instinct for Communion which in Religion becomes the manifest interpretation and equivalent for the Life of the spirit.

NOTE 32, PAGE 133.

There is no question here of the difficulties, which are patent, indeed, and often most painful, in deciding between competing moral claims, and ascertaining what particular course it is our duty to take. What we are for the moment intent upon is the consideration that when once this is made clear to us, its claim is absolute. It admits of no compromise. The alternatives are simply obedience or disobedience: loyalty or treason. The inherent and intrinsic dignity of Duty is not enhanced should the particular thing enjoined bulk large and shine conspicuous in the eyes of men. The one thing, the only thing of moment, is this: it is our Duty. Its sublimity lies simply in the absoluteness of its claim upon the Will. If questions, then, were left with us, when we parted from those other realms where the man of science, the philosopher, the artist, studied and wrought, as to where shall be found the source of that strange claim which Truth and

Beauty make on those busy, eager lives: with what accentuated meaning does this same question meet us here? For in this direct immediate appeal to the Will we are surely pointed to the central fount of all Authority that claims the man. In other regions it was a delegated authority, but in this moral realm its true nature is exhibited undisguised. How momentous, then, is the inquiry here! What is it in the Universe that here reveals itself as infinitely above that highest thing we know, viz. a free human Will?

For the present, however, we must be content to hold this inquiry in reserve. Let it be sufficient to lay this especial emphasis upon 'Will' as being that free power within us to which the Moral Law makes its direct appeal, or rather which it claims with a categorical imperative. It is now for us simply to consider how in this Life of Conduct may be generated that Cosmos, that beautiful Order which shall answer in its coherence, unity, and strength to those other ranges of our life at which we have already glanced. In those the ideal points of aspiration and endeavour were named Truth and Beauty. These, as ruling Ideas, exert from their central throne an organising force in the intellectual and aesthetic world, and are the inspiration of the enthusiasts who live and work therein. That there should be discovered a close analogy between these and that moral world we are now concerned with might well be anticipated; for are they not sections, provinces of the unitary life of the person? The analogy, I say, is very manifest, and as deep-lying as it is obvious. For, just as in the world of a man's multitudinous and various thinking, the aim, the end, the far-off ideal (whether consciously pursued or not), is such a completed organisation of his thought, that each and every item should fall into its fitting place: that all incoherence, inconsequence, contradiction, should be so far expelled that no thought should finally clash with any other, but that each should lend to all its own especial contribution, be it little or much, to the perfect knowledge which answers to the completed

Truth: so, also, in this all-inclusive sphere of the Moral Life, the aim of the aspirant is to achieve an analogous rectification and organisation of Conduct. This, if it could be attained, would make of our Practical Life a Moral Order, where no duty should finally conflict with any other: where, again, every right action should so fall into its fitting place as not to clash with any other, but each, in this case also, contribute something, be it little or much, to that perfected Obedience of the Will, which answers as the subjective element to its great Objective—the perfect Righteousness.

NOTE 33, PAGE 134.

We must leave it to the psychologist to track out for us the gradual process with its several stages and occasional crises, by which out of instinctive propensions and desires this autonomy of life may be at length evolved. Our immediate concern is with the fact too often overlooked, that Will, like Intellect, needs its *materials*, so to speak, before it can exercise its autocratic function, and that these materials are gradually provided for it, as they are also for the Intellect, out of that early sensational experience which is for all of us our starting point in life. As it has been well put, neither Intellect nor Will can act *in vacuo*: as the one needs its sense-imagery to enable it to exert its proper office of discriminating what is different, and of putting together what is judged to be alike, in this way carrying forwards those analytic and synthetic processes which have created for us the worlds of Science and of Philosophy: so in this all-important sphere of Voluntary Conduct, that which we name abstractly our Will, but which is in truth our very selves in free activity, can originate nothing. Its office is that of choosing, selecting, deciding between contending claimants on our motor activity. Thus its materials are accumulated little by little, as the whole series of organic wants, appetites, instincts, and the

rest—all in fact that make up our impulse to act—are brought into play. Then it is, and in a manner closely analogous to that apparent in the related sphere of purely mental operation, that it finds its opportunity, and enters as a sovereign among them. Yet here also it finds within itself clear evidence that it is, after all, a delegated authority with which it is invested: that like the Centurion in the gospels itself also is under Authority, though it have its ministers and servants under it to whom it can say 'Come, and he cometh': or 'Do this, and he doeth it.' Thus the man who has attained that perfect autonomy which was the lofty ideal of the noblest Stoicism, discovers that he is related as a subject to some mysterious Authority which speaks down to him from a height supreme. And, again, one is tempted to anticipate and ask, 'Whence does this Voice speak? Where on high is seated an Authority which thus claims that highest power we know in this our human life, a free human will?'

NOTE 34, PAGE 135.

It is inevitable, doubtless, that ultimately that larger claim which lies in the Revelation of Christ will assume into itself the Ethics of the Christian, and in so doing will inspire and transfigure them. But it is still the part of a Christian thinker not to allow this great fact to interfere with his serious endeavour to obtain some clear and satisfying conception of Morals, of Ethics, in general.

NOTE 35, PAGE 136.

This extraordinary diversity has always given large occasion to the scoffers to deceive themselves and others with the notion that this sacred principle of Duty is, after all, a very chameleon in its shifting hues: a matter indeed almost altogether of climate, of age, of that relative civilisation or relative barbarism which sums up the normal

condition of human life in this world. Yet, spite of all that can be urged on this score, and allowing for every conceivable variety of embodiment and interpretation of this principle, there must surely be discoverable some *one* generative and supporting idea which shall give to Ethics an essential identity of meaning and authority, and which no possible change of circumstances or advance of Social Evolution need ever compel us to abandon. Failing this would be indeed to lay the foundations of morality in the shifting sands and would issue in its virtual abolition and extinction. And in this direction has been the tendency, from the age of the Sophists to the present time, of all attempts to construct an Ethical System upon the basis of Sensational Psychology.

NOTE 36, PAGE 136.

The principle we are in search of must show itself competent to meet the successive insensible changes of evolutionary progress in both these ranges, else the claim to universality must be abandoned. That separate unity of sphere which gives to the Ethical its own high place in the total life of man, co-ordinate with, and yet claiming authority over those other provinces of the Intellectual and Aesthetic we have passed in review, must also be abandoned. Truth no longer conflicting with Truth, but making harmony with it: Beauty, which is but the aesthetic aspect of Truth, ridding itself of all jarring notes in all ranges and grades of artistic conception and production: Duty, which is but the moral aspect of that same Truth, in like manner no more making tragic war with Duty, when out of the discordant chaos of our life of conduct shall have been wrought out a veritable Cosmos, a world of moral order, beauty, and truth in the life of humanity: this must stand beyond question for ever as the Ideal of a perfected human life.

In some such way must one etch the outline of a future Perfection; and it is certain that any attempt to make any

steps towards it from out this confused tumultuous Present implies that there exists a constitutive principle in Ethics which is universal, and because it is universal must combine an absolute fixity of base with an infinite flexibility of application to all the detail in every stage of the life of man.

NOTE 37, PAGE 145.

'Dogma is a Source of Division : Ritual preserves Esprit de Corps.' So writes Bernez, quoted by Renan, and with no disparagement of Dogma there is some truth in the statement. For Ritual is interpreted mainly by Feeling lending itself to Aesthetic accessories, and, though it embodies Ideas, yet it allows a far larger scope for differences of intellectual conception and interpretation than Dogmatic Statement can do. Its symbolism is of larger range, and gives far more freedom for the Conscience than the intellectualised 'Symbolic' of Creeds. May it not be possible that this lies deeply operative at the root of that strange, and, as it seems, abnormal revival of Ritual in the Anglican Church in these days? The reaction which long since set in against the narrow positivism of the Scientific Spirit has swept masses of people back to seek some share in Religion, such at least as shall preserve among them something of that 'Esprit de Corps' which, in their chill secularism, they had painfully felt they had lost. Moreover, there is that in the Ritual of high Anglicanism which in some respects is fitted to meet those spiritual sensibilities which are an integral part of human nature, and which claim their satisfaction in acts of worship and communion with the Unseen. And this although they still find they cannot revert to the dogmatic beliefs from which they have long broken away.

See an interesting article in the *Quarterly Review* for January, 1899. 'The Ethics of Religious Conformity.'

LECTURE VI.

NOTE 38, PAGE 151.

There is no need to spend time here upon concrete illustration of a principle which the experience of every day is enough to exhibit and verify. For the blindness of Passion, of excited feeling in any of its multiform phases: the misjudgments thence arising: the revulsions of Remorse: these, alas, rank with us among the commonest experiences of life, and require no further enlargement. Compare Sir W. Hamilton's illustration in various ranges of our experience of the dictum enunciated by Kant: 'Knowledge and Feeling, Perception and Sensation, though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other.' Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. ii., Lecture xxiv.

NOTE 39, PAGE 152.

All that is possible is some approximation, more or less. This is conspicuous enough on the surface of every civilised community. An imposing Judiciary bulks large among its institutions, and the Majesty of Law is everywhere in evidence. Yet it is readily perceived that such presentation and vindication of the august Universality of Morality as is here apparent is in the main narrowed down to the fulfilment of the Law's great utilitarian function of keeping Society tolerably together. Thus, none but the flagrant offender is ever likely to be an object for judicial decision; while, further, the necessarily generalised form of such enactments as there are, makes it impossible to secure any such just proportion between Judgment and Conduct as the moral nature implanted within us still ever claims. Moreover, there are cases not a few where 'Summa lex, summa injuria' is hardly an exaggeration of the facts.

Further, when we regard the whole scope and area of human Conduct as exhibited in Voluntary Acts, each of which claims to be morally assessed, the section covered by such tribunals, however important for social and political purposes, must be set down as absolutely insignificant. The same sense of utter inadequacy is borne in upon us as we pass from this most limited field of formal judicial process to that wide indefinite area of public and private opinion where *every* man's conduct and character may be said to be ever 'sub judice.' Here indeed some sort of moral cognisance is taken by every tiniest section of Society of each individual living within it, but it is with every variety of standard of judgment that this censorship is exercised. 'Quot homines, tot sententiæ.'

NOTE 40, PAGE 154.

It may be remembered that in an earlier Lecture (Lect. IV.) we were occupied with the generative principle of all that had just right to be called Philosophy, and we found it fittingly expressed in our instinct for Unity in the Totality of Things and Thoughts. It results from the endeavour to interpret the Multiplicity and Diversity everywhere observable in Nature by means of a Central Unity of Idea or Conception. It appeared that the discovery of one dominating and illuminative Conception could alone dispel the confusion and incoherence which constitute the proper pain of Reason. This alone can do something to enable any thinker to organise his thought; to escape from the distress occasioned by unrelated and conflicting notions, and to attain at least some glimpse of that beautiful Order which in every department of our human life must stand as the great desideratum.

It was further noted in developing the subject, that this general principle common to all intellectual effort, finds in its application a natural distribution into three several, yet intimately related spheres, viz.

(*a*) The Intellectual: that of Speculative Thought, concerned with such aspect of the Universal Reality as can be

intellectually apprehended, and expressed in formulated statement: the aspect to which the term 'Truth' is commonly applied.

(*b*) The Aesthetic, concerned with that aspect of this same Reality which makes its appeal to our sense of the Beautiful.

(*d*) The Ethical, which claims higher rank than either of the other two, because, though concerned with this same transcendent Reality as its objective, it reveals it on its Imperative side, and so makes its direct appeal to that in us which has its seat in the citadel of our being, and which, in an essential and prerogative sense, is the completed exponent of our true Personality, viz. the Will.

Each of these spheres was described figuratively, yet with a certain precision, as being constituted by a central point with such radius as should give the full scope of its application to the infinite detail of human experience. And for convenience, though by an admittedly imperfect and approximate expression, Truth was assigned as the governing, determining, and inspiring centre of the first-named of these spheres: Beauty of the second: and Right, meaning by the term that which claims absolutely the will, of the third. Each of these spheres, again, was ideally regarded as a Cosmos, where, with whatever variety and even sharpness of contrast between the several included items, there was yet no fracture of continuity and coherence, no radical contradiction, but each and all by virtue of their relation to the centre, were thereby placed in harmonious relation with one another. It was further argued that these three spheres were themselves essentially related to one another. Now this is a statement which implies that if we could but penetrate to their ultimate nature and origin we should discover that the trio were but modes or phases of one Supreme All-comprehending *Unity*, whatever this might be, and whether discoverable by us or not. The claim that each of these separate Authoritative Centres makes upon us cannot be disputed; and it is at once intelligible and reasonable for us to regard, at least

for the present, each of these three ruling Ideas as vice-regent so to say, on behalf of One Idea, Paramount and Supreme, which we may name, as it extends its claim to us from the Infinity which surrounds us, the Transcendent Reality. The question still awaits us, whether we, as living persons, can ever rest satisfied with the enthronement of an *Idea*, however loftily seated or magnificently named. For the present, however, we are justified in maintaining that these three—*Truth*, *Beauty*, *Righteousness*—are terms which can but stand for the several modes in which this one Transcendent yet Immanent Reality makes to us its appeal and claim. While, further, by virtue of the universality and absoluteness of the claim of Righteousness, covering as it does the whole field of voluntary human conduct: by virtue also of its appeal not to the Thoughts or to the Feeling only, but to the Will, we must conclude that as its range is wider, so also is its seat of authority higher than those assigned to its kindred powers. The claim upon the Will which governs all our activities, proclaims that the authority of Duty is the ultimate source of whatever behest is issued to the Investigator, Thinker, Artist, in the name of Truth and Beauty. Thus then does Duty stand disclosed as not simply the 'Primus inter pares,' but as the Authority Supreme in human life.

NOTE 41, PAGE 154.

This is indeed only to throw into other words what met us earlier, in the concise statement that Duty is always the imperative of Truth. Thus in this case the Ideal is the imperative Idea: and since it is the sphere of Conduct and Character that we are now concerned with, the Ideal in question is the familiar 'Moral Ideal.'

NOTE 42, PAGE 155.

At this point it might seem that our Inquirer needs to review the whole series of so-called Ethical Systems from

Socrates to the present day in order to gain a satisfactory answer to these questions: and of course any specialised study of Ethics would rightfully claim such a critical survey. But a task of this kind would obviously lie altogether beyond the range of the opportunities of those whose case I am seeking throughout to keep in view. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent every Christian thinker from obtaining possession of an illuminating and guiding principle which will prove a veritable lamp to his feet should he at any time become a student of Ethical Science. For he will never be able satisfactorily to canvass the merits or defects of any theory of morals, until he has so far cleared his own thought on the subject as to be able to intelligently approach and handle it; and this analogy between the health of the Physical and that of the Moral nature will prove for this purpose most useful. The intimate relations of interdependence between the two ranges of phenomena need not be allowed to obscure this analogy between them as separated, if related spheres. There is, and must ever be in any intellectual handling of the phenomena of Life, a tendency to sharp delimitation not *wholly* correspondent with the actual facts presented in Nature. Such failure is of course simply the reappearance in a new connection of that which met us at the outset of our inquiry in discussing the necessary limitations of Logical and Scientific method. That discussion left us with the salutary caution, that the drawing of the sharp dividing line, which from its very nature the Intellect desiderates, though accepted as a necessary condition of distinct apprehension and statement, must still be open to qualification whenever the insensible transition of Continuity enters into the case: especially where the concern is with *vital* phenomena. But though, *e.g.* the Zoologist finds himself baffled when, descending the scale of living organisms, he finds himself in a range where he cannot distinguish between Animal and Vegetable life, and advertises his inability by coining such a term as Zoophyte:

yet the words 'animal' and 'vegetable' remain for him still most intelligible and serviceable terms. Similarly there may meet us at certain points in this Ethical region a like confusion of Physical and Moral, which nevertheless may leave us competent to use the two terms antithetically, and to institute a parallel and an analogy between them.

NOTE 43, PAGE 158.

In the main, doubtless, we may trace throughout the whole course of Ethical Thought, though with endless shades of difference and many qualifying considerations, that first division of the stream close to its fountain-head, into the two well-marked types of Sensational and Rational. These, through the Cyrenaic and Cynic, Epicurean and Stoic, Utilitarian and Intuitional Schools, have descended to us, and in many refined and modified forms are with us to-day. But if the principle be admitted which demands that there shall be adequate recognition of *all* essential and characteristic endowments and powers, and these in their relative order and subordination as constitutive of a perfected human life, then, certainly, must every theory which violates this proportion be accounted to that extent faulty and defective.

NOTE 44, PAGE 158.

Such suggestion at least seems pathetically shadowed forth in that sense of helplessness which has stricken some of the most serious and earnest inquirers after the way to a perfect life, when no clear light has shone upon them from a sphere transcending human moralities. The question of the actual existence of any such transcendent Ideal, as also the question of the real nature of that strange absolute claim which it makes upon the soul, is, for the present, held over. It is enough in this place to exhibit the reality and the urgency of the need for it.

NOTE 45, PAGE 159.

It was a sense of this obvious and often oppressive practical difficulty that made it necessary to insist, at the outset, upon the necessity for combining with the principle of fixity in this Ethical sphere another antithetic but complementary principle of pliancy or elasticity of application; so that while the centre remained a point absolutely fixed, there should be no limit to the radius and the circumference described by it.

NOTE 46, PAGE 159.

It is clear that in the adaptation of Principle to Conduct there must be found a corresponding continuity, while yet the terms Right and Wrong remain apparently fixed in meaning. This is in fact nothing else than the emergence at a new point of that same difficulty which met us at an early stage of this discussion. It then appeared that in all endeavours to apprehend and handle in clear thought and speech the ever-shifting phases of this transitional life, our logical Intellect, with its sharp lines of demarcation, always became involved in contradiction and paradox. But what then presented itself as a difficulty in the formulation of Truth now appears in the formulation of Rules, *i.e.* of Truth in the Imperative mood. The difficulty, however, is one and the same in both cases: a certain failure in explicit Thought and Language to handle with adequate exactness that greatest of all Realities which we call Life. In this case, as in the earlier one, it is not denied that there is a large and important function for both to fulfil. We need always, however, to bear in mind that their adequacy and competency must necessarily vary with the subject to which they are applied: and that whether the mood be indicative or imperative, wherever continuous process is of the essence of the case, there must be expected and allowed for a certain failure to do perfect justice on the

one hand to the Truth, and on the other hand to the Duty it is attempted to formulate. Certainly as the subject dealt with rises in importance, *i.e.* as it is concerned with Life in its widest and deepest issues, we shall find ourselves approaching ever more nearly that state of mind which led the Preacher in the synagogue of Capernaum to exclaim in His despair of making His meaning clear:

'Verily, verily, I say unto you: the Flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I speak unto you, they are Spirit, and they are Life.'

NOTE 47, PAGE 163.

The progress of our inquiry has, I think, clearly disclosed itself as a movement not simply forwards but upwards. For that sphere of the complex life of a human spirit which is rightly designated moral, has been seen, by virtue of its universality and the absoluteness of claim which characterises it, to take precedence both of the intellectual and the aesthetic, though intimately related to both. To this position the common sense of all the more thoughtful of mankind in every age has borne a constant witness.

Goodness, in the sense in which Ethics interprets the word, takes higher rank than that speculative wisdom which in the philosopher's lips is apt to be identified with formulated Abstract Truth; or than that Beauty which in all the diverse regions of Artistic production claims the homage and aspiration of the Poet and the Artist. This is implied in the very limitations which are expressed in the terms Philosopher, Scientist, Artist and Poet. For Universality everywhere is a mark and sign of pre-eminence. We count these specialists on our fingers, and if we include the wider nebulous fringe of those who in our day claim to be students of Science or Art, the whole number still remains an inconsiderable fraction of mankind; while the very name of Philosophy bears to the minds of most men a connotation of haughty exclusiveness. But the moral quality of a human life is concerned with

the totality of *all* responsible existence. Duty claims all men alike, in whatever section of divided interest and occupation they may be found to dwell. It claims all men—all men equally, and absolutely, and at the centre. This it does because its appeal is made not to any special faculty, sense, endowment, aptitude, but to the Will which is the true expression and exponent of the whole Personality.

This it was which, when we were engaged in determining the several regions of the Logical, the Scientific, the Philosophical, the Aesthetic and the Moral, compelled the remark, that though it was convenient to our purpose to differentiate these as separate kingdoms, in each of which an organising process is being carried forwards by the central authority proper to it, yet, when looked at more closely, all the agents at work in these several departments are seen to be not simply yielding to an attraction and fascination which they were free to disown, but all of them are in every voluntary act acknowledging an authority which has its seat above them—an authority supreme and unique. It is not Truth, as Truth, that compels the will of the Truth-seeker: nor Beauty, as Beauty, that, amid whatever of enthralling sweetness in this case enters into and disguises the claim, goes to the heart of the allegiance of Poet or Artist. Each, in his own way, renders homage to a Power sovereign over all, the one central source of *moral* authority; and as we pass from all these specialised classes to the mass of mankind we may see that this Power is the very same in essence as that which claims the obedience of all men everywhere. For it is of their free will that both Philosopher and Poet yield themselves to that spell which makes the sweetness of devotion to Truth or Beauty. And surely in yielding the will to these glorious and august abstractions, and in finding such an ecstasy of delight in the sense that their life-work is best construed as a call to interpret and express to their fellowmen the meaning and power of them, there is contained a

certain implication that there must be found existing behind and above them all a Supreme Personality, with whom they themselves are in some undiscovered yet assuredly vital relation.

But for the present, I am intent on making it clear that in passing from the purely Intellectual and Aesthetic to the Moral, we are moving not only to a further related branch of our general subject, but are unquestionably ascending to a higher realm that lies nearer to that mystery of the unity above us which makes the world a universe, and vitally corresponds with our own constitution as unitary persons. All I would contend for now is that the fact that in each of these three several provinces of human interest and effort there has been disclosed a central source of authority, which claims to guide and govern all Thought, Imagination, and Conduct therein, and which evokes and kindles an enthusiastic loyalty in all who devote themselves to it, is itself a valid evidence that there exists above them all One Supreme Seat of Authority.

This, for the moment, let us be content to name the Transcendent Reality which environs us, and in every variety of mode and fashion is ever and anon descending upon us from some illimitable height above. So to entitle it will probably sound to many ears a mere indulgence in metaphysical trifling: but yet it may well be necessary at the stage we have now reached, and if we will but be patient and give as precise a meaning to the awkward phrase as we can, we shall perhaps appreciate its utility, and be better prepared for our final position that these abstract Ideas, which are a necessity to the thinking mind, and which have been invested with such singular attributes of authority by every human life that aspires, demand in their final presentation to be unified, to be clothed in the concrete, and ultimately, ere a thoroughly reasonable account can be rendered of them, to assume personal attributes answering to our own, and find the synthesis which they clearly

show that they require in a Personality Supreme and Divine.

Short, however, of such a conclusion, we may for the present assert that by this all environing Reality we mean an Existence which is at the least as real as ourselves. Further, that it is a Reality altogether and illimitably above us all and all the several spheres in which we live, move, and have our being. This it must be, else it could never claim us, and claim us absolutely as confessedly it does. All this is but to say, It is a Reality Transcendent.

This it is, however we may choose to name it, which is ever breaking through from some height above us into our limited actual life, and making to us all at one time or another its authoritative appeal. And who will deny that it is in our loyal response in rising to meet it that the noblest and worthiest parts of our living declare themselves? Here is surely the fountain, interpret it how we may, of that great enthusiasm which is the pure glow of the Intellectual, of the Aesthetic, and supremely of the Moral Life. Without it, these several fields of interested energetic living would be but an arid waste, and all Life would become what, alas, in a certain degree it is for so many, 'Stale, flat, and unprofitable,' when nothing but the repeated fillip of sensational excitement and the recurrence and appeasement of physical appetite should remain to give any semblance of living.

Thus, then, we may now go on to make a statement that will perhaps be intelligible to all. These several ruling Ideas—which, when claiming homage and obedience, it is usual to name Ideals—to which we all look up with at least some answering will of recognition and aspiration, as Truth, Beauty, and Right, may now be regarded as simply the several modes of manifestation of this one Transcendent Reality, which in the sphere of Duty claims us all.

Truth, as commonly interpreted, is but this Reality on its side towards an Intellect speculative, apprehensive, cognitive.

Beauty is but that other mode of this same Reality which appeals to our aesthetic emotional nature.

While Right, which combines in its supreme demand upon the will both our Thought and Feeling, in those well-marked modes of the life of Conscience familiar to us as our moral judgment and our moral sentiment—Right also is but this same Transcendent Reality, only now revealed in its highest power as Supreme Will.

Such is, I take it, the fact stated barely and boldly, for the sake of succinctness and clearness, which gives all its meaning to so many ardent utterances of poet and artist, scientist and moralist. This surely lies at the root of that moralising of artistic production which charms us in Ruskin, and of the aestheticizing of morals which is so distinctively and characteristically Greek. This gives its intellectual interpretation to that Beauty of Holiness which holds spell-bound the Spirit of the Devout. This it is which, when in an earlier Lecture we were considering the striking limitations inherent in all Language in its power adequately to give expression to Truth, led us to conclude that 'Truth' was too great a word to allow its meaning to be tied down to formulated statement, whether Scientific, Philosophical, or Theological. This is why we found it ever breaking bounds in proportion as the imagination and feeling became more engaged, until, even with all the sensuous and emotional aid rendered by rhythm, metre, melody, clear thought and spoken words were left behind; not because there failed the substantial Reality, seeking expression, but because this Truth had widened its appeal and broken forth from the straitening swathes and bands of definite conception and sharp, clear statement. This is why it is that in certain moods of experience, and these the highest that we can know, both Thought and Language fail us, and 'our mouth is filled with laughter, and our tongue with singing, and we are like them that dream.'

But it needs now that we should for a moment fix our

attention upon that special aspect of the Transcendent Reality which environs us, which is revealed to us in Conscience and the Moral Life, and ask wherein lies the secret of its power and right to claim us absolutely.

NOTE 48, PAGE 165.

Among the nobler sort, nothing in their experience so sensibly raises them to a higher plane of living, or so vividly reveals to their consciousness the inherent and intrinsic dignity of which their nature is capable, than when, in some sharp crisis of life, every other consideration is brushed aside, and there shines out before them a duty to be done in scorn of consequence. There may be little enlightenment as to the strange nature of the claim, but it is felt with an absolute conviction that at such a moment Life attains its noblest simplicity and strength. There may be grave misreading of the particular things that are thus to be done or suffered. But there is the vivid thrilling apparition of a Majesty on high: there is heard an utterance from the infinite unknown, which has no tone of pleading or inducement: a bare Categorical Imperative—to use the apt and famous phrase—which leaves them with no alternative save loyalty or treason: to do, or to leave it undone. In every age and in all Literature, amid whatever perversions of application, the unique august quality of this absolute claim has attracted the keenest interest of the reflective portion of mankind. That strange impersonal 'ought' which gives all its significance to morals is the most impressive and significant word in all human speech. Attempts have been made to discredit it as an illusion: it has been stigmatised as a phantom imperative, conjured up by the superstitious fears of men: or, in more serious argument, it has been analysed and dissolved into elements harmless and unauthoritative: yet there is a helpless vanity in these endeavours to rid human life of that which is its greatest distinction, and if

our concern were solely with abstract speculative thought they would scarcely call for serious rejoinder. But it cannot be denied that there is that in human nature which sets the current so strongly in the direction of sensuous gratification and indulgence, that with no care and no ability to examine into the true nature of the ethical problem there is generated a readiness only too pronounced to grasp at anything which offers a colourable pretext for the pursuit of these ignoble ends, and Moral Philosophy has been often exploited, so to say, to allow license its full range.

Yet it may be affirmed that no fact is better attested in the whole region of experience, whether Individual, Social, or National, than that precisely in the degree in which the sense of moral obligation has declined, to that extent it is most patent that dissolution and degradation have set in. This needs no contention. It stands before the student of human life in every region that is open to him as a veritable axiom, or at least as an induction than which none is more broadly based, or more validly concluded—none except that other which is but its correlative and converse, viz.: that the Individual Life, the Life of Society, the Life of a Nation is raised in everything that makes it noble and powerful in the degree in which Duty is recognised and revered as Sovereign. And if there is one thing more than another amid the discordant tumult and confusion of our own day upon which a student of public affairs within our own borders may fasten with satisfaction, it is that our National Policy, amid all its distracted cross-currents, is becoming ever more moralised, and that the philanthropic movements everywhere abroad are not simply inspired by benevolence, but own at their very root the constraining force of moral obligation. Whatever section of the community may perhaps too exclusively claim credit for this widening and deepening influence of national conscience—and our Nonconformity has at least proved a wholesome and powerful factor in this respect—there is amongst us, beyond question, an ever-growing insight into,

and an ever-strengthening grasp of that saving truth that it is indeed Righteousness that exalteth a nation.

It may perhaps strengthen our argument for the supremacy of conscience, and help to remove disquieting scruples in some minds, if we go on to observe, that this inherent dignity and supremacy of Conscience is not impugned or weakened by any light our Psychology may have thrown upon the process of its growth and development. This has been with not a few a source of serious distress in our own age, when evolutionary process has swept like some incoming tide into every range of the scientific investigation of nature, and pre-eminently of human nature. Endowments of faculty and capacity that had been accepted as original in their completeness, and so had seemed to attest a direct immediate holding from the divine, have been revealed as stages in a perpetual procession of evolutionary progress, and their foundations have seemed in this ceaseless flux to have become sapped and undermined. In some cases, doubtless, this has been due in great part to the fact that there has not been a sufficient space of time, but, above all, not sufficient freedom and steadiness of mind to make a due adjustment of the thought to the new situation. Still more commonly has there been a quite inadequate perception of those necessary limits of all so-called Scientific Explanations, on which we have already touched; and perhaps most of all there has been a lack of illuminating ideas proper to the case immediately in hand.

It is only one way of expressing what we mean when we characterise our age as pre-eminently a scientific age, to say that the analytical and critical modes of intellectual activity are especially conspicuous, and to a preponderating degree. The keenest search-lights of the Scientific Intellect have been directed to the scrutiny of process in that obscure Past out of which this Present is in some way being perpetually and continuously evolved. It is the *backward* look that has

quite naturally, but still excessively, absorbed the energies of the Critical Intellect, and it has too readily been implied that process explains product.

It is this that is not only so conspicuous in what we may name Scientific Investigation properly so-called, but that has generated that great body of Historical Criticism, which, in the theological range, has been and is so hotly debated *pro* and *con*. It is not to be wondered at that this critical survey, conducted in the full and ever operative faith that everywhere we are in the presence of existences which have most gradually, and with all sorts of incidental accretions, grown up to be what now they are out of innumerable simpler elements—I say it is not surprising that this concentration of minute attention upon the details of obscure process should have brought to light an immense amount of misconception and positive error in current ideas. To those flushed by such triumphs, and absorbed in the fascinating pursuit, it is not unnatural that there should have arisen a narrowing of the horizon, and a too exclusive emphasis on certain facts to the exclusion of others even more necessary to a sound and rational view of the whole problem. Too hastily is it apt to be assumed that careful analysis and study of the stages of the Process may be taken as equivalent to the careful examination of the Result which is its final issue. Yet nothing is more certainly or more obviously an error. That the study of the Process may furnish us with some such light upon the drift and direction of the movement, and even some light upon the goal for which it is making, may be allowed. But such are the strange and even revolutionary effects of the various contacts of Organism with Environment that, even in the physical sphere, an accurate and minute acquaintance with the properties of the several elements may well afford no knowledge of the characteristic qualities of the compound which results from their chemical combination. What light, *e.g.* can be obtained upon the Laws of Hydrostatics or upon the attributes of water itself,

from a study of the separate gases, oxygen and hydrogen, of which it is composed? And when we leave this lower range of inquiry, and are occupied not with the action and reaction of physical elements, but with the manifold and subtle interactions involved in spiritual contacts, still less can any record of factors and stages supply adequate data for an interpretation and estimate of the resulting product. In the region of organic life, in all its hierarchy of existence, it is ever the completely developed Product that is the clue to the right understanding of all that has preceded it—a truth proclaimed eloquently and impressively by every plant that grows. And when we come to this highest range of Organic Life—the Moral Life, the Life of Conscience—where Ideals lying above and beyond us are among its most striking manifestations, we may well conclude that not the keenest attention bestowed upon its germinal and rudimentary stages can ever be accepted as any equivalent for an examination of the fully developed moral consciousness. Priority in time implies no Primacy in Importance, but rather, in evolutionary process, the exact opposite is the truth. Here, very conspicuously, it is clear that Interpretations are from above, not from below.

NOTE 49, PAGE 167.

One is tempted at this point to quote some volcanic utterances from Carlyle, dealing with this Majesty and Universality of Duty. But all will be familiar with the urgency of his insistence upon the fact that the man does not breathe who has not his duty to do. The form and mode and circumstances of it are, in comparison, nothing. It is the one opportunity which is open to all, and to all men equally. Men wrangle about Privilege, and insist much on Rights; yet there is no Privilege of the natural human life comparable with this. We are each of us capable of Duty.

There is only one revelation to the soul of man which works in his life a more blessed transformation than is accomplished when the supremacy of Duty has been adopted as the sovereign guide of Judgment and Practice, viz. the vivid apprehension that the Source of that absolute claim on the will is found in the Personal Relation which every man sustains to the Supreme. Then will it appear absurd, if not indeed actually unmeaning, that any Abstract Conception embodied in an abstract word, whatever number of august associations may surround and glorify it, can ever have right to rule over one who himself is no abstraction, but a Unitary Personal Being. The revelation is completed when it is further perceived, that it is not only the Will Supreme that in every Duty is in vital contact with the Will of Man, but also that it is the Will of Him, who, as Father of our spirits, loves us with an infinite love. Then, indeed, Duty is transfigured for the obedient soul into the Life of Love.

NOTE 50, PAGE 176.

When, earlier, we were considering Ideals which enter so conspicuously into the moral life, this same thing met us, though not in its naked absoluteness. For the Ideal gave us not so much any separate item of duty sharply defined. It appeared rather as a co-ordinated synthesis of items, a total character. In its fullest meaning it appeared, with all degrees of distinctness and fulness, as a presentation from above of our very self realised—reducing to a beautiful order all those impulses to action which make up the elementary material of a voluntary life.

Thus an Ideal of this kind distributes its contents into a whole scheme of separate duties; each one of which is, however, in its due place our next step forwards towards this very consummation. But in this unity and wholeness and order which constitute the Ideal of a human life in any one of its many types, there is found a very evident and winning

beauty which is not readily discerned in the separate duty which claims so absolutely our obedience. Still we see at once the close kinship which exists between them. The Ideal, like the separate Duty, is from above; and it claims our will, and its claim, however softened and imbued with an attractiveness and charm, such as brings mortals so readily into the region of aesthetic emotion—still its claim, I say, is Absolute. And we have to press the question, What does this Absoluteness in Duty and in Ideals mean? The term 'Absolute' is a favourite one in the lips of transcendental philosophers, and is always metaphysically implicated with another, viz. the 'Infinite,' while both are apt to be brushed contemptuously aside by the common-sense man whose practical but somewhat self-righteous soul is revolted by metaphysical abstractions. Still, I suppose there are rare moments when even he may be summoned to think steadily. This, at any rate, is an occasion when a clear-headed and serious Christian thinker may, for once, at least, find a very practical utility in these two great related terms. Related they certainly are in a sense that warrants our calling them Correlatives, and this we may plainly see in the present case. That Duty's claim is absolute carries a clear explicit meaning, such as is given in the text.

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